WORLD REFUGEE SURVEY

1986 IN REVIEW

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

> "Sometimes, we must interfere. When human lives are endangered, when human dignity is in jeopardy, national borders and sensitivities become irrelevant. Wherever men or women are persecuted because of their race, religion, or political views, that place must—at that moment—become the center of the universe."
>
> *Elie Wiesel*

U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES

Twenty-eight years ago, the U.S. Committee for Refugees described the refugees of concern like this:

> They are the waiting people of our time—more than two million refugees living a shadowy half-existence . . . They are the refugees of mid-century Europe, Algeria, Palestine, Tibet China. They are the flesh and blood symbols of the upheavals of the past two decades, escapees from the horrors of war, revolution, persecution. They are not far different from many of our own ancestors who came to the United States for the same reasons that have brought today's refugees to a dead-end in a camp in Austria, a barracks in Italy, a tent in Gaza, a shack in Hong Kong.

USCR was established in 1958 to inform the public about world refugee issues and populations. It set itself the tasks of consulting regularly with refugees, government leaders, and United Nations officials; stimulating research on refugee problems; and working closely with American voluntary agencies. USCR has always been privately supported; it receives no government funding.

On January 1, 1982, USCR and the American Council for Nationalities Service were merged. The continuing nonprofit corporation is ACNS; however, the distinctive USCR name and program of public information and advocacy regarding the world's refugees continue.

The year 1961 saw the first issue of the *World Refugee Survey*, then and annually since then a review of the status and fate of refugees around the world. A variety of publications on refugee situations have supplemented the *Survey*, including, in recent years, issue papers on Cambodian, Lao, Vietnamese, Afghan, Ugandan, Mozambican, Iranian, and Tamil refugees. Asylum seekers in the United States are the subject of the most recent USCR paper.

Recent site visits to Thailand, Hong Kong and Malaysia, South Africa, Mexico, Mozambique, Uganda, Malawi, India, and French Guyana have allowed staff to learn first-hand of circumstances of refugees and the agencies dedicated to assisting them. Published reports based on such visits are provided to governments and the public.

USCR corresponds with government officials in the U.S. and abroad, as well as with other refugee-oriented organizations around the world, to assure attention to refugee problems, equitable and humane treatment of refugees in asylum countries, and safety of refugees as they await the resolution of their situations. Also, USCR cooperates closely with UN programs in the refugee field, and is associated with the Department of Public Information of the United Nations.

All of USCR's activities reflect a sentiment of an early USCR publication: "Once the conscience of man is aroused, great deeds can be accomplished." For some of those refugees whose plight was identified by USCR in its founding year, satisfactory resolution has been found. This issue of the *World Refugee Survey* records solutions for some more recent refugee problems and points the way to resolution of others.

USCR has received important support from the Ford Foundation and the Exxon Corporation for its public information and research activities.

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CONTRIBUTIONS FOR USCR'S EFFORTS TO INFORM THE PUBLIC ABOUT REFUGEES WORLDWIDE ARE NEEDED AND WELCOMED.

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Cover quote from Nobel Peace Prize acceptance speech by Elie Wiesel in Oslo, Norway, 1986.

Cover photo by Thomas Getman, World Vision. A black South African family. The father is giving his son cough medicine. The photographer notes that on entering the area in early morning, one is first aware of many children coughing.

The Year in Review

Roger P. Winter

This blind Mozambican refugee crossed minefields and a high fence and eluded wild animals to reach asylum in South Africa's Gazankulu "homeland." He demonstrates here how the children who accompanied him led him to safety. USCR/Roger P. Winter

There are many people of good will in *South Africa*; they are not in power. The lot that governs the country is a cruel and shortsighted one. Its vision of what constitutes "humanity" does not in practice include most of its own nationals. It is no wonder, then, that the fence South Africa erected this year to keep out Mozambican refugees has the capacity to electrocute those who encounter it.

The nations of southern Africa are either actively involved in regional conflicts or are on the brink. The number of refugees from *Mozambique*, *Angola*, *Namibia*, and *South Africa* is large and growing. Larger still, are the numbers of internally displaced people in those nations—persons uprooted by violence and, in the case of South Africa, conscious policy. Already an area of concentrated humanitarian and human rights disaster, the region holds the potential for tragedy of what one colleague describes as "biblical proportions."

When accepting the 1986 Nobel Peace Prize, Elie Wiesel spoke to what must be done in the face of such upheaval:

> . . . I swore never to be silent whenever and wherever human beings endure suffering and humiliation. We must always take sides. Neutrality helps the oppressor, never the victim. Silence encourages the tormentor, never the tormented.
>
> Sometimes we must interfere. When human lives are endangered, when human dignity is in jeopardy, national borders and sensitivities become irrelevant. Whenever men or women are persecuted because of their race, religion, or political views, that place must—at that moment—become the center of the universe.

In general, humanitarian agencies—particularly those in the human rights and refugee field whose clients are those persecuted because of their race or their beliefs—realize that steps must be taken to end the suffering of those who are already victims throughout southern

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Roger P. Winter is the director of the U.S. Committee for Refugees

Africa. Fewer, however, are actively taking steps to minimize further tragedy, let alone to prepare for an even greater regional humanitarian emergency. UNHCR's formation of a southern Africa working group is a small step in the right direction. The League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies' program of strengthening the ability of national Red Cross societies in front-line states to deal with humanitarian emergencies is to be commended. Of course, much more of this needs to be done. We cannot claim we did not receive warning early enough.

While southern Africa races towards tragedy, refugees elsewhere also merit our attention and action. There were three truly large developments regarding human rights at the beginning of 1986—namely, the changes of government in the *Philippines*, *Haiti*, and *Uganda*. Eventually, each could bear positive results for refugees. Particularly in the case of Uganda, refugees have already returned in significant numbers. Many of those who remain in asylum are also expected to return over the coming months. Speaking to the Organization of African Unity Heads of State and Government in July, Uganda's new President Yoweri Museveni spoke on behalf of the victims of violence and persecution:

> Over a period of twenty years, nearly three quarters of a million Ugandans have perished at the hands of governments that should have protected their lives. . . . While Ugandans perished on such a scale, the rest of the world kept largely silent. . . . I must state that Ugandans were unhappy and felt a deep sense of betrayal that most of Africa kept silent while tyrants killed them. The reason for not condemning such massive crimes has supposedly been a desire not to interfere in the affairs of a (OAU or UN) Member State. We do not accept this reasoning. . . . While we accept and recognize the validity of the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of a Member State, we strongly hold that this should never be used as a cloak to shield genocide from just censure. . . . Tyranny is color-blind and should be no less reprehensible because it is perpetrated by one of our own kind. . . .

Such facts underlay the need for an agreement such as the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, which came into force in 1986.

Uganda is the most positive refugee story for 1986, but not the only one. Pirate attacks on boat refugees from *Vietnam* continued to decline, although the reasons for the reduction are open to debate. It is clear the refugees themselves are learning how to avoid pirates; however, it is equally clear that *Thailand* is starting to make progress in its anti-piracy efforts. Thailand, UNHCR, and donor countries—especially the United States—should be commended for this progress and closely monitored to assure no slippage.

". . . in a world divided between countries in which they cannot live and countries which they may not enter."

Vietnamese victims of pirate attack in the South China Sea. UNHCR/P. Deloche

Generally, however, 1986 was a bad year for most refugees—one of no progress or even of deterioration.

Western Europe, spawned in part by growing militant racism and xenophobia, severely curtailed asylum, particularly for those from the third world.

The conflicts in *Afghanistan*, *Sri Lanka*, and *Nicaragua*, and the *Iran-Iraq* war, all major producers of refugees, remained unresolved. Violence in *El Salvador* continued, and hope for meaningful progress faded.

The *Soviet Union* continued to curtail most emigration.

South Africa's military attacked refugee sites in Botswana, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

The tragedy of Palestinian civilians in *Lebanon* and elsewhere remained one of unending violence.

Thailand continued to repatriate forcibly asylum seekers from *Laos* along some portions of its borders. Thailand also established a tragic precedent: it announced the closing of the Khao I Dang refugee camp and the removal of its residents to the jeopardy of the Cambodian border, solely because the refugees had not been able to obtain third-country resettlement.

Vietnam and the *United States* allowed the Orderly Departure Program to collapse and, essentially, took no meaningful steps to revive it; Vietnam steadfastly refused to release for resettlement its reeducation camp prisoners, some of whom have suffered for a dozen years, or to abandon its internationally condemned occupation of *Cambodia*.

In the *United States*, the desire to curtail resettlement from Southeast Asia appears to have led to an increased tolerance of risk for some asylum seekers and refugees in first asylum there. With respect to Cambodians in Thailand's Khao I Dang refugee camp who were rejected for U.S. resettlement, rigid policies were formulated, based more on personalities and institutional pique, than on judging the merits of each refugee's claim within a spirit of fairness and humanitarianism. Government officials have talked consistently of shifting to immigration as an alternative to refugee resettlement from Southeast Asia while not actually implementing anything new.

The Moakley-DeConcini bill to protect Central Americans who wished not to return home because of civil unrest was defeated.

IYSH·1987

The United Nations has designated 1987 as the International Year of Shelter for the Homeless. Refugees are a substantial portion of their numbers.

On the other hand, the United States again led the world in contributions to international refugee assistance and resettlement.

Congress also enacted a major immigration reform bill with a provision that *could*, if implemented properly, legalize many undocumented aliens, including many who justifiably fear returning to their homelands. The law also includes long overdue provisions that would allow some Haitians to gain status here after enduring years of abuse.

Still, the United States continued in 1986 to act like "a nation of immigrants that is afraid of foreigners," as Michael Hooper of the Haitian Coalition has noted. The dominant characteristic of U.S. refugee policy has become that of deterring asylum seekers—continued interdiction of Haitians at sea, deportation of some whose reasons for seeking asylum are reasonable, and long-term detention of some even after finding their fears of persecution to be well-founded.

As diplomatic support for generous asylum policies deteriorates in the United States and Western Europe, the UN High Commissioner for Refugees faces the herculian challenge of restoring momentum to his newly reorganized agency and the refugee assistance and protection system it represents. The alternative is the risk of presiding over its undermining. In this regard, the UNHCR decision to downgrade substantially the level of its presence in Washington was misdirected and will not serve the institution well.

While surrounded by so much cynicism in official quarters, we must remember that refugees really do exist, and that they warrant our assistance and our protection. European Jews, as Chaim Weizmann noted on the eve of the Holocaust, lived in a world "divided between countries in which they cannot live and countries which they may not enter." This same dilemma faces many refugees today. For a government, its action toward an asylum seeker is a small thing. For the individual, it is nothing less than his life and future.

This Survey *is dedicated especially to those who seek solutions to the growing tragedy of southern Africa's refugees and displaced people.*

List of State Parties to the 1951 UN Convention the 1967 Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees

Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Austria, Australia, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, Central African Rep., Cameroon, Chad, Chile, China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ethiopia, Equatorial Guinea, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon, Gambia, Germany (FRG), Ghana, Greece, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Holy See, Iceland, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Ivory Coast, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Mali, Malta, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Rwanda, Sao Tome and Principe, Senegal, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, Spain, Sudan, Suriname, Sweden, Switzerland, Togo, Tunisia, Turkey, Tuvalu, Uganda, United Kingdom, United Republic of Cameroon, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Yemen (Arab Republic), Yugoslavia, Zaire, Zambia, Zimbabwe.

Signatories to the *Convention* Only: Madagascan, Monaco, Mozambique.
Signatories to the *Protocol* Only: Swaziland, United States.

Fortress Europe

Philip Rudge

Mass movements of refugees and migrants have long characterized the social history of much of the developed world. European countries in 1985 commemorated the 300th anniversary of the enforced movement of tens of thousands of protestant Huguenots from France, obliged by religious persecution to seek safe haven in surrounding countries. The personal tragedy of these many exiles subsequently became a story of enrichment to the financial, commercial, and cultural life of those countries that received them. Over the years since, refugees in Europe, North America, and Australasia have been the familiar messengers of injustice and persecution. Much more than in Europe, countries of the "New World" have long had the proud boast that their "melting pot" cultures offered a new chance to the victims of racial, political, and religious oppression. In the United States, Canada, and Australia, the tradition of political and economic immigration has been central to the process of nation-building itself and fundamental to economic and social development. The trauma of departure from home and the struggles and successes of making a new life in distant lands are deeply embedded in the historical experience of millions of the citizens of the developed world. Movements of persons across continents are not a new or recent phenomenon.

In times of crisis, refugees tend to become the scapegoats for a situation they can neither comprehend nor control. The long wait for a legal status adds to their plight.
UNHCR/A. Prandi

Now, however, many of the countries of Europe are registering alarm at the influx of refugees and asylum seekers looking for opportunities for safety and resettlement; their tradition of offering asylum as a positive act of state policy and international solidarity is coming under threat. The steady progress of formalizing, through legal instruments, the expression of support for the victims of persecution and repression seems to have halted and to be in real danger of being reversed. In the autumn of 1986, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees himself was obliged to tell a distinguished audience at Oxford University that, faced with transcontinental movements of asylum seekers, the governments of developed countries "have reacted with refugee policies which are of a defensive or even a repressive nature."

Increasingly, refugees are presented not as people in need of help, but as people who constitute a threat to the order of things; they do not *have* problems, they *are* the problem. The same year that saw Band Aid and the outpouring of cash and concern for tragic events overseas has seen the closing of doors against those seeking a home in Europe. This article will argue that the defensive measures being adopted by European states are based on a misrepresentation of the nature and the scale of the problem, are an excessive response to the alleged crisis, are a retreat from agreed norms of humanitarian law and convention, and are a diversion from the real issues posed by the global refugee crisis.

Philip Rudge is secretary of the European Consultation on Refugees and Exiles.

The Scale of the Problem

The overwhelming burden of the global refugee crisis continues to fall not on the shoulders of the rich and powerful countries, but on some of the poorest and most deprived nations on earth: the combined totals of refugees and asylum seekers in the countries of Western Europe amount to less than 5 percent of the total estimated world refugee population. The 165,000 asylum seekers who arrived in Europe in 1985 constitute under .005 percent of the population of Western Europe. The total number of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe since World War II represents an average of under .2 percent of the indigenous European population—albeit unequally distributed. Countries of Africa, Asia, and Latin America are confronted with incomparably greater outflows of refugees and otherwise displaced persons.

The growing negative attitudes towards asylum seekers and refugees must be seen in the context of the shifting nature of general immigration to the developed world in the post-war period. As countries of traditional immigration, the United States, Canada, and Australia have had and continue to have a positive and substantial immigration policy; this results in a somewhat different perception of the pressure for resettlement of refugees from "third world" countries from that felt in many European countries. European post-war immigration has been of various kinds. To satisfy the urgent labor demand of post-war reconstruction, millions of manual workers were recruited from the former colonies (West Indians and Asians to Britain, North Africans to France, Indonesians and Surinamese to the Netherlands) or else migrated on their own initiative from the countries of the Mediterranean, Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean.

Such was the appetite of the economic engine of recovery in Europe, that this immigration was considered a necessary and positive development. However, none of the receiving European States expected or intended that this immigration should be the permanent movement leading to long-term resettlement which it has in fact turned out to be. With the end of the boom signalled by the economic crisis of the 1970s, the countries of immigration rapidly moved to end all economic migration and furthermore expected that the economic migrants would return home (an Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development report at the time described the moves of the Western European governments to encourage return as an attempt "to redistribute the burden of unemployment from the more advanced to less advanced countries"). Following 1973, some—mostly southern Europeans—did return home, but the majority of the third world migrants stayed and actually brought family members to join them as part of a plan for long-term resettlement. Events have subsequently proven that the end of the welcoming attitude towards economic migration has been an important key to the collapse of the positive approach to all kinds of immigration, including political migration. It also fuels the assertion, often virulently expressed, that Europe is now being besieged by persons who are not asylum seekers at all, but "merely" economic migrants abusing the asylum laws since regular methods of immigration are now closed to them.



Children of asylum seekers attend school. UNHCR/R. Gilling

Asylum seekers arriving in any single European country belong to three categories:

a) asylum seekers who will be determined to be refugees according to the 1951 United Nations Convention and 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees and are therefore generally entitled to durable asylum;

b) asylum seekers who do not conform to a strict interpretation of the criteria of the refugee definition in the Convention and Protocol, but who are refugees in a wider sense of the concept and will normally be allowed to remain in the country in accordance with provisions of national law or administrative practice; or

c) asylum seekers who do not qualify as refugees, either under the Convention and Protocol or in a wider sense, and who may be expelled, may return voluntarily or otherwise, may resettle or apply for asylum in a third country, or may remain in the country of arrival, possibly as clandestine aliens.

It is the second category which now presents the main challenge to the protection policies of Western European countries and which remains a serious cause for concern. One hears that "the boat is full," it is "five minutes to twelve," that Europe is being "swamped." What is more, there is much talk about the drug pushing, prostitution, and criminality that allegedly characterize these people. But if there is a crisis in European asylum policy, part of that crisis is the gross misrepresentation of the scale of the problem.

At present, the standard of statistical reporting of refugees and asylum claimants is very low. In this field as in others, there are lies, damned lies, and statistics. The number of asylum applications in European countries did increase suddenly in the late 1970s, particularly in the years 1979-1981. This increase coincided with the developing economic crisis in Europe, and some countries felt obliged to refuse extension of stay permits to substantial numbers of immigrant workers. A high proportion of asylum applications in these years were therefore from people who did not wish to leave, often after quite long periods of residence, and not from people who were seeking to enter a European country for the first time. At the same time, owing to sharply worsening conditions of physical security in certain parts of the third world, a number of people from specific countries which had suddenly experienced a state of turmoil sought asylum in order to remain in the European country in which they had just completed a course of studies. There has been no massive invasion of Europe by refugees, asylum seekers, or economic migrants posing as refugees. An analysis of the countries of origin of the newly arriving asylum seekers makes it clear that, while their countries of origin are indeed poor, they are those which are wracked by internal conflict, generalized violence and disorder, and the violation of human rights which threaten the personal security of many of their citizens (Iran, Iraq, Sri Lanka, Turkey, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Lebanon). In the global context, European countries sit at the edge of this sea of misery as third world countries themselves ride out the real storm.

Statistical misrepresentation through misleading government figures characterizes the background document prepared by UNHCR for the May 1985 *Consultations on the Arrivals of Asylum Seekers and Refugees in Europe*, which includes a paragraph called, "Number of Arrivals in Europe":

> During the last 40 years, countries in Western Europe have admitted great numbers of refugees and asylum seekers, especially following upheavals in neighboring countries. During the last decade, indicative figures of such arrivals were as follows:

1975	**19,600**
1976	**20,600**
1977	**29,900**
1978	**49,400**
1979	**77,600**
1980	**158,500**
1981	**116,500**
1982	**80,700**
1983	**67,000**
1984	**103,500**

> During the same period, a total of approximately 200,000 refugees have been accepted for resettlement in European countries of whom more than 170,000 were Indochinese from South East Asian first asylum countries.

Taking these figures, we are presumably to conclude that nearly 725,000 arrived in Western Europe from elsewhere to claim asylum in the period 1975-1984. This figure cannot be left unchallenged. A large number of the 725,000 had been living in Europe for some years when unexpected circumstances arose which caused them to seek asylum in order not to go home. One can think of the guest-workers, mainly Turks, in the Federal Republic of Germany or, in the United Kingdom, the Iranians, constituting more than half the total of asylum seekers during each of the years 1972-1982 and who were mostly students who feared to return to Iran. These groups and others like them are not "arrivals."

The implication of the total statistic is that these 725,000 were all admitted, but the figures include those who were subsequently rejected, who withdrew their applications and either went home, moved on, or managed to stay under other criteria.

The figure does not indicate that of course refugees often go home when the situation in their country of origin changes (Argentina, Brazil, Guinea Conakry, Nicaragua, Santo Domingo, Uruguay, Zimbabwe) or even when it doesn't (Chile, Uganda). So we need to look at "departures" as well as so-called "arrivals."

The figures imply that all 725,000 are separate individuals, when we all know that there is significant double-counting and some people claim asylum in several countries or indeed under several names in the same country.

So, although the deplorable state of statistical recording will not at present show up the true figures, we can be very sure that the number of people who have arrived from outside Western Europe in the past ten years in order to claim asylum is much lower than 725,000. The tables of UNHCR statistics on page 8—now that these caveats have been presented—give an indication of the asylum situation in Europe statistically.

The apocalyptic scenario which suggests that the whole world is planning to seek asylum in Europe bears little relation to the truth of the situation and is very destabilizing of public opinion.

The "burden" Europe is being asked to bear cannot be measured by some simplistic statistical projections; a country's reception capacity is a subjective evaluation based on historical factors and related to the political culture of a country, as well as the prevailing conditions of the labor market, the infrastructure, the overall performance of the economy. For all the problems of recession, Europe now is in many respects better able to handle refugees than 40 years ago in the devastation of the post-war period, but the language of "waves," "streams," and "floods" is having a seriously negative effect on public opinion.

The Excessive Response—Deterrence and Restriction

The 1985 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe adopted a series of *Recommendations on living and working conditions of refugees and asylum seekers*, the "Boehm Report," which states quite explicitly:

> The number of refugees in Europe compared with the total number of aliens in Europe does not justify the restrictive attitudes of the receiving countries as a result of pressures from public opinion conditioned by the economic crisis and unemployment.

These restrictive attitudes have been translated into a wide range of dissuasive or deterrent measures aimed at preventing the access of asylum seekers, most specifically from third world countries, to Europe, and detailed descriptions exist in a number of independent reports on the present situation. These measures relate to the actual arrival of asylum seekers and include the peremptory imposition of visas, the fining of airline companies for carrying "undocumented aliens," refusal of entry, detention, and other restrictions on freedom of movement of arrival, and difficulties in entering the refugee determination procedure. Having surmounted these initial hurdles, the asylum seeker in many countries then encounters limitations on the right of residence, accommodation, employment, social welfare benefits, counselling and advice services, areas of provision crucially important in the early days of reorientation and adjustment in a new environment.

Since in most European countries a majority of those who arrive are eventually permitted to stay—with or without refugee status—the impact of this harsh regime on the physical and psychological integrity of those affected is seriously damaging to the individuals themselves, discriminatory by comparison with standards of provision for the indigenous population, and counterproductive insofar as it blocks or retards the progress towards constructive integration. For all these reasons, such measures have been censured by critics of the deterrent approach as unethical and anti-humanitarian and contrary to the provisions of international agreements freely entered into by European States, including the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. On the practical level, they have

Table 1

European Countries With Significant Numbers of Asylum Applications

(Source: UNHCR)

	1980	1981	1982	1983	1984	1985
Austria		34,500	6,300	5,898	7,208	6,700
Belgium	2,728	2,445	3,056	2,948	3,683	5,357
Denmark	225	203	298	332	4,312	8,698
Germany (F. Rep.)	107,818	49,391	37,423	19,737	35,278	73,832
France		19,863	22,505	22,350	20,714	28,810
Greece		2,250	1,200	450	750	1,400
Italy		3,600	3,150	3,050	4,550	5,400
Netherlands	1,390	754	1,214	2,015	2,603	5,644
Norway		95	116	107	300	800
Portugal				1,500	400	70
Spain			2,450	1,400	1,100	2,350
Sweden				2,500	10,700	13,100
Switzerland		4,226	7,135	7,886	7,435	9,700
United Kingdom	2,352	2,425	4,223	4,296	3,869	4,859

Table 2

Refugees Recognized According to the Geneva Convention (1951-1986)

(Source: UNHCR)

	January 1, 1986	% of total population
Belgium	36,600	0.37
Denmark	8,500	0.17
France	174,200	0.31
Germany (F. Rep.)	134,000	0.21
Greece	3,600	0.03
Ireland	600	0.01
Italy	15,200	0.02
Netherlands	15,500	0.10
Portugal	700	0.007
Spain	9,300	0.02
Sweden	90,600	1.09
Switzerland	30,600	0.49
United Kingdom	135,000	0.24
United States	1,000,000	0.43
Somalia	700,000	13.46
Pakistan	2,702,500	2.80
Iran	2,300,000	4.73
Burundi	267,500	5.80
Sudan	1,164,000	3.61

also been criticized as actually futile since they have not in any case led to an overall reduction in the numbers of asylum seekers, although the recent proliferation of visa requirements may radically achieve this end. Furthermore, in global terms such measures do not address the root causes of the movement of asylum seekers from their country of origin which relate to repression, gross violation of human rights, civil war, and armed conflict.

The Retreat from Humanitarian Standards

Taken together, this retreat from European human rights norms relating to asylum, on the one hand, and the failure to elaborate a serious and active policy towards the complexities of the crisis of global mass forced migration, on the other, constitute a profoundly unsatisfactory reaction to the international dimensions of the refugee problem. The rising proportion of refugees arriving in Europe outside the organized quota system of resettlement and the increasing public anxiety about the apparent lack of any mechanism to control this theoretically unlimited movement have produced a polarization of the debate on asylum policy. One of the main consequences of that debate has been a narrowing of the interpretation of the 1951 Geneva Convention.

The criteria for determination of refugee status now under dispute bear particularly on the notion of individual as against collective persecution. Very significant groups of refugees, among them Tamils from Sri Lanka, Iranians, Palestinians, Lebanese and Ghanaians, are, in many countries, deemed to fall outside the definition of the Convention as one country after another has excluded collective persecution as a ground for an asylum claim. The present debate over the validity of the 1951 Geneva Convention and 1967 Protocol to treat this situation reveals the lack of consensus on the principles of an asylum policy at the national and European level.

There are those who hold to the position that the 1951 Convention, liberally interpreted in the humanitarian spirit in which it was conceived and written, can cover the vast majority of the current asylum cases in Europe. They claim that post-war European refugees under the 1951 Convention were just as much the victims of generalized persecution and violence as those seeking asylum now, even though, according to the spirit of the immediate postwar period, they were granted refugee status based on some notion of persecution of the individual. This analysis suggests that the current attempt to narrow the scope of the 1951 Convention owes more to a political aversion to non-European, nonwhite, culturally dissimilar refugees than to any fundamental difference in the quality of their claim for protection against persecution and danger. They argue further that the 1967 Protocol which, in recognition of the wider refugee phenomenon, expanded the scope of the 1951 Convention to include non-European refugees, was an optimistic promise to the world which must be fulfilled despite the protectionism and growing ideological nationalism of the 1980s.

Increasingly, refugees are presented . . . as people who constitute a threat to the order of things

Others argue that the Geneva Convention may well be too limited to handle the present situation and that European states should in practice adopt some of the broader criteria laid out in the 1969 Convention of the Organization of African Unity Governing the Specific Aspects of Refugee Problems in Africa, expanding on the Geneva Convention to include as grounds for refugee status, flight from "external aggression, occupation, foreign domination or events seriously disturbing public order," grounds which describe explicitly the background of many of those fleeing to the security of Europe in the past few years.

Others again, particularly lawyers and activists working in the wider human rights field, point to the plethora of UNHCR Executive Committee Resolutions of recent years, and the (underused) provisions of the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms which consolidate the rights of refugees and asylum seekers in Europe. In recent years, the governments, acting by consensus, have approved through UNHCR Executive Committee Conclusions a range of positions on asylum, *nonrefoulement*, expulsion, the determination of refugee status, the extra-territorial effect of refugee status determination, refugees without a country of asylum, extradition, arrivals en masse, and manifestly unfounded and abusive asylum requests. All of these constitute a natural evolution of the 1951 Convention. Furthermore, the European Human Rights Convention contains a number of Articles which may be relevant to the treatment of asylum seekers, *inter alia* those relating to inhuman and degrading treatment, abusive detention, lack of appeals procedures, interference in family life, restrictions on freedom of movement, and compulsory labor. The very refusal of entry may itself be a violation of the Convention.

Thus, those who argue that the treatment of asylum issues requires a dynamic, evolutionary approach reflecting changing circumstances can invoke a substantial corpus of agreed international law and convention over and above the 1951 Convention in support of their case. It is noteworthy that the new Refugee Law and Doctrine division of UNHCR is also now committed to a deeper analysis of the evolution of refugee law and the impact of international human rights and humanitarian law on the refugee question.

While there are few who call openly for the abandonment or rewriting of the Geneva Convention, individual governments are, in reality, extending the provisions of the Convention to a decreasing proportion of asylum seekers in Europe. This is not to say that those, particularly from third world countries, who are refused Convention status are denied all protection, but their status is more or less precarious and depends very much on varying national decisions of individual states. The jargon associated with these lesser legal statuses reflects the complexity of the situation: *Tolerance, B Status, C Status, exceptional leave to remain, assimilated, de facto, non-Conven-*

tion; all are forms of extra-Convention status containing widely varying sets of rights and obligations. Fortunately, with very few notorious exceptions, European states are in general holding to the principle of *nonrefoulement* for those for whom forced return would threaten grave danger or almost certain death even if they fall outside the very formal interpretation of the notion of individual persecution.

However, what is lacking is an agreed upon set of minimum standards of treatment for those in this extra-Convention no-man's land; as a consequence, they may stay, often for years, with very poor prospects for successful integration and facing the threat of expulsion. States have not yet brought themselves to elaborate a safer status to give permanent rights to this growing group.

All European countries are signatories of the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol (though Italy and Turkey maintain the European geographical reservation), yet there are wide inconsistencies in recognition rates of asylum seekers between countries, no agreement on criteria on country of first asylum, nor on the question of which country is responsible for examining an asylum request. The last brave demonstration of true "burden-sharing" was the 1979 commitment to the Indochinese boat people. Since then, burden-sharing has all too often turned into buck-passing, and international cooperation has become a search for common instruments of deterrence. Unilateral actions taken by individual States in search of a national solution serve only to divert the movement of asylum seekers to other countries and to heighten tension with European partners. The evidence of recent years gives little hope that the current search for coherence and "harmonization" will lead to much more than a decision to proceed at the level of the lowest common denominator.

The recent debate reveals a very real tension between those who stress the need for a reassertion of a positive European policy based on human rights and legal principles and those who stress the political constraints, economic realities, and the impact of xenophobia on the democratic fabric. The polarization of the debate sometimes means this is a dialogue of the deaf; it is a cause of some concern that in some areas the dialogue which should include all actors in the process—governmental, intergovernmental, nongovernmental, and refugees themselves—has actually broken down.

The Politicization of Refugee Policy

The recent authors of a study on U.S. refugee policy coined the felicitous phrase "calculated kindness" to describe the combination of political partiality and humanitarianism that has always characterized the refugee policy of Western countries. No modern state has ever had an "open door" policy for refugees; its kindness has always depended on a calculated balance of factors of foreign policy and domestic acceptability. Reviewing the trends of recent years in his Oxford University speech, the High Commissioner pointed to the dangers of "the plight of refugees . . . being used as a political tool in domestic party politics." He was referring to the impact of the problems of deep-seated recession and unemployment which have been exacerbated in 1986 by the preoccupation with terrorism and the electoral advance of political movements standing on, or influenced by, racist and xenophobic political platforms.

European preoccupation with terrorism has deepened in 1986 since the U.S. bombing of Libya and bomb attacks in Berlin and Paris, and has cast a long shadow over recent meetings of European Ministers of the Interior and Justice at which asylum issues have been discussed. The heated nature of the debate on collective security measures is predictably blurring the vital distinctions between legitimate action against criminal atrocities and the generalized scapegoating of certain groups of foreigners, including asylum seekers from areas of the world (for example, Sri Lanka, the Middle East, Iran) where the cause of their flight is associated *inter alia* with terrorist atrocity.

The steady progress towards the dismantling of controls on freedom of movement across borders in Europe is being re-examined in the light of this new security preoccupation. Critics of the way the present counter-terrorism debate is being handled point to the fallout in terms of the human rights of asylum seekers—they view the sudden imposition of visa requirements on certain larger groups and moves to give more authority back to border police and immigration authorities as examples of a trend which may deny access, in an indiscriminate manner, to those fleeing persecution and looking for safety in Europe.

The increasingly political prominence of the refugee/foreigner issue is demonstrated most starkly in the way in which it now figures on the political platforms of governing parties facing internal pressures or national elections. The asylum issue has provoked most acute domestic political debate in the Federal Republic of Germany, ahead of the general election in January 1987, leading to unprecedented visa agreements with the German Democratic Republic (GDR) affecting the hitherto sacrosanct international status of Berlin, tensions in relations with neighboring countries, and even calls from very senior political figures for an amendment of the Republic's Constitution itself to excise the explicit right to enjoy asylum codified in Article 16.

The platform of the incoming government of France included tough new provisions related to foreigners which threaten to erode the position of asylum seekers; the foreigners and racism issue has provided the political base of the extreme right wing, leading for example to the election of ultra-nationalist members of the European Parliament; since September 1986, all foreigners except EEC nationals and the Swiss are required to have a visa. In Switzerland, home of the headquarters of UNHCR and the new High Commissioner, 1986 cantonal elections produced an alarming swing to the racist right. The government has reacted to public disquiet by adopting very harsh public positions, particularly towards Sri Lankans; it has taken much publicized exemplary action against Zairians and Chileans and faces a referendum on the asylum issue in early 1987. The Swedish and Danish governments negotiated agreements at the end of 1985 with the GDR to prevent the movement of asylum seekers from the GDR via Baltic ports across the narrow strip of water to Scandinavia—a move which merely served to divert the flow across the city of Berlin and thence into the Federal Republic. The British government imposed visas in May 1985 on Sri Lankans, the first time visas had been imposed on Commonwealth citizens, and has followed in autumn 1986 with visas targeted at citizens of the Indian sub-continent, Nigeria, and Ghana, to a storm of protest from opposition political parties.

Overall, 1986 must have seen a greater

The last brave demonstration of true "burden-sharing" was the 1979 commitment to the Indochinese boat people. UNHCR/C. Penn

coverage of the asylum issue in the mass media than since the days of public concern over the Vietnamese boat people. Unfortunately, much of the concern and human solidarity expressed over that event has evaporated. A review of the press coverage exemplifies at its worst the elements of classic racial prejudice. The alien group is characterized as causing political, moral, and economic damage in the host population; it allegedly demonstrates a higher than average criminality; it lives a parasitic lifestyle, spreads disease, and is a drain on the pocket of the nation. Such assertions are regrettably quite compatible with the social Darwinism that underpins the political philosophy currently enjoying something of a renaissance in some parts of Europe. It leads to a need for scapegoats and pressure on the rights of marginal groups.

In such a context, asylum seekers can be blamed for their own defenselessness or else denigrated for violating the rules that guarantee the smooth running of the world of the strong and powerful. As one country after another seals its borders to non-Europeans through growing visa controls and other measures, asylum seekers look for loopholes, use and are abused by "helpers," and resort to commercial entrepreneurs who exploit them. Governments have found it electorally beneficial to step up accusations of abuse and illegality and seize on the small minority of opportunists to defame the majority of genuine asylum seekers.

There is a problem here of selective memory and morality. In the 1930s, when European governments failed to react adequately to the horrors of Nazi Germany, Jews were forced to use whatever means they could, "legal" or "illegal", to leave; no one would now deny the absolute moral imperative of that action; in the late 1970s, Vietnamese were forced to steal boats and bribe corrupt officials and boatowners to leave their country, and we welcomed them by the tens of thousands. Self-righteous legalism, particularly by governments overtly or covertly engaged in shoring up repressive regimes which actually generate refugee flows, has little to do with the proper investigation of abusive or manifestly unfounded asylum claims and ignores the reality that in refugee history there have always been people prepared to trade in human misery.

European Initiatives

Established European-wide institutions are responding to the urgent demands of the asylum question in a variety of ways, and new forums of consultation are also seeking ways forward.

The Council of Europe, which brings together the 20 Member States of Western Europe, plus Turkey, has played a key role in the elaboration of European human rights law. Its potential involvement in asylum questions is fourfold: it can expand the possibilities afforded to asylum seekers by the European Convention on Human Rights; it can standardize the criteria and the procedures for examination of the criteria for granting the right to asylum; it can deal with the problem of refugees in orbit; and it can develop solidarity within European States with asylum seekers, and foster intra-European solidarity.

Within this overall brief, there have been various initiatives in 1986. There have been calls for an additional *Protocol* to the European Convention on Human Rights relating specifically to a right of asylum. The standardization of procedures for examining an asylum request has been made by Recommendation of the Committee of Ministers in 1986. The Ad Hoc Committee of Experts on the Legal Aspects of Territorial Asylum, Refugees, and Stateless Persons (CAHAR) has restarted its work to conclude a proposal on the responsibility for examining an asylum request, though as CAHAR's deliberations are for some reason confidential, it is not possible to report on this in any detail. For those to whom the status of refugee has been granted, there is the European agreement on the transfer of responsibility for refugees, concluded in 1980, which allows refugees to establish themselves in another country. This agreement has only been ratified by seven States: Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, and Switzerland; others have been called on to move in this direction.

In 1986, the Parliamentary Assembly, in Recommendations 101 and 1031, called on governments to show greater solidarity with refugees and has debated the issue vigorously. CAHAR has also agreed to undertake a systematic exchange of information on the distribution of asylum seekers in European countries, though so far responses from governments have been sketchy.

The Parliament of the twelve States of the European Community has recently commissioned an investigation into the problem of asylum. The

Committee on Legal Affairs and Citizens' Rights, through its Rapporteur, Oskar Vetter, referring to the "steady deterioration in the legal and social position of those seeking asylum in the European Community," investigated the situation in most of the twelve States of the European Community and has produced a series of recommendations for the Parliamentary Assembly. This is the first such initiative by the Parliament and reflects the increasing engagement of the Community in broader political and human rights matters, territory hitherto the interest of the Council of Europe. The "Vetter Report," to be presented to the European Parliament in early 1987, contains extensive recommendations which focus on rights for refugees and asylum seekers to humane and expeditious treatment of their cases and the avoidance of deterrent measures. It also calls for action by the Commission of the European Communities to facilitate burden-sharing and to underwrite through its budget the work of government and nongovernmental agencies. In the preparation of his report, Mr. Vetter consulted widely with independent experts, governmental, and nongovernmental agencies. Practical action on the proposals in his report will depend upon the political will of the European Parliament and the administration and financial capacity of the European Commission.

Following the May 1985 UNHCR Consultations on the arrival of asylum seekers in Europe, a number of European governments (and also representatives of Canada) have met in a series of working groups, specifically on the issues of the Tamils and Iranians who have sought asylum in Europe in recent years.

The apparent intention of these working groups is to provide a forum for a fully rounded discussion of all aspects of the forced movement of these asylum seekers, including evaluation of the situation in the country of origin and the issue of country of first asylum. These working groups are private, and this secrecy on an issue of very broad public interest naturally causes great concern among nongovernmental organizations and the human rights community. It remains to be seen whether this process will restore UNHCR's faltering authority to lead on asylum issues in Europe, or if the quality and seniority of governmental representatives is such as to provide the necessary political will to seek humane solutions.

A noteworthy recent development in the field of asylum has been the increased collaboration between nongovernmental organizations (NGOs); it is the NGOs in most European countries that undertake the bulk of the work of integration of refugees and which often represent very large constituencies of public opinion. They are upgrading their collective analysis of refugee problems and their advocacy work at national and international levels in favor of a humane asylum policy. Under the auspices of the European Consultation on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE), a European Legal Network on Asylum has recently been established to reinforce the collaboration between individual lawyers working in the asylum field; and an initiative has been launched to create minimum standards for the acquisition and sharing of refugee-related documentation between centers in Europe and other parts of the world. Other human rights organizations and European churches are mobilizing their various networks and international resources through networking activities. In 1986 NGOs in the Scandinavian countries ran a large scale public information and fundraising campaign, "Refugee 86," stressing the global refugee crisis, and a major year-long mobilization of public opinion was led by the voluntary agencies in France in support of their campaign for the right of asylum. Contact between NGOs in Europe and those in North America has also increased substantially in view of the growing linkage between official asylum policies on both sides of the Atlantic.

Prospects

In the current climate in many European countries, it is not easy to predict the future development of asylum policy with any certainty. There is no shortage of prescriptions for improving the lot of asylum seekers nor of detailed recommendations for procedural standards to regularize the situation in Europe. Much technical work has already been done to ease the pressures and strains on current policy.

The Council of Europe, the European Parliament, and other governmental forums have the mechanisms to harmonize their policies in a humane direction if they have the political will to do so. The accelerating process of control and deterrence may be expected to result in measures that make it virtually impossible for asylum seekers from many third world countries to seek asylum in Europe; instead, one may anticipate a more rigid application of "quota" programs and severe curtailment of movement of "spontaneous" asylum seekers.

A central political priority of the States of the European Community is to extend the freedom of movement across borders within Europe—an idea which is, not surprisingly, very popular with European electorates. This relaxation of internal borders will require the strengthening of an overall external frontier, and it is this process, done in the name of consolidating the economic market and counteracting terrorism, drug-dealing, and illegal immigration, that will have a profound effect on the exercise of the right of asylum.

The second key element of a coherent asylum policy, the analysis of root causes and concerted action to prevent forced migration, remains low on the agenda, despite repeated calls for "regional solutions" at intergovernmental meetings. The superpower search for military solutions to complex developmental issues; the fuelling through arms and aid policies of regional conflicts; the first world's support of repressive, persecuting regimes; and the crippling impact on weak political structures in many third world states of the colossal international debt problem, if unchecked, must inevitably lead to greater violation of human rights and freedoms, new refugee crises, and proportionally greater pressure on countries of resettlement.

The High Commissioner calls for a "global approach" at precisely the moment when European states are strengthening their fortress. The deterrent policies of European states are already under fire as an attack both on the rights of asylum and on the democratic values and achievements of European society; if the sealing off of Europe from third world asylum seekers is compounded by inaction and indifference to the growing tragedy of global refugee displacement, then we see the worst of both worlds. That seems to be the way things are going. In the end, it will be the weak and deprived who have to carry the burden. It will be the rich and the strong who let them.

South Africa's Refugees

Thomas R. Getman with David Flory

Some of the most severe apartheid laws have been repealed by recent actions of the South African Parliament. It would be negligent of this author not to mention this fact or that, among many progressive Afrikaners, there is a significant recognition of and repentance for the injustices and cruelties inherent in apartheid law. Yet, in daily practice, the spirit of these old laws still has a tenacious grip on the lives of ~~the~~ people of color . . . especially under the harsh police emergencies.

In reading this report, Afrikaner friends bemoan the fact that it does not capture, to their satisfaction, the deep and widespread reformist mood that is growing in South Africa. Black friends, on the other hand, assert that the report is "a good reflection of the spirit that still remains." Such is the complex and paradoxical nature of the South African reality. Neither the viewpoints of the people here, nor the issues they are confronting, sort out into a black/white, good/evil matrix. An external observer must, therefore, distinguish between the despised structure of apartheid and the courageous people of all races and backgrounds who are living and working for change under its dark shadow.

African families who have lived and worked for generations in particular areas may be removed from the towns where they live if, in the opinion of the authorities, they exceed the reasonable labor needs of the area.

> *. . . after seeing the circumstances under which these people must live, it is clear they are refugees in the spirit of the term*

Apartheid is an oppression that affects all members of South African society. An Afrikaner Member of Parliament has acknowledged that the creation of apartheid is now recognized as a monstrous mistake which has deeply divided the population. "Just talking with blacks in the liberation movement or speaking out about police provocation puts our lives at periodic risk. My family and I have talked about the possibilities and have decided that we must pay the price to bring change and live with as much grace as possible in the midst of this terror."

Although white South Africans who decry apartheid take risks, the displaced people within South Africa face the harsh uncertainties of life under apartheid every day. Especially with the formal dismantling of some apartheid law, the economic and political powerlessness of the poor causes frustration and lack of trust. The pain, heartbreak, and alienation of both legal and economic apartheid run far more deeply than many South African whites seem to understand. One black speaks for many when he says, "Men can measure the depths of the oceans, but who can measure the hurt we feel in our hearts?"

In South Africa, none have seen the injustices and cruelties of apartheid more clearly than the "Coloureds" and the blacks who are oppressed by its discriminatory laws. Because of apartheid, they have been forced to stay in or move to isolated homelands, to live in substandard townships, to depart these to live in squatter camps, or to flee the country altogether.

Those who are internally displaced are not legally refugees according to the definition of the United Nations Convention on Refugees. Yet, after seeing the circumstances under which these people must live, it is clear that they are refugees in the spirit of the term. Elfan Rees, in *We Strangers and We Afraid*, more broadly defines a refugee as "anyone who has been uprooted from his home, has crossed a frontier—artificial or traditional—and looks for protection and sustenance from a government or authority other than his own." It is not uncommon for black families to be uprooted and forced to live in particular townships even though the enabling forced removal legislation has been scrapped. Other blacks have been denied the possibility of enjoying South African citizenship, as they have been moved across artificial borders to semi-autonomous "homelands". Many of the people in the black areas now depend upon private voluntary organizations to provide their daily needs.

The 1985 census indicated that of South Africa's population of approximately 34.2 million people, there are 26 million blacks, 4.6 million whites, 2.8 million mixed race Coloureds, and .8 million Asians. By past influx and pass laws, more than half of the black population have been crowded into an underproductive 13 percent of the land, while the other 87 percent is owned primarily by the white minority. In 1980, the monthly income earned by all whites

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was more than three times greater than that earned by blacks. Blacks also bear most of the unemployment in South Africa. Unemployment in 1980 for whites was less than one percent. For blacks in the homelands, it was estimated at 27.5 percent. In 1986, 54 percent of the blacks were jobless in some Eastern Cape communities, while unemployment for whites was also unusually high, at 5 to 6 percent. The risk of life, fortune, and future has brought terror to any who confront the terrible inequities these statistics reveal. Maldistribution is the harvest of apartheid which will be reaped no matter what the future government.

On several recent trips to South Africa, I have had the opportunity to visit a number of the tragic black townships, nine of the ten homelands, and a dozen squatter communities. The human relationships were often heartrending, leaving one in tears or outraged. Deliberate deprivation of people of color by whites has in many cases forestalled the provision of even the most basic amenities and disrupted normal family lives. The images and heartache become deeply carved into one's consciousness.

Townships

South African law provides for dividing all towns into separate "group areas" in which only members of the white and the Coloured "groups" can own property. When a white area is declared, Coloured persons living there may not remain in the area longer than such period of grace granted by authorities.

The townships were created in an effort to segregate the South African society racially. The vision of the original architects of apartheid was to create separate self-contained communities. In carrying out this program cruel and oppressive means were used. The imposition of the "group areas" has become more diabolical as force is used to maintain the misguided plan. Members of all races have been uprooted, but it is the blacks, Coloureds, and Asians who have borne the brunt of it.

The living conditions within many of the townships resemble abject refugee camps more than viable communities. Housing was originally built as temporary lodging; however, much of it has never been replaced. Until recently, most of the employment was found outside the township, and any shopping had to be done in white communities. Like many refugee camps surrounded by fencing and barbed wire, Soweto, a township-city of almost three million people, is inhumanely surrounded by a no-man's-land. Containment, control, and coercion of blacks living there are carried out with mechanistic efficiency.

Dominee Nico Smith and his wife Ellen, a child psychiatrist, decided to confront this segregation. They are now living and working in the large black township of Mamelodi, outside Pretoria, and are among only a handful of whites since 1948 who have set up housekeeping in black townships. He is one of the few white pastors in the black Dutch Reformed denomination. "Apartheid has worked well," Dr. Smith points out. "95 percent of the people in Pretoria have never been to Mamelodi to discover what wonderful, but suffering, people these are." Smith adds, "We need a miracle of grace. People of different races must open their hearts and homes to one another to ensure a peaceful transition." The township is but six miles from the graceful, tree-shaded streets of the capital city. Only a short distance separates squalor from comfort, but the chasm between the communities appears to be insurmountable.

The images and heartache become deeply carved into one's consciousness.
World Vision/Tom Getman

Some townships, such as Oukasie and Alexandra, existed before the Group Areas Act designated separate neighborhoods for each race. They originally were racially segregated ghettos, or "locations," common to other multi-racial societies. The present-day townships, however, are a result of the deliberate and, to an extent, legislated poverty imposed upon blacks to consolidate the white ruling party's political and economic power.

Fifty-year-old Alexandra is a one-mile square township of more than 100,000 people. It is surrounded by the wealthiest of white Johannesburg suburbs, yet it still has few homes with running water or sewage disposal. Raw sewage is often dumped out of buckets into the dirt ditches where children play tag and tops. The tensions are exacerbated by the fact that many of those from "Alex" who are able to work do so in the white homes and gardens which are within walking distance. Government officials until recently refused to improve services or provide investment capital because, "the black people shouldn't be there anyway, but in the homelands where they belong."

The township of Oukasie is another deplorable example of the mistreatment of blacks. The residents there have been told that Oukasie has been "abolished" because it has been declared "unhygienic." They must now leave their homes and move to another township fifteen miles away. According to the government, the new township of Lethlabile will provide better housing and facilities than those they currently have. Most of the remaining residents say, however, that they will not move. Living in more modern Lethlabile would require a long, more costly, and inconvenient commute to work. They are also angry over their lack of choice in deciding where they can live.

Residents say that the government has purposely allowed the conditions in the township to deteriorate by cutting off most of its municipal services. In Oukasie, as in Alexandra, officials are reluctant to improve the living conditions, since they feel the blacks should instead be moved to new townships in less visible areas. A member of the Black Sash, a group of predominantly white women who provide paralegal advice and advocacy offices for those living under the complex apartheid laws, said angrily, "The government can upgrade [the area] for whites, but not for the 10,000 black residents. The real reason they are doing this is that it is too close to a white area." Although the last official forced removal occurred in Magopa during 1984, the 1986 confrontation over the fate of Oukasie illustrates the subtle coercion and manipulation with which the blacks still must contend under ever-changing definitions and new forms of oppression.

Homelands

Even with "independence" and "self-government" in 1975 for Africans of the Transkei, the legislature has such powers as the South African government prescribes. Transkei and other homelands are provided counselors from the South African civil service. Therefore, laws passed by the "self-governing" legislatures take effect after receiving the assent of the State President of the Republic of South Africa.

The idea for independent homelands was made reality in 1961 by Prime Minister Hendrick Verwoerd in order to facilitate "separate development" and to recognize traditional chief leaders. The policy was rooted, however, in the British trust areas of the last century. Four of the now ten homelands are "independent," but are not recognized by any nation other than South Africa. They are, in a real sense, artificial states where all blacks must, according to the government, exercise their political rights and by which the South African government can lamely excuse its refusal to provide enfranchisement of blacks in the Republic of South Africa. The KwaNdabele homeland, northeast of Pretoria, recently refused "independence." Residents within KwaNdabele feared that they would have been deprived of sharing the wealth even though they were promised retention of citizenship and rights within South Africa.

The homelands provide a staggering picture of other injustices blacks must bear. One example can be found in the self-governing homeland of Lebowa, in the northern Transvaal. There, a remote cooperative community of older widowed and deserted women had discovered a measure of self-sufficiency and excitement through a pottery enterprise. Shortly after gaining a foothold on dignity with a newly built water cistern and supply of materials and products, a homeland government official came to inform them that their settlement was to be bulldozed for a highway. They would have to invest their energy in rebuilding their enterprise less than 100 yards away. The assistance of the government was given begrudgingly in the form of a stack of cinderblock. Although the right of eminent domain is not uncommon, even in the United States, there was no apparent need for a "highway" in this region of dirt paths. Even though it is unlikely that Pretoria as a matter of policy acts against emerging entrepreneurs, the local officials have a reputation for undermining any activity that spawns independence and self-respect.

According to the South African government, forced removals to the homelands have been stopped, but in reality, some blacks are still surreptitiously moved. In KaNgwane, one of the senior homeland officials as recently as June decried the helplessness that he feels in resolving the complexity of the problem of dealing with the people forced to live there. "People are being dumped here, and there is seething discontent. Dying people have no power, only those who have something to do and to eat. The violence directed at children is one of the biggest problems. I am the target of anger. Please pray for me and encourage development organizations and American politicians to come here to see and to help."

Squatter Camps

When Africans who have been ordered to leave an area refuse to do so, the government, under the Police Emergency, has complete discretion to order that—without trial in a court of law or any further investigation—they can be removed from the area.

Squatter camps are primarily a result of the need for jobless people to move out of the rural areas and into the cities to find employment. Housing has not been provided for them in order to discourage their migration to the cities. As a result, the burgeoning squatter camps in the Capetown area reflect an apparently callous, white-government attitude that blacks are not entitled to the same amenities as whites.

The government has been miserly in designating housing and services for blacks in the Western Cape because Coloureds—people of mixed Afrikaner, Malay, and "Khoikhoi" (or "Hottentot," a more common, denigrating term) heritage—for many years were given labor preference. Also, until recently, migratory labor laws forbade anyone but the "labor unit," typically husbands and fathers, the option of living in the locality of the workplace. The remainder of the family was supposed to reside in the homeland, content with the breadwinner's one-month-a-year vacation visit. Even with the scrapping of the most repressive laws, thousands of mine and factory workers continue to live in grim, single-sex hostels. As a result, blacks who come looking for jobs in Capetown and who wish to live with their families must build shacks in ad hoc communities. They otherwise face a difficult commute from further distant Khayelitsha, a new township of tin shacks and military storage tents located in the barren sand dunes 20 kilometers east of the city.

Teeming Crossroads, neighboring KTC, and Nyanga are well known as places of struggle for those squatters who try to maintain a semblance of family life. In May and June 1986, winter months in South Africa, more than

70,000 Crossroads residents were left homeless when underlying tensions erupted in vicious fighting and home burning that reportedly were provoked by the police. It has been alleged that South African officials play upon political differences and social enmities by arming collaborators. Instead of reconciliation being sought, polarization is enhanced.

The authorities, long wanting to move the dwellers of this eyesore, bulldozed many of the remaining shacks into the rainsoaked quagmire. They have refused to allow the residents to rebuild. Through most of 1986, thousands of these "refugees" were sheltered and fed by SHAWCO (the University of Capetown's Student Health and Welfare Centers Organization), the Red Cross, and World Vision. As has been widely reported, twenty-five members of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) were threatened with expulsion from the country in mid-November as a result of the International Convention in Geneva refusing to accept the credentials of the South African delegate. The South Africa government reversed its decision because ICRC asserted that the vote at the October conference to suspend South Africa "was illegal."

External Refugees

In addition to the oppression felt by South Africa's internal "refugees," significant numbers of people have fled to neighboring countries. Estimates of South African refugees in Angola, Nigeria, Kenya, Swaziland, Botswana, Zimbabwe, Zambia, Lesotho, and Tanzania range from 25,000 to 30,000 people—mostly black, but some white—among credible sources such as the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), and on-site observers from private voluntary organizations.

Even in the front-line states, the refugees are not exempt from the reach and power of apartheid. On May 19, 1986, while members of Secretary of State George Shultz's Advisory Committee on South Africa and the Commonwealth Eminent Persons Group were present in the region, South African helicopters, jets, and commandos shattered the predawn tranquility when they attacked refugee camps in Botswana, Zambia, and an African National Congress (ANC) office in Zimbabwe. The defenseless camps were suspected by the South African government of being bases of operations for the ANC. Three people were killed and thirteen were wounded, including two Angolan children aged two and five.

The strikes created a resurgence of insecurity and fear among the refugees of the front-line states, particularly the South Africans. Jonathan M. is a South African refugee who has lived in Zimbabwe for three years. In an interview with UNHCR staff, he said, "You ask me how I feel? For one, we are just insecure. You feel like you are on the run all the time."

The strikes have also heightened some hosts' reluctance to aid the refugees. "Today everyone is scared—not just the South African refugees and those of other nationalities, but the local inhabitants as well," commented Patrick Bagwasi, the director of the Botswana Refugee Council, in an interview with Annick Billard of UNHCR. As a result, housing and employment are becoming difficult to find for the refugees. Says Bagwasi, "Even if the [property] owner has no objection, the neighbors often insist that the undesired neighbor be evicted. It is the same with job hunting. Refugees are to be avoided."

The raids of May 19 are not the South African government's first attempt at intimidating its neighbors into closing their countries' borders to refugees. Botswana, Mozambique, Lesotho, and Swaziland have all felt the retribution of the South African government in recent years for their lenient refugee policies. Magnus Malan, the Minister of Defense, speaking before Parliament in February, gave a brutally clear message to neighboring states not to harbor dissidents. "This government will not permit murderous gangs to complete their training, planning, and preparation in the security and protection of neighboring states, and from there act against South Africa. The Security Forces will hammer them wherever we find them."

The tragedy of this policy is that in the South African government's attempts to destroy ANC bases in each of these countries, innocent refugees, as well as host country civilians, are often wounded or killed. There has been a blurring of the distinction between legitimate refugees and guerrillas. Joseph Hanlon, in his book *Beggar Your Neighbors*, alleges that this has been intentional, in order to allow the South African government to further harass the surrounding states. Because of these strikes and ones like them in the past, front-line nations are experiencing tension and strife within their countries on both individual and diplomatic levels.



"People are being dumped here, and there is seething discontent."

What is left of a children's school in KTC near Male

Despite the risk of further pressure and retaliation by South Africa, the governments of the front-line states are not abandoning their policies of accepting genuine refugees from South Africa. Sylvester Awuye is the head of the UNHCR branch office in Botswana. "I do not think the Botswana government would refuse asylum to South African refugees for fear of an attack because their policy is founded on their moral perceptions of the situation in South Africa and on the problem of apartheid." Dr. P.S. Mmusi, the vice president of Botswana, reinforced this commitment to South African refugees in November 1986 at a meeting in Washington, D.C.: "We will not allow the South Africans to stop us." Lesotho, Swaziland, Zambia, and Zimbabwe have also reaffirmed their commitment to continue to provide asylum to South African refugees.

Airport. World Vision/Tom Getman

Refugees from Neighboring Countries

The prohibitions against the presence of foreign Africans in South Africa were made more stringent in 1986 with the Police Emergency legislation, even for those who have had permits to work in the gold, coal, or uranium mines.

One cannot adequately look at the refugee situation in South Africa without recognizing the fact that there are a substantial number of Africans from surrounding countries who have chosen to seek asylum or employment in South Africa. They often come trying to escape the poorer, or sometimes more life endangering, conditions in their own nations.

One aspect of the treatment of refugees to be encouraged is many South Africans' acceptance of the more than 75,000 Mozambican refugees estimated by relief workers to be in South Africa. In addition, it appears that upwards of 200,000 will continue for the near future to seek refuge as illegal aliens. It is reported that, while the government's orders to the South African Defense Force include keeping refugees out or returning them to Mozambique, a number of cases have been reported where humanitarian action by individual soldiers has saved refugees' lives or has guided them to reception areas. They are subject to immediate deportation if caught before arriving at receiving centers. As many as 2,000 a month, by government count, are already being returned.

Of those Mozambicans who make the harrowing trip into South Africa, many of these ethnic cousins to black South Africans have been assimilated into the population. Others have been resettled by voluntary agencies into fairly well run and partially self-sufficient refugee villages. These refugees have been absorbed into the communities and often benefit from relief and health services provided locally by the authorities. Approximately 45,000 refugees live in Gazankulu, about 25,000 are in KaNgwane, and almost 5,000 reside in Lebowa. Mozambicans seeking refuge in South Africa must survive the frightful escape through minefields within their own country, electrified barbed wire fences, Mozambican and South African soldiers, wild animals, and days of living off of the parched land.

It remains to be seen how much longer Mozambican refugees will be allowed to come, or stay, in the country before they too are used as pawns in the larger struggle for political and economic power. A "push back" is a real possibility, as the South African government has already announced that 68,000 documented Mozambican workers in South Africa will have to return when their contracts expire, although 38,000 in early 1987 were given an extension. The death of Mozambique's President Samora Machel in October and the resulting destabilization only increase the uncertainty of their fate.

Relief and Development Involvement

Whites, including journalists, who communicate to people of color that apartheid laws are unjust and should not be obeyed are guilty of "treason," punishable by imprisonment for ten years.

Many Americans are individually and collectively, through private voluntary organizations, searching for ways outsiders can responsibly help in the transition and healing processes that lie ahead. Those who make the difficult emotional and spiritual journey to and from South Africa often see that the oppressed, and even the oppressors, are victims in a situation which requires from us a deep level of humility, understanding, and accountability. The protection of refugees will of necessity be a closely watched issue during this time of increased tension, suspicion, cross border raids, and counter raids.

Along with the U.S. government, many U.S. foundations, corporations, service organizations, and voluntary agencies are involved in South Africa through the funding of black relief, development, and education projects. In 1985, Congress voted $45 million for development assistance to black-led indigenous groups. Much of this money is assisting the internal "refugees" by helping to fund scholarships aimed at training community groups to expand and better run their own programs, and by increasing aid to human rights groups.

The recent U.S. sanctions legislation is not intended to prevent continued humanitarian assistance. In fact, there is every reason to believe that both Congress and the private voluntary organizations will add significant

Squatter camp near Capetown. World Vision/Tom Getman

amounts of funding. Members of Congress have been seeking to authorize additional funds to southern Africa through a supplemental appropriations bill. Also, InterAction, an American association of 120 private agencies, and its European counterpart, the International Council of Voluntary Agencies, are committed to finding ways of increasing their members' involvement in the region.

For South Africa's refugees, both internal and external, the fearful consequences of life under legal and economic apartheid continue. Several key pieces of legislation still on the books, as well as Police Emergency powers, allow the South African government to pursue its policy of uprooting families and villages and removing them to different locations. The authorities continue to bulldoze the meager shanties of squatters clinging to the family's most basic right to live together. As long as the policy of apartheid is enforced by such laws as the Group Areas Act, and continues to make possible the discrimination by race under the Population Registration Act, the displaced people within South Africa will continue to suffer injustices similar to those of other refugees throughout the world.

Like so many other victims of oppressive governments and circumstances, the "refugees" of South Africa call upon us to stand with them in their struggle to obtain freedom and justice within their land. This will require wisdom and a desire to negotiate between the powerful and the powerless which are not now present in the region. It is this author's hope that finally the awakening of the Christian conscience of the Calvinist Afrikaners and their economic self-interest will compel them to participate in a statesman-like resolution of the conflict. But even if the cruel laws of apartheid are all repealed, the challenge to redistribute the economic and political power will continue for some time to come.

Klaus Nurnberger, professor of ethics at the University of Southern Africa, summarizes four possible scenarios for the future of South Africa. First, there could be ruthless and successful white repression for several more decades. Secondly, there might be a quick and successful black revolution brought about by the police and military's loss of resolve. Thirdly, there is the possibility of an extended, no-win, low intensity war of attrition with both Marxist revolutionary and right-wing counter revolutionary dynamics driving the country into chaos and destruction. Finally, the South African government could make progress through concessions and adaptations leading to true reform and a multi-racial, black majority democracy. The first two alternatives are unlikely. The last, although hoped, worked, and prayed for, is improbable without some miraculous hinge event, as in the Philippines. Sadly, given the nationalistic recalcitrance of many—although certainly not all—South Africans, the third scenario seems to be the most likely. Yet, there are moderate people—even within the South African government—working toward reform. Therefore, we must continue to cling to the possibility of the surprise ending, where the powerful would move down to enable the poor to move up, until there is some political and economic balance.

Regardless of the outcome in the long term, it is inevitable that more refugees will be internally displaced by civil strife and forced to flee the country because of their politics. There will continue to be a need for refugee advocacy and support during the upcoming months and years as the struggle for fundamental justice continues. As many South Africans of all races work toward the long range goal of a multiracial democracy, the immediate needs of South Africa's "refugees" must not be forgotten.

The Empowerment of the Refugee Community

Robert Rubin

CONGRESSMEN WOO REFUGEE VOTE—If this headline had appeared during the past political campaign, the threat to reduce overseas refugee quotas might be significantly diminished; budget cuts to refugee social service and job training programs would be subject to stiffer political opposition; a greater understanding of conditions in countries producing refugees might even be realized. This scenario, however, exists only in the collective hopes of today's refugee community. Refugees who have entered the United States during the past ten years have yet to wield this type of influence on the political scene. Whatever degree of disenfranchisement may exist, however, should dissipate in the very near future, given the outstanding quality of emerging leadership in the refugee community. Refugees will then have established themselves as a viable political constituency whose needs cannot be ignored.

The empowerment of any minority group is generally affected by three factors: 1) the ability to establish an economic base; 2) meaningful access to the political process; and 3) effective use of the legal system. These factors must be seen as interdependent, with full empowerment contingent upon success in all three areas. The responsiveness of elected officials, for example, is often a function of the economic standing of a particular constituency. In the same way, a clear understanding of one's legal rights and the implicit threat of using the judicial system to enforce them will command the attention of public officials. Achieving success in these areas is a difficult task for any community, and the difficulty is compounded for those totally unfamiliar with American economic, political, and legal structures.

The refugee community must now build upon these gains and establish itself as a cohesive, forceful presence

What are the barriers to refugee empowerment and how can they be overcome? A general mood of xenophobia, fiscal cutbacks in public support for health, education, welfare, and housing, and an uncertain economy have all contributed to the erection of institutional barriers that deny or restrict the rights of refugees. These barriers must be attacked through the legal and legislative processes so that refugees' social and economic standing does not impede their participation in the political process.

For some constituencies, this task is more easily accomplished. For the refugee community, it can be fraught with fear, misunderstanding, and intimidation. Because of their experience as victims of government-sponsored persecution, refugees are understandably wary of any contact with governmental authorities and particularly fearful of initiating the contact. Furthermore, for refugees fleeing totalitarian countries, American society's emphasis on personal initiative can be very frightening. These refugees are accustomed to higher authorities making decisions for them. They may easily be overwhelmed by the myriad of options available to them, particularly when one might involve a direct challenge to an arbitrary governmental action.

Further exacerbating the situation, the refugees' apprehensiveness is often intentionally manipulated by persons here in their adopted homeland. The rights of Vietnamese fishermen around the country, for example, have often been grossly violated. The fishermen initially sought legal assistance, but ultimately declined to pursue litigation after expressing a genuine concern regarding verbal harassment and acts of violence by competing fishermen. While the fear of racially motivated violence is all too real, these same refugees also revealed an uneasiness about the effect of the contemplated legal action on their immigration status and the possibility of retribution from government officials.

This sense of foreboding must be overcome. Whether complaining to a landlord about unsafe conditions or resisting unfair labor practices on the job, refugees must be prepared to assert their interests vigorously. This cannot be accomplished without an adequate understanding of available legal remedies and their potential consequences. While eradicating xenophobia may indeed be a Sisyphian exercise, a more critical element of refugee empowerment is being able to recognize instances of discriminatory action and knowing how to respond.

MAAs Can Lead in Advocacy

The advocacy efforts of mutual assistance associations (MAAs) and other community-based organizations will be crucial in developing the community's awareness of legal rights and the political process. The MAAs, directed and run by refugees, are quickly able to engender the trust of the refugee community and, therefore, are better situated than traditional voluntary

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Cambodian and Lao refugees protest eviction in Chicago. Hector Alicea/Lerner Newspapers

agencies to educate and mobilize people around particular issues.

To succeed in this role, the MAAs must adapt to meet the changing needs of a diverse refugee population. For many refugees, the emphasis on early resettlement needs is no longer appropriate and must give way to long-term empowerment goals. This will require a shift in priorities for MAAs from focussing solely on employment-related services to a more broad-based community development role that encourages political organizing and assertion of legal rights.

This change in focus does create an obvious tension for MAAs between advancing the long-term needs of the community and the current availability of federal funding for early resettlement purposes. Federal funds are gradually being cut, however, and the MAAs must develop strategies to survive beyond the period of government support. More importantly, while federal priorities are singlemindedly employment related, MAAs have a broader vision and must resist the temptation of allowing a funding source to dictate the long-term needs of the community.

Nowhere is this conflict more evident than in the social service grants and contracts offered by the federal Office of Refugee Resettlement to MAAs. While perhaps unintended, the availability of these funds has encouraged MAAs to concentrate on developing social service delivery systems to the detriment of the community's long-term empowerment. As a consequence, the MAAs may be producing social service professionals rather than political leaders. This would be a particularly unfortunate result because it will distract MAAs from their more central role of marshaling the resources of the community to establish economic and political power bases. To avoid this conflict and ensure future financial stability, the MAAs must expand their funding base to include local governments, financial institutions, and other private sector sources. Ultimately, the priorities of the community must be dictated from within and not by public or private funders who have an agenda of their own.

Naturalization—A Key to Refugee Empowerment

As a first step toward political empowerment, the MAAs must develop community education programs that stress the importance of naturalization. While obtaining citizenship is the most elementary form of participation in the political process, the issue is more complicated for refugees. A decision to naturalize represents the final break with one's homeland, a particularly troubling dilemma for refugees who may long to return home when political conditions improve. However difficult that decision may be, refugees must acknowledge that political empowerment cannot be attained by a disenfranchised community.

Naturalization also provides important benefits to refugees with families remaining overseas. As refugee quotas continue to dwindle, immigrant visa petitions on behalf of relatives may be the only viable route for family reunification. As naturalized citizens, refugees can petition for spouses, children, parents, and siblings. Refugees with permanent resident status may petition only for spouses and unmarried children. Furthermore, in most instances, relatives of citizens are not subject to the lengthy delays in obtaining a visa that are inherent in the quota system governing entry of relatives of permanent residents. Thus, while perhaps not as critical for economic development or participation in the legal process, naturalization may be indispensable to successful family reunification and other pivotal aspects of long-term refugee resettlement.

High naturalization rates are key to refugee political empowerment, but registering to vote and actually participating in the electoral process will ultimately determine political clout. Here too, MAAs can play a leading role. The MAAs are in the unique position of understanding both the traditional ambivalence with which refugees regard the political process and the powerlessness of a disenfranchised community in American society. Free elections are not the norm in many countries from which refugees have fled and, thus, they understandably view with suspicion the idea of meaningful involvement in the selection of political leaders. This distrust of the system must be sensitively addressed through community outreach.

Once the element of distrust is overcome, coordinated efforts must be launched encouraging refugees to register to vote. Political forums must be established in which current issues of pressing concern to the community are regularly debated. If consensus is reached, the views of the community should be communicated to the appropriate public officials or political candidates.

Because the corporate structure of most MAAs prohibits supporting political candidates, the vehicle for such political lobbying should be separately incorporated political action committees. Through these committees, refugees can gauge the responsiveness of politicians on issues affecting their community. This type of involvement produces a more informed electorate better equipped to decide whether to support a particular candidate and thereby capable of playing a more influential role in the overall electoral process.

While sheer numbers will work to the advantage of the refugee community, this does not necessarily translate into political power. Asians, for example, represent 7.5 percent of California's population, but do not have a single representative in the state legislature. As long as ethnic minorities are under-represented politically, they are not likely to wield the type of influence their numbers might otherwise suggest.

The overall Asian population in California is expected to double within the next fifty years. During this same period, Vietnamese are expected to be the fastest growing Asian-American group and will become California's largest Asian ethnic group. Will the Vietnamese, and Southeast Asian refugees in general, be able to mobilize their burgeoning communities in order to build effective political power bases? To do so, they will have to overcome certain cultural barriers. The community will have to look beyond short-term resettlement issues and project itself as a long-term participant in the political process. Southeast Asians must overcome the fear associated with challenging government actions. Refugee leaders must educate the community on the importance of protesting arbitrary actions, pressuring elected officials, and generally making demands on the system to ensure its responsiveness.

A new U.S. citizen. INS

Some inroads have been made. In California, for instance, the Southeast Asian community has developed a close working relationship with Assemblyman Art Agnos, one of the most powerful figures in the state legislature. At the community's urging, the Assemblyman has sponsored many significant pieces of legislation affecting the educational and economic interests of refugees. This type of access to the legislative process is essential to political empowerment.

What about the Hispanic community? Will the hundreds of thousands of Central American asylum seekers, many of whom will legalize their status under the newly enacted Immigration Reform and Control Act, be able to establish themselves as a viable political constituency? A recent Census Bureau report reveals that Hispanics, the fastest growing population in the country, could increase sevenfold within the next century and make up more than 35 percent of the nation's population. Hispanics now comprise approximately 7 percent of the population. Will these figures translate into a corresponding increase in Hispanic voting power? Not if the voters in California have a say in it. On the same day these Census Bureau figures were announced, local officials in California initiated plans to eliminate Spanish from election material. Responding to the overwhelming passage of Proposition 63, which declared English the official language of the state, county officials also are seeking to convert voter registration forms and ballot envelopes into English only. It is only a matter of time before similar efforts are launched in the areas of health and education.

Within the next year, at least 25 states will have considered proposals to make English their official language. While such public sentiment does not bode well for newcomers, it does underscore the importance of a critical issue for the refugee community—empowerment must not come at the expense of other ethnic minority groups. The community must resist the appeal of certain politicians, for example, who have suggested that refugee quotas are being cut due to the heavy influx of undocumented aliens. Immigrants and refugees, whether undocumented Mexicans, refugees from Southeast Asia or asylum seekers from Central America, must stand firm against all such divisive efforts. Significantly, refugees leaders in California now regret not having directed greater resources toward forging coalitions with other immigrant groups in opposing Proposition 63. Whatever different interests might exist on a single issue, immigrants and refugees must recognize that they are generally perceived as a single community and, therefore, on most issues, will be uniformly subject to differential treatment. This socio-political reality can be ignored only at the expense of a lost opportunity for establishing a concerted, meaningful presence in the political arena.

The importance of building these coalitions is highlighted when one considers that the entire immigrant and refugee community is now confronting an issue with the potential for undermining any hope for a stable economic base—the imposition of sanctions on employers hiring undocumented workers. Without a united front to combat the more invidious aspects of this recently enacted law, *all* newcomers may witness the institutionalization of alienage-based employment discrimination. Under the guise of complying with the law and refusing to hire "illegal aliens," employers can avoid sanctions while discriminating against legally present persons of "foreign appearance." President Reagan suggested this scenario when he signed the Immigration Reform and Control Act and stated that employers would be free to use such employee screening practices as aptitude and English language tests even if they bear no relationship to the job in question. Unless prospective employees can present evidence that employers "intentionally discriminated," the President stated, "the employer need not offer *any* explanation for his employee selection process." A requirement to show discriminatory intent is a particularly high standard of proof. The author of the antidiscrimination provisions in the law, Congressman Barney Frank, called the President's characterization of the antidiscrimination provisions "intellectually dishonest, mean-spirited" and incorrect.

Refugees must acknowledge that political empowerment cannot be obtained by a disenfranchised community. INS

There is also an exception to these provisions on discrimination which allows employers to hire a citizen over an alien if the two individuals are equally qualified. Depending upon the meaning of "equally qualified," this exception could swallow entirely the prohibition on discrimination. As a result, refugees, aliens with work authorization, and even naturalized citizens may find themselves without any remedy to protect against arbitrary hiring policies.

The ability of these groups to coalesce around the issue of "employer sanctions" will determine whether they can overcome this most serious threat to their economic stability. Regulations implementing the employer sanctions component of the Act will be promulgated shortly, and the immigrant and refugee community must endeavor to influence the regulatory process. Thereafter, common litigation strategies must be formulated to challenge specific instances of employment discrimination in the courts. The economic well-being of all ethnic minorities is very much at stake.

Using the Legal System to Combat Discrimination

The success of prior legal efforts initiated by refugees does provide some measure of hope in combatting alienage-based discrimination. Although, as noted, certain actions are not filed due to misplaced apprehensions, refugees generally have effectively utilized the courts to advance important statutory and constitutional rights. Unlike the legislative process which oftentimes is responsive only to voting interests, the judicial system is open to all persons, irrespective of immigration status.

Haitian refugees, for example, have

successfully challenged the government's failure to provide due process rights in the conduct of their immigration proceedings and thereby avoided deportation. Salvadoran asylum seekers have obtained preliminary relief in requiring INS to inform them of their right to apply for asylum before enforcing deportations. Another class of asylum applicants secured an injunction against INS for arbitrarily denying requests for employment authorization. The ability to obtain employment authorization is particularly critical to refugees' economic empowerment now that sanctions will be imposed on employers for hiring undocumented workers.

Other refugee groups, more secure in their immigration status, have challenged institutional barriers affecting their long-term resettlement. Onerous residency requirements, for example, have restricted the rights of refugees seeking to attend state colleges and universities. A statewide class of refugees in California obtained a court order enjoining enforcement of this discriminatory policy. As a result, refugees are now able to attend state institutions of higher learning and receive state financial aid under the same terms and conditions as United States citizens. Refugees in Texas, Arizona, and Colorado, subject to similar restrictions on their right to education, have expressed a strong interest in pursuing legal remedies.

The refugee community has required little prodding in asserting its rights when legal barriers impede economic development. A prime example was provided last year when the federal government attempted to withhold $11.5 million earmarked by Congress for the Targeted Assistance Program which allocates funds to counties heavily impacted with refugees. This program not only offers refugees important job training skills, but has been instrumental in the establishment of a number of refugee businesses. Technical assistance with securing business loans, permits, and licenses also has been provided to refugee business start-ups and expansions.

As soon as word leaked about the proposed withholding of funds, refugee groups from Florida, Washington, Illinois, Colorado, Texas, and California moved quickly in urging the federal Office of Refugee Resettlement and the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) to release the impounded monies. Less than two weeks prior to the end of the fiscal year, the OMB announced that it would not release the $11.5 million. Bolstered by its previous successes, the community looked to the courts and sought immediate judicial relief, knowing that monies not spent prior to the end of the fiscal year revert to the general fund of the Treasury. Individual refugees and mutual assistance associations, together with members of Congress led by Congressman Don Edwards, obtained an emergency restraining order which prevented the reversion of the funds only hours prior to the end of the fiscal year. This decision mandated that the $11.5 million be released immediately and made available to the refugee job training programs in accord with Congressional intent.

This piece of litigation provided the refugee community with a textbook example of the manner in which a democratic form of government functions. It involved an arbitrary action by the executive branch of government thwarting the will of the legislative branch. As injured private citizens, refugees turned to the third branch of government, the judiciary, to protect their interests. The case also illustrated that participation in the political process must mean more than simply electing our public officials. Refugees are now aware that when elected officials act in ways that are detrimental to their interests, there are available remedies. This litigation afforded refugees these important insights into the interplay between the three branches of government and leaves the community in that much stronger a position the next time it must utilize the political process to advance its interests.

Finally, participation in the legal process cannot be limited to major class actions. Indeed, involvement in these types of systemic issues is often facilitated by common knowledge of the problem and the early intervention of legal advocates. Most legal problems, however, are known only to the individual affected. Without an understanding of these more basic legal rights affecting one's daily life, refugees will be unable to identify those unlawful actions that can be remedied through the legal process. Community education on legal rights, therefore, must include information regarding landlord-tenant laws, wage and hour regulations, permit and license requirements, zoning laws, as well as health and safety regulations. Likewise, refugees receiving public assistance should be educated on the fair hearing process so they are able to challenge actions that arbitrarily terminate or reduce their benefits. Only through a full understanding and effective assertion of their most basic rights will refugees be able to participate meaningfully in a democratic process.

For refugees who have entered this country during the past decade, their future is at a critical juncture. The onslaught of English-only laws is threatening political empowerment, while job discrimination under the new immigration law threatens their economic base. The immediate priority must be full-scale political organizing and community education regarding legal rights; the extent to which this effort is successful will determine whether refugees progress from a disenfranchised underclass to a viable political constituency. Refugees must establish action-oriented vehicles by which their views are effectively communicated not only to political leaders, but to the public at large. Common misperceptions fed by xenophobic attitudes must be dispelled while the legitimate needs and goals of the community are skillfully and forcefully advanced in the political arena.

Petitioning the government to redress grievances is one of the most basic of our constitutional principles. The right is rendered meaningless, however, and cannot be exercised unless the aggrieved individual fully appreciates its significance. The refugee community must be alert to instances in which it is being subjected to arbitrary treatment. Refugee leadership must impress upon the community that passivity in the face of discriminatory action serves only to undermine the political strength of all refugees.

Refugees can assume their rightful place on the political scene through an intensive campaign of community organizing and forging of coalitions with other minority groups. Having successfully utilized the courts to secure important rights, refugees are in a position to command greater respect from public officials, thereby facilitating full integration into the political system. The refugee community must now build upon these gains and establish itself as a cohesive, forceful presence capable of influencing policymaking at all levels of government on issues affecting its vital interests.

When Refugees Are Victims of Torture

Neal R. Holtan, M.D., M.P.H.

Many people are surprised to learn that torture is still a widespread phenomenon. After all, the use of torture as a legitimate policy of government is not officially sanctioned in any country. It is clearly and universally held to violate international law. Nevertheless, Amnesty International estimates that more than two-thirds of the nations of the world practice or condone torture. And while only a small percentage of the world's refugees are also torture victims, their number is large enough to have come to the attention of health workers in Europe and North America. For example, of the several thousand refugees arriving in Denmark each year, there are enough torture victims to keep the Rehabilitation Center for Torture Victims in Copenhagen very busy. In fact, there is a long waiting list. In Saint Paul, Minnesota, a 1984 survey of 98 troubled refugees from Southeast Asia who were clients of a refugee social adjustment project found that 61 percent of them answered that they had been tortured at some time during the previous ten years.[1]

In any particular country, the percentage of refugees who are also torture victims depends on the country of origin of the refugees. In Denmark and Canada, many torture victims are South Americans. Tortured refugees from Iran are now being seen in Denmark. On the west coast of the United States, Central Americans who have been tortured are numerous. Victims of torture from Southeast Asia, especially Cambodia, are seen in the United States. Tortured Ugandans have been cared for in Toronto. A surprisingly large percentage of Ethiopian refugees in the United States have experienced torture.

Even the definition of torture may be culturally relative. It is expected that one is beaten while in prison in some countries. In 1984, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment was unanimously adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. It opens with a definition of torture:

> For the purposes of this Convention, torture means any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession, punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity. It does not include pain or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to lawful sanctions.

Another author has said, more succinctly, that torture is not "*arbitrary* and *sporadic* misuse of authority" but rather a "*systematic* means of political control."[2]

People who work with refugees or who are interested in understanding their situation need to become aware of the possibility that some of them were victims of torture in their homelands. Once in refuge, few victims spontaneously disclose that they experienced torture, a trait they share with victims of other kinds of physical abuse. It is thus important that whether or not they have been tortured is a question that needs to be asked directly of troubled refugees; otherwise, the underlying cause of their problems will go undetected.

The tortured refugees rarely talk about their experiences unless encouraged to do so by a sensitive person whom they have come to trust. Once they do begin to verbalize, the burst of emotion which follows may be cathartic. In a different setting, however, perhaps a hostile or threatening one such as a deportation hearing, the survivors of torture may later re-tell their stories in such an unemotional way that they appear to be lying.[3]

Genevieve A. Cowgill, director of Survivors International in Toronto, has pointed out that survivors of torture are devastated when others do not seem to believe their stories. Their self esteem, broken and shattered by torture, receives yet another blow when others fail to believe or comprehend what has happened to them. Such traumatic experiences lead them to conclude that it is best not to mention their history of torture.

The disbelief on the part of those who come in contact with a refugee who has been tortured may be a form of psychological denial. Torture is so repugnant to think about and so antithetical to the premises of the helping professions that the initial reaction on the part of a helping person may be disbelief. Even if unstated, the denial may be communicated to the tortured victim through subtle behaviors and facial expressions.

Recognizing the Symptoms of Torture

Much has been learned about survivors of torture from the work of the Rehabilitation and Research Center for Torture Victims in Copennagen and the Canadian Center for Investigation and Prevention of Torture in Toronto. Their studies have documented a consistent set of physical and psychological effects from the torture experience, such as back pain, headaches, abdominal pain, insomnia, poor memory, and many other conditions. Psychological difficulties, found in nine out of ten survivors in Canada, were obvious even after much time had elapsed for the

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victims, sometimes a period of years.

The Danish center is based on the philosophy that torture victims are normal people who experienced a normal reaction to an extremely abnormal situation. The survivors are not looked upon as patients with psychiatric illness. Therapists in Copenhagen believe that it is important for rehabilitation to avoid treating the survivors as patients in a medical setting. Therapists do not order unpleasant or painful medical tests and are reluctant to subject the survivor to batteries of psychological tests. Instead, they rely more heavily on their considerable experience in working with torture victims.

There are similarities between torture victims and other people who have suffered severe trauma, abuse, or fear of death—rape victims, hostages, military personnel in war situations, and concentration camp inmates. In addition to psychological trauma, these groups may also have suffered head injuries and severe malnutrition, both of which can produce neurologic and psychiatric difficulties at a later date.

In the United States, researchers have tried to understand the problems of torture victims by using criteria set up by the American Psychiatric Association in its *Diagnostic and Statistical Manual III*. The diagnostic category that seems to fit best with the psychological status of many torture victims is the post-traumatic stress disorder (PTSD), chronic or delayed. There is no distinct category for a particular "torture syndrome." Many observers believe that it will become a subcategory of PTSD once more data are available about larger numbers of torture survivors. PTSD is defined as a constellation of symptoms which follows a "psychologically traumatic event that is generally outside the range of usual human experience." Three specific diagnostic criteria characteristic for PTSD are described in the manual.

Survivors of torture often manifest the first of the three criteria for PTSD, namely the re-experiencing or recollection of their trauma. Such re-experiencing, which is recurrent and unwanted, occurs as remembrance of the suffering or a sudden feeling that the torture is happening again. These feelings may be triggered through a particular stimulus in the environment or through a recurring thought.

The second diagnostic criterion of PTSD also occurs in some survivors of torture. They may exhibit little responsiveness to the world around them and have markedly reduced interest in any of life's significant activities. Likewise, the victims may have a strong feeling of detachment and distance from other people in general, even their own families.

The third diagnostic criterion for PTSD contains a group of specific physical and mental conditions which many torture survivors have also described to therapists. Survivors may experience marked physical and psychological symptoms such as an exaggerated startle response, disturbed sleep, survival guilt, memory impairment, and inability to concentrate.

Psychological problems may occur long years after the actual torture experience. They do not seem to be related to the personality of the survivor before his or her torture. They are involuntary and may be denied consciously or subconsciously by the survivor.

Survivors of torture may not fit neatly into psychiatric diagnostic categories and may even resist attempts to categorize them. Yet, in addition to PTSD, they may manifest anxiety, depression, or simple adjustment difficulties secondary to being a refugee in a strange land. Studies have repeatedly shown a high prevalence of psychological problems among survivors. For proper care of those who do have problems, an evaluation by a psychiatrist or psychologist is the best way to assess their status and arrive at a proper care plan for rehabilitation.

Tortured refugees rarely talk about their experiences unless encouraged to do so by a sensitive person whom they have come to trust. UNHCR/R. Giling

Therapies for Victims of Torture

The therapies for troubled survivors of torture are controversial, partly because so little information is available about them. No study of treatment methods has been reported which uses the criteria of the DSM III system of diagnosis. Therefore, the efficacies of individual or group psychotherapies, medications, relaxation techniques, and other treatments are unknown, except in the individual experience of a few therapists. Complicated problems arise in therapy due to language and cultural barriers between the victims and the therapists. Psychiatric assessment instruments may not be applicable for use with clients who are illiterate, who are from a drastically different culture, or who are undergoing severe adjustment problems secondary to being a refugee. Specific therapies, for example psychotherapeutic insight, may be culturally uncomfortable for some clients.

There is evidence that a case manager such as a social worker is essential in maintaining coordination among a survivor's helping professionals, personal friends, family members, legal advisors, clergy, and employers. The case manager is important in shielding the torture victim from constantly retelling his or her story to a series of therapists.

The Danish center uses three phases at the start of treatment. A screening procedure or initial registration consists of a referral from an Amnesty International physician. This initial registration is simply a way for the Center to keep a list of potential clients.

The next step is an intake or registration interview. An experienced physician or psychologist at the center talks with the torture victim to determine when and where the client was tortured and the forms of torture that were endured. The sequelae of the torture—the pathological conditions which result—are discussed, along with the general status of health and social well-being. The detailed interview takes about three hours. Workers at the Danish center are clear about the emotionally demanding nature of the interview and the importance of the experience to the client's future attitude toward the center and the treatment. The registration interview therefore forms the basis for planning the full examination and treatment of the client.

After years of torture while detained in Argentina without charge or trial, Rosemary Riveros was released into exile and, in 1983, was able to reunite with her daughter in Lima, Peru.
Amnesty International

Following the interview, the client is assigned to a permanent psychotherapist, social worker, and physiotherapist. Medical and dental examinations are also conducted. Most importantly, a psychotherapeutic process occurring over numerous two-hour interviews expands on the basic information given in the registration interview.

Dr. Frederick Allodi in Toronto has pinpointed four issues that psychiatrists and other health professionals need to keep in mind during the treatment of torture victims. First and foremost is the issue of trust. The torture survivor needs to have a secure feeling toward the therapist and the institutions with which the therapist is allied. Second, the initial interviews may invoke a catharsis and a regression on the part of the survivor. The outpouring of emotions which accompanies the description of the torture and the problems which have resulted from it may be very intense and even cause the survivor to regress into a seemingly more troubled state. Third, there may be strong feelings of guilt in the torture survivor, especially when friends or relatives of the victim were also tortured or perhaps killed as part of the torture process. In contrast to the Jewish Holocaust survivors who were found to have severe and existential feelings of guilt resistant to any amount of reassurance, torture victims experience guilt which is an anger directed inwardly. Treatment helps to relieve and dispel this type of guilt because blaming and retribution directed toward the torturers may be helpful to compensate symbolically for the suffering. Some victims become active in human rights organizations and feel a sense of victory over their persecutors. Finally, the torture victim must eventually establish a new sense of integration with society. Being a refugee works against integration and hampers the feeling of security necessary for continuity with the culture. Social skills training is a necessary part of the total rehabilitation process.

Specific programs for victims of torture are available only in a few scattered places in Western Europe, North America, and South America. When comprehensive programs are not available, a make-shift rehabilitation program can be devised by a sensitive health professional or social service provider knowledgeable about refugee issues and familiar with local resources. Written information is increasingly available about how to assess and care for victims of torture.

In summary, there are several recommendations to those who work with refugees who have been tortured. International agencies, governments, and individuals need to be aware of torture as a fairly common experience among certain groups of refugees. They should not assume that refugees will spontaneously talk about torture or even admit to having been victims. Some refugee health problems and difficulties in social relationships may be symptoms of an underlying psychological syndrome which has resulted from torture. The manifestations may appear years after the torture experience. Victims of torture need to be protected from unnecessary and avoidable trauma such as painful medical tests which might remind them of their torture experience. Insensitive psychological evaluations and evaluations which are not followed by a well planned process of therapy must be avoided. Finally, they should remember that the goal is to rehabilitate the torture victim, to restore a feeling of self-worth, and to rebuild connections with society.

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2. Stover E. and Nightingale, E.O. *The Breaking of Bodies and Minds.* New York: Freeman and Co., 1983, p.3
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Amnesty International Promotes Protection of Refugees

John G. Healey

The difference between a refugee and a prisoner of conscience or a torture victim is often purely circumstantial.

When repressive governments begin to fill their prisons and labor camps, or embark on programs of political murder, it is inevitable that other citizens in similar circumstances take the only option open to them: flight.

Amnesty International is necessarily concerned with the plight of this vulnerable population. Often without the protection of any state, refugees remain at high risk for human rights abuse. In various parts of the world, refugee camps have been raided by both government and opposition forces. Refugees have been considered unwelcome guests and frequently resented in areas where they are in large concentration, easily falling victim to abuse.

Amnesty works within a purposely narrow and specific mandate. That mandate requires the organization to work towards the release of prisoners of conscience, fair and prompt trials for political prisoners, and an end to torture and executions.

Although the word *refugee* is not specifically mentioned within Amnesty's mandate, one of the organization's methods of working towards these statutory objectives is to prevent the forcible return of anyone to a country where he or she can reasonably be expected to become a prisoner of conscience, or be tortured, or executed—either inside the judicial framework or outside it through politically motivated assassination.

Amnesty bases its refugee work on the fundamental principle of nonrefoulement, or nonreturn, of refugees as set forth in the United Nations Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees. The focus of Amnesty's refugee work is prevention.

How each national section of Amnesty International handles that assignment varies widely. Throughout the 1960s and 1970s, each national section evolved its own refugee programs. It wasn't until the mid-1970s that Amnesty's International Executive Committee, recognizing the need for a cohesive refugee program, asked the German and Dutch national sections to initiate a study of the refugee situations, and government policies affecting them, in countries with Amnesty sections. The study also focused on how the various sections were involved in refugee work.

In 1978, the completed study revealed that, while there was great diversity in the way the different sections handled refugee programs, there were common threads running throughout.

A major thrust of all Amnesty programs is information. Because of Amnesty's vast research capabilities and reliability as a source of information on international human rights, it can assist refugees by providing credible information about their countries of origin.

Most governments accept in principle that they should not return refugees to a country where they are likely to be subjected to major human rights violations. In practice, however, the refugee often has to plead his or her case before a host government which does not believe that there is sufficient evidence that the individual will be subjected to persecution if returned home. While it is often not possible for Amnesty to provide specific information relating to an individual, it can usually offer general information about human rights conditions in a given country, and sometimes has specific information relating to an individual case.

Many Amnesty national sections make this kind of service available. Most sections also provide some form of legal help to individual refugees, take initiatives to improve asylum legislation inside their own country, and cooperate with other refugee-oriented organizations.

In Europe, Amnesty's involvement in refugee work has increased to such an extent that, for many people, this has become the most visible aspect of the organization's work. In the Federal Republic of Germany, Amnesty's section examined 899 new asylum cases in 1985, finally opposing refoulement in 622 of them. The West German section also initiated an asylum campaign, organizing two conferences: one addressing asylum policy in the Federal Republic, and the other on asylum and human rights.

In the Netherlands, Dutch authorities have recently been tightening asylum procedures to discourage refugees from entering the country. Amnesty's Dutch section has campaigned actively against this. In 1985, Amnesty's International Secretariat intervened on behalf of a group of refugees from Sri Lanka in the Netherlands.

The Norwegian Amnesty section also recently intervened on behalf of six Iranian refugees in danger of being returned to Turkey. As a matter of principle, Amnesty opposes the return of refugees to any third country from which they could ultimately be returned to a country of possible persecution. The section negotiated with Norwegian authorities for a month before the government invited the six refugees back to Norway. Norwegian authorities have subsequently agreed to ask Amnesty for information before sending applicants back to their countries, and have agreed to have more regular contacts with the organization in the future.

Amnesty USA's refugee work is concentrated in its Washington, D.C. and San Francisco offices. In Washington, Amnesty keeps track of legislative and executive government initiatives relating to refugee protection. In San Francisco, Amnesty provides letters and other material to lawyers working on

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individual cases. A task force of Amnesty members works with the staff on refugee policies.

Amnesty USA's refugee work began when the organization testified before congressional committees formulating the 1980 Refugee Act. At the hearings, Amnesty stated that three principles should guide refugee law in this country: no one should be returned to a country where he or she will be persecuted; refugees from all countries are essentially equal and should be accepted on the basis of humanitarian need rather than political expediency; and U.S. refugee law should include people still trapped in their own countries, such as detainees, who are not covered by the United Nations treaty on refugees.

In general, the U.S. Refugee Act recognized these principles. However, Amnesty remains concerned that guidelines and procedures established by immigration authorities may, in fact, contradict or undermine these principles.

Amnesty has expressed concern at some U.S. immigration detention and interdiction procedures. In February 1982, Amnesty wrote to the U.S. Attorney General about procedures applied by the government to Haitians seeking asylum in the United States, expressing concern at the practice of intercepting boats carrying Haitians at sea and holding expulsion hearings aboard U.S. Coast Guard vessels without allowing the Haitians legal representation. Amnesty also asked about the procedures applying to approximately 2,700 Haitians then detained in the United States and Puerto Rico. The government responded that immigration officials had acted in accordance with U.S. law. However, in June 1983, a federal district court judge ordered the conditional release of Haitian asylum seekers on the grounds that the Justice Department had made a procedural error when it adopted the policy of detention.

Amnesty USA has also campaigned vigorously for extended voluntary departure status for Salvadoran nationals to grant them temporary safe haven in the United States. During both the 98th and 99th Congresses, Amnesty supported provisions of the Moakley-DeConcini bill, calling for a halt to deportation of Salvadorans and, subsequently, Nicaraguans seeking refuge in the United States. As part of this campaign, Amnesty USA testified before a congressional subcommittee on immigration, refugees, and international law in April 1984, stating the organization's concerns regarding the temporary supension of deportation of Salvadoran refugees. Amnesty depended heavily on individual members during much of this campaign, asking them to write to their representatives to request support for the legislation. Many members also visited their representatives to request support for the bill personally.

Connected with the refugee debate in this country is the issue of sanctuary. After observing the trial of eight church sanctuary workers in Tucson, Arizona, convicted of conspiring to smuggle illegal aliens into the United States, Amnesty International decided that, if imprisoned, it would consider the eight as prisoners of conscience.

In making the announcement in June 1986, Amnesty stated that, while international human rights standards do not require the government of a country to admit to its territory persons other than citizens of that country, they do stipulate that governments should not deport refugees to countries where their life or freedom would be threatened on account of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or because of their political opinion.

Amnesty stated that its research had established that the United States had applied its legal controls on immigration in a way which denied Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees in the United States the right to remain here. Amnesty based the decision to adopt the eight church workers on the contention that the sanctuary workers assisted Salvadoran and Guatemalan refugees who, if returned, could have been in danger of human rights violations under Amnesty's mandate—including arbitrary seizure, torture, "disappearance," and extrajudicial execution.

Amnesty concluded that the court had convicted the defendants of violating laws which, as applied by the United States Immigration and Naturalization Service, facilitate the violation of human rights to which Amnesty is opposed.

Increasingly, California and the Southwest are becoming points of entry for asylum seekers entering the United States. This is among the reasons why most of Amnesty's individual refugee work is conducted out of the San Francisco office. The casework is handled by a small staff assisted by volunteers. Amnesty USA's Refugee Task Force and Legal Support Network play valuable roles in analyzing refugee and asylum issues and recommending Amnesty strategy and programs. Amnesty's regional offices also keep records of asylum attorneys and provide this information to foreign nationals seeking asylum.

While the U.S. section's refugee program has grown substantially in response to overwhelming demand, conditions for refugees in the United States are not unique. They are, in fact, similar to those in other industrialized countries where third world refugees seek protection. Unfortunately, many governments today, perhaps burdened by their own domestic problems, and perhaps reflecting public opinion, seem less willing to accept refugees. This is a fact that many people concerned with the plight of more than 10 million refugees must address.

Finally, refugees themselves play a major role in Amnesty's own work. Throughout its 25 years, Amnesty has often depended on refugees, refugee organizations, and exiles as a vital source of information on human rights conditions inside their homelands. Their testimonies, along with in-depth research and information gathering done by the Amnesty International Secretariat in London, have enabled the organization to paint a composite picture of human rights abuse in various parts of the world.

Refugees are inevitable while governments continue to violate their own citizens' basic human rights. Amnesty International is working to see this abuse ended. In the long run, undoubtedly, this is the most vital service Amnesty International can provide the world's 10 million refugees.

Conscientious Objectors as Refugees

Bill Frelick

The community of nations has been slow to recognize the right of conscientious objectors to refuse military service, and even slower to grant asylum to those who flee countries where conscientious objection is not recognized. Although the right to freedom of thought, conscience, and religion is recognized in the UN Universal Declaration of Human Rights and is accepted, in principle, internationally, nations have been considerably more reluctant to accept certain actions arising from individual exercise of conscience.

Customary international law recognizes the right of governments to conscript their citizens for military service. Article 8 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights states that neither military service nor alternative service, where conscientious objection is recognized, can be considered as forced labor. The Covenant does not, however, directly address whether conscientious objection is a right, or whether governments have a responsibility to offer alternative service to those who refuse to bear arms.

In a survey of member states conducted by the UN in 1983, 40 countries said they conscript citizens into the military without recognizing conscientious objection at all, not even to the extent of allowing conscientious objectors to perform unarmed duties within the military itself. This essay focuses primarily on the principle of asylum as applied to conscientious objectors fleeing those countries. They include such refugee generating states as Afghanistan, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Iran, and Iraq. Other countries believed to have similarly restrictive policies, such as Nicaragua, did not respond to the UN survey. Still others, such as Malawi, though not actively engaged in conscription at the present time, have laws that would not recognize conscientious objection in the event of conscription.

This article is concerned not with those conscientious objectors who remain in their countries to face imprisonment, but with those who opt to flee. An almost universal stigma is attached to the terms "deserter" and "draft evader" as implying cowardice and disloyalty. However, a conscientious objector who flees his country is, precisely, either a deserter or a draft evader—the stigma attached to these terms notwithstanding. Countries of asylum need to overcome their prejudices concerning the terms "evader" and "deserter" to give fair consideration to the factors that motivated the person's flight. Arguably, there are a variety of reasons for draft evasion and desertion, and, obviously, not all who desert or evade military service do so on conscientious grounds. But many who flee are likely to do so for reasons of conscience, and a number of factors, in practice, have weighed against fair

Child-soldiers in Iran are forcibly conscripted. The government does not recognize conscientious objection.
Iran Liberation

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determination of the reasons for refusal to serve or fight.

Although the Consultative Assembly of the Council of Europe and the UN Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities have both recognized conscientious objection as a right, the UN has so far not adopted a comprehensive resolution doing so, and even the Council of Europe's Committee of Ministers has not recommended that conscientious objection be included in the European Convention on Human Rights.

The lack of universal recognition of the right to conscientious objection creates a circumstance which is likely to prejudice the attitudes of states determining whether to grant objectors asylum. The international instruments for refugee protection, the 1951 Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees and its accompanying 1967 Protocol, make no direct reference to considering conscientious objectors who flee their countries as refugees.

The Convention defines a refugee as a person with "a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion" who is unwilling or unable to return to his home country. A person's claim to refugee status turns on the question of persecution. A number of courts both in the United States and abroad have held that draft evaders fear prosecution, not persecution. They have held that countries have the right to conscript, that failure to respond to the call violates legitimate laws, and that the penalties for refusal to serve in the armed forces are not persecution because of a person's beliefs, but rather prosecution for failure to obey laws. Although the person's violation of draft laws may be conscientiously motivated, this school of thought holds that the government has the right to enforce laws which do not in themselves violate a person's rights. The analogous situation would be that of a person engaged in civil disobedience who is arrested for trespassing. Such protesters are not arrested for their political opinion, but for the specific acts they perform to express their opinions, acts which may well violate universally recognized laws, such as laws that prevent a person from sitting in the middle of a busy intersection or from blocking the entrance to a public building.

One notable exception to the usual reluctance of the world community to recognize conscientious objection as a right and to offer asylum to those fleeing conscription for reasons of conscience is UN General Assembly Resolution 33/165, which recognizes the right of South African citizens to refuse to serve in the armed forces on the grounds of opposing apartheid and calls upon member states to grant safe transit and asylum to those fleeing South African conscription for this reason. The resolution does not require that South African conscientious objectors be pacifists, only that they oppose participation in military enforcement of apartheid. The General Assembly determined that refusal to serve in the South African armed forces is a right because apartheid is juridically a crime against humanity, and all persons and nations are considered to have a duty to refrain from any act in furtherance of a crime against humanity.

While the apartheid system of South Africa is uniquely abhorrent, the principles underlying Resolution 33/165 could be applicable to other situations. Objection to military enforcement of other internationally condemned acts could include grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions, genocide, military aggression, and crimes against humanity. This would be consistent with principles of humanitarian law incorporated in the Geneva Conventions and with the Nuremberg Principles that hold soldiers responsible for war crimes.

When Prosecution Equals Persecution

The UN High Commissioner for Refugees' *Handbook on Procedures and Criteria for Determining Refugee Status* states that

> where the type of military action, with which an individual does not wish to be associated, is condemned by the international community as contrary to basic rules of human conduct, punishment for

Young boys are forcibly conscripted in El Salvador.
The Christian Science Monitor/R. Norman Matheny

> desertion or draft evasion could, in the light of all other requirements of the definition, *in itself* be regarded as persecution (emphasis added).

In other words, in this case punishment for draft evasion would not have to be disproportionate or discriminatory in order for refugee status to be granted. Prosecution, in this case, does equal persecution.

The question is particularly relevant today, where both sides in the Iran/Iraq war have been found to violate Geneva Convention standards for the conduct of war and where many refugees are draft evaders and deserters. Western intelligence sources reportedly estimate about 100,000 Iranian draft evaders at the present time and Iraqi opposition groups claim comparable numbers of deserters and draft evaders from the Iraqi armed forces. In June, coinciding with a renewed Iranian conscription drive, 3,000 Iranians fled to West Germany. In October, an Iranian *gendarmerie* regiment commander was quoted in the Iranian press as saying, "During the first six months of the current year, arrests of conscripts have increased thirteenfold." He added, "The figures on absentee conscripts in 1985-6 reveal a hundredfold increase over the previous year." Although less information is available about Iraqi draft evaders, Amnesty International has expressed concern repeatedly about allegations that "large numbers" of army deserters have been executed.

Punishment for deserters or evaders of service in military occupation forces that have been condemned by the international community might also be viewed in itself as persecution. The UN General Assembly, for example, has repeatedly called for the withdrawal of Vietnamese forces from Cambodia. Yet, some 300-400 Vietnamese military deserters who fled service in Cambodia have been stranded in the Thai transit center of Chon Buri since 1981 with little hope of resettlement. Resettlement countries have turned a deaf ear to their situation, based as much on a visceral prejudice against military deserters as on suspicions due to prior service in a communist army. Despite the refusal of the United States and other countries that traditionally have resettled Southeast Asian refugees to consider these people, the deputy director of the Thai National Security Council has said, "Their repatriation is not viable since Hanoi may persecute them for abandoning their duty."

The principle of prosecution being equivalent to persecution is applicable to another category of draft evaders as well. The UNHCR *Handbook* says there are cases "where the necessity to perform military service may be the *sole ground* for a claim to refugee status, i.e., when a person can show that the performance of military service would have required his participation in military action contrary to his genuine political, religious, or moral convictions, or to valid reasons of conscience."

Many conscientious objectors base their refusal to bear arms on deep religious and ethical grounds—the pacifist stand. Such objectors are likely to oppose war in all cases without reservation. In such cases, the principles underlying the pacifist stand reflect fundamental beliefs held by an individual to be essential to the moral conduct of his life. Freedom of belief cannot be truly recognized as a basic human right if people are compelled to act in ways that absolutely contradict and violate their core beliefs.

Other acts of civil disobedience do not, in themselves, express the fundamental beliefs of the protester. The law is violated to draw attention to some other perceived evil—blood is poured on the draft record, the entranceway to the Pentagon is blocked—not because pouring blood or blocking entrances, per se, are essential to the conduct of a person's life. Conscientious objection to military service, however, is disobedience of a different order. In this case, the law itself that requires a person to bear arms is perceived as the evil; to obey such a law would violate the dictates of the individual's own conscience. To punish a person for refusing to do so is to persecute that person on the grounds of religion, whether or not a particular religious label is applied.

U.S. Asylum Policies Biased Against Refugees Fleeing Military Service

Despite the UNHCR *Handbook*, which generally is relied upon by the Board of Immigration Appeals and the courts for interpreting terms undefined by the U.S. Refugee Act of 1980, immigration authorities in the United States generally have paid scant attention to those sections dealing with conscientious objection and have taken a dim view of conscientious objectors seeking asylum or resettlement as refugees. Perhaps the memory of American draft evaders seeking asylum in Canada during the Vietnam war prejudices the architects and enforcers of U.S. asylum policy. Ignorance of the developing international recognition of conscientious objection as a human right also likely works against such applicants. And U.S. authorities have shown a tendency to latch onto UNHCR's oft-stated position that conscription, in itself, does not constitute persecution, and to have interpreted it illogically to mean that evasion of conscription therefore precludes consideration of a person as a refugee.

A recent denial of asylum for a Salvadoran conscientious objector illustrates these biases. The immigration judge found the applicant, a 17-year-old pacifist, to have a genuine religiously based objection to military service. Although acknowledging that the young man would be punished for exercising his beliefs, the immigration judge ruled against asylum and withholding of deportation. He deferred heavily in his judgment to the State Department's advisory opinion. The judge ruled,

> In this case, the State Department did not come forward with a positive opinion, but indicated that the respondent would not suffer a fear of persecution, if he should return to El Salvador. Therefore, I find that the El Salvadoran government would indeed punish an individual for the belief of not participating in their particular army, because of being a conscientious objector, pacifist, or a devout member of an evangelical church, as the respondent appears to be. But this punishment, although appearing to be crude, in my mind, is within the particular law of El Salvador.

While the judge acknowledged that "it appears that all young people are drafted by gunpoint in El Salvador" and that no option for conscientious objection or noncombatant service exists, he relied on the argument that the punishment for refusal to serve in the military would not be disproportionate for conscientious objectors. Although the boy would be arbitrarily conscripted at gunpoint and given no opportunity even to present a claim to his government for conscientious objector status, the immigration judge said that he "would not be treated any differently than anybody else in El Salvador being of seventeen years of age or older or younger, actually." And, following the argument that conscription is a recognized right of governments, he found that

> the El Salvadoran government does have the capability to punish individuals who evade the draft, or do not participate in military action for the government. I further find that, pursuant to its laws, it appears that the El Salvadoran government does have the right, as other countries and the U.S. have the same rights, the right being to punish individuals who do not obey the particular law of the land.

The UNHCR *Handbook* states, "If an applicant is able to show that his religious convictions are genuine, and that such convictions are not taken into account by the authorities of his country in requiring him to perform military service, he may be able to establish a claim to refugee status."

While accepting as true the credibility of the applicant's convictions and the refusal of El Salvador to consider those convictions as having a bearing on the requirement for military service, the immigration judge did not follow the UNHCR advice to consider these as factors in determining asylum status. Nor did he follow the precedent established in a federal district court in *Sarkis v. Sava* that objection to military service is legitimately grounds for consideration of refugee status. The case involved two Armenian Christians who feared returning to Iraq due to their refusal to serve in the military. The court used the language of the UNHCR *Handbook* to remand the case to determine "whether performance of military service would be contrary to petitioner's genuine political, religious or moral convictions, or contrary to valid reasons of conscience."

Finally, the judge held that the government of El Salvador had the right to conscript boys in press-gang fashion and to punish those whose religious beliefs forbid them to bear arms. In upholding this "right", the judge noted, "I do not find, at this time, that the El Salvadoran law has reached a point of violating all standards of justice."

This decision is not isolated. As with immigration judges generally, who are administrative appointees of the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), the judge in this case essentially echoed the advisory opinion from the State Department's Bureau for Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs (BHRHA). INS sources say that State Department advisory opinions are followed in 99 percent of the cases. Advisory opinions, as shown in the case below, leave the impression that once the State Department sees that a person is a "deserter" or "draft evader," it automatically kicks in with a formula response that ignores the applicant's motivations and fears of persecution as well as the federal court ruling in *Sarkis v. Sava*. In response to an asylum claim from a man who formerly had served in the Shah's armed forces, but whose abhorrence of the Khomeini regime prevented him from serving in its military, the State Department wrote:

> The applicant's claim to have a well-founded fear of persecution rests largely . . . on his fear of military service or legal or administrative penalties for evading or avoiding such service. . . . National military service is required universally by many countries of its [sic] citizens. Military service, fear of it or legal or administrative process for evading or avoiding it is not persecution. Further, any legal or administrative process for evading or avoiding such service would be considered *pro*secution and not *per*secution.

In response, the Iranian asylum applicant's lawyer wrote, "First and most important X feels that he will 'come to the attention of the Government' and will be singled out for persecution, because of his refusal to register or serve in the military of a Government which he opposes. He does not oppose the Military Service; he opposes Military Service for the Ayatollah. . . . What we said, and which you overlooked or failed to consider, was that the Ayatollah's Government had no reason to focus on him until such time as he was required to register with the Ayatollah Government."

In this case, the asylum applicant was basing his claim on a fear of persecution based on political opinion. He argued that his refusal to register or serve, based on his political objections to serving a government which he opposes in its entirety, would bring him to the attention of the authorities of that regime and make him subject to persecution. The argument was essentially ignored by the State Department. That draft evasion was a component of the asylum claim allowed the Department of State to create a "straw man" and recommend a denial of asylum based on arguments which bore little resemblance to the facts of the case.

Curiously, while the State Department appears to ignore conscription at gunpoint practiced by both El Salvador and Iran, this fact provided the basis for a *positive* advisory opinion on behalf of Afghan draft evaders. In *Matter of Salim*, the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA)—like immigration judges, part of the Justice Department administrative network—held that an Afghan who refused to join the Soviet-backed army would be eligible for asylum. The finding that the Afghan army is "dragooning and forcibly impressing" conscripts convinced the BIA that Afghan conscripts face a well-founded fear of persecution. "This clearly differs from persecution claims by aliens who merely seek to avoid military service in their country," the BIA noted.

It should be noted that the Salim case did not involve a conscientious objection claim at all. The arbitrary and brutal nature in which conscription itself was conducted—presumably for all Afghan men equally—was the determining factor.

In ruling against the Salvadoran conscientious objector who showed that conscription in that country was applied in a comparably brutal and arbitrary fashion to the Afghan case, but that such conscription would fall especially heavily on him as a conscientious objector, the judge denied the parallel between the two cases. He stated in his ruling, "In this case [*Matter of Salim*] the decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals was bolstered by a positive finding by the State Department Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs, concerning the respondent's persecution, if he should return to Afghanistan. . . . I believe the *Salim* case was based on the particular facts of the case, its situation, and the countries involved, and also that the Board gave tremendous significant weight to the State Department Bureau of Human Rights and Humanitarian Affairs opinion."

The stance of the BHRHA raises serious questions about the ideological and foreign policy biases which color State Department opinions. In creating an ideologically neutral Refugee Act in 1980, the Congress never intended that immigration judges shirk their responsibility to adjudicate asylum applications according to impartial legal standards or surrender their judgment to U.S. foreign policy makers.

The apparent intrusion of foreign policy biases seems to be the only explanation for a curious 1985 BHRHA advisory opinion against a South African conscientious objector. Consistent with the Reagan Administration's "constructive engagement" policy with South Africa, the decision contradicted the directive of UN Resolution 33/165 calling upon member states to grant asylum to those who refuse military support of apartheid with a narrow legal argument that minimized the realities in South Africa. The State Department opinion said:

> As the U.S. representative to the General Assembly stated in supporting the resolution's adoption, any decision as to granting of asylum or safe transit must be taken in accordance with the law of each state. Consequently, in evaluating the subject case, we must adhere to the basic principle that, for prosecution to be tantamount to persecution in the appropriate cases, the punishment must be disproportionate to the crime. Resolution 33/165 therefore does not alter our conclusion that a six-year period of imprisonment is not inherently disproportionate.

The same BHRHA opinion described the conditions of imprisonment the returned draft evader would be likely to face:

> Treatment of objectors can be harsh, and those involved are required to wear different-colored uniforms than other detainees in the barracks. Long and sometimes recurrent periods of solitary confinement are a feature of military detention punishment. Allegations of physical mistreatment have been made but not substantiated. While admittedly conditions to which draft objectors or evaders are subjected during their terms of imprisonment may be difficult, there is no evidence to indicate that these conditions are such that a six-year term of imprisonment, which could not otherwise be disproportionate, would constitute persecution. Specifically, there is no evidence suggesting that objectors are subjected to conditions that are significantly more harsh than other persons detained for similar periods of time in South African prisons, nor has the applicant established that, if convicted, his treatment is likely to be significantly more harsh than the treatment of other objectors.

It is absurd to suggest that because conditions of imprisonment are uniformly grievous, that persecution is thereby mitigated.

Iranian boy-soldier on the Iraqi front.
Iran Liberation

The State Department opinion essentially disregards the only UN resolution specifically drawn to offer asylum to conscientious objectors seeking to avoid performing military actions condemned by the international community. It parenthetically reveals a lack of seriousness in its officially stated opposition to apartheid. How does one condemn apartheid, yet deny asylum to one who would refuse to enforce it?

The opinion also understates conditions of imprisonment in South Africa and illegitimately introduces the argument of "disproportionate punishment." As the asylum applicant's lawyer rebutted, "X's asylum application contains thorough documentation of the physical and psychological abuses that occur in South African detention facilities. Detainees have been tortured, killed, and driven to suicide. . . . The BHRHA states that there is not evidence that objectors are subjected to conditions that are 'significantly more harsh' than the treatment of other types of detainees in South Africa. . . . This does not negate the fact that subjection to torture and other forms of mistreatment constitute a disproportionately severe penalty for draft resistance."

The "disproportionate punishment" argument is obviated when conditions of imprisonment are so harsh—involving torture and killings—as to constitute persecution. It is absurd to suggest that because conditions of imprisonment are uniformly grievous, that persecution is thereby mitigated.

While it is a moral anachronism that the world community has not fully recognized the right of conscientious objection to military service and that so many nations continue to persecute conscientious objectors, it is incumbent especially on nations such as the United States that have recognized the principle of conscientious objection for their own citizens to be generous and fair in the granting of asylum to those who do not yet enjoy this right in their home countries.

Southeast Asian Refugees: Back to the Future

Joseph Cerquone

Throughout the world, when political disagreements erupt into violence, refugees are forced to take cover. Once farther from the source of conflict, they sometimes aren't much better off. Often, simply because of bureaucratic inertia, such people languish for years in makeshift refugee camps, threatened with expulsion by a host country that considers them a burden.

This situation is what could be in store for people escaping from Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos if the Reagan administration rigidly implements a key recommendation put forth by a special State Department panel.

The panel, headed by the former governor of Iowa, Robert Ray, submitted its report in April 1986. One of its major recommendations was to shift gradually U.S. processing of Southeast Asians to an "immigration track" in cases involving family reunification—an idea proposed earlier by Sen. Alan K. Simpson. Put simply, this could mean ultimately that any applicants for resettlement who meet immigration criteria would no longer be processed as refugees.

The Ray panel's rationale for this shift to immigration channels is twofold. First, it says, such a transition is a logical development for the Indochinese resettlement program. The panel report notes that a majority of the 500,000 Southeast Asians resettled in the United States since 1975 have been in the country more than five years. They should now be eligible for citizenship and its attendant right to sponsor relatives through regular immigration channels. Second, the Ray panel contends that "many of those now arriving in first asylum appear to have less compelling claims to refugee status" than earlier arrivals. Those rejected for refugee status would obviously have no other way of getting to the United States except through immigration processing.

How valid are these arguments? Can an immigration program function normally in a first-asylum setting? And what will this mean for the future of refugee processing? Such are the troubling questions facing the U.S. program in Southeast Asia at the beginning of 1987.

Without question, Southeast Asians in the United States are interested in becoming citizens, a step necessary in order to petition for the admission of immigrant relatives. Drawing upon the most recent figures available, the newsletter *Refugee Reports* stated more than a year ago that some refugees, especially Southeast Asians, were naturalizing faster than immigrants generally.

But statistics don't alter the fact that naturalization may be a daunting prospect for many Southeast Asians. Furthermore, even if some refugees do naturalize, they may still be prevented from petitioning for relatives; a petitioner, under U.S. law, must also be a financial sponsor, an impossible role for many former refugees. Furthermore, nonfinancial barriers exist, too, such as the "exile mentality" of some refugees; that outlook reportedly causes some to resist citizenship for the sake of preserving national identity, and to cling to the possibility of returning home one day.

An additional issue to be confronted is the fact that immigrants to the United States are not entitled to the same transitional benefits as refugees. Studies have shown that health and mental health problems are quite prevalent and quite severe among refugees, particularly Southeast Asians. Currently, low-income refugees are eligible for federal medical assistance during their initial period here; as immigrants, though, they would be left to their own personal resources, means which are largely limited.

The Ray panel report recommended that the federal government "should undertake a . . . study of benefits for Indochinese refugees and immigrants." Such a study could provide important new information about the relative needs for and uses of such current refugee benefits as overseas language and orientation programs and transportation loans, as well as cash and medical assistance.

How many people seeking asylum in Southeast Asia are "bona fide refugees" and how many are "economic migrants?" The question has been at the very center of many heated debates during the past decade. An exact reckoning, of course, is impossible, although it can be said that those fleeing Southeast Asia today differ in some respects from the refugees of the mid-70s. When the governments of Vietnam, Cambodia, and Laos toppled, they triggered an exodus of people who, because of their obvious anti-communist associations, were targeted for reprisals and persecution. Saved in the frenzied atmosphere of an international emergency, their acceptance as refugees was rarely questioned. This generous international response set the stage for accepting hundreds of thousands more.

Gradually, however, a different kind of person began to appear in asylum countries claiming refugee status—the peasant, the shopkeeper, the fisherman—who increasingly seemed not to fit the profile of a political refugee. Not only did such persons have trouble proving their claims of political persecution, but they also often sought to rejoin relatives in the West.

"Approximately 45 percent of the (Southeast Asian) refugee admissions . . . last year were based on family relationship," the State Department panel noted, adding that "immigration cases" were a "growing component of departures for the U.S."

The question of whether someone is an economic migrant or a true refugee, ultimately, is not one that can be answered in the aggregate. Only processing and individual interviewing can determine a person's motivation for flight or whether there is a reasonable basis for a "well-founded fear of persecution." The fact that someone may

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have family in the United States should not discredit his or her case for refugee status, nor should it preclude admission of the individual as a refugee.

The Ray panel report recommended that a transition period of two years be established, during which those with close family ties in the United States will continue to be processed as refugees, but with emphasis gradually shifting toward their movement as immigrants.

Normally immigration processing presupposes that the family in the United States (the "petitioner" for the immigrant visa) is able to locate and communicate with the relative overseas (the potential "beneficiary"). It assumes that consular officials in the U.S. embassy will have access to the overseas relatives for interviewing and case documentation and that the necessary documents—birth certificates, marriage licenses, etc.—are available. The normal immigration system further assumes that, depending on the type of family relationship involved, the beneficiaries are in a position to wait up to several years to receive their visas. In fact, none of these assumptions holds true for asylees in Thailand.

Anticipating at least some of the difficult circumstances confronting Cambodians in Thailand, the administration announced in September 1985 that it was implementing a special immigration program for some of the 260,000 Cambodian "displaced persons" camped along the volatile border. The essence of the program was to admit "on a limited basis" those who qualified either for immigrant visas or for a special immigration category known as "humanitarian parole."

Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) guidelines for the program state that humanitarian parole status would be provided to those who are "eligible for immigration except for the availability of a visa number." Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, immediate relatives—spouses, parents, and minor unmarried children—of U.S. citizens are granted immigrant visas as soon as they prove their eligibility. Persons with other categories of family relationship may need to wait months or even years before their visa number becomes "current" and they are allowed to emigrate to the United States. Humanitarian parole cases are allowed to enter the country before their immigrant visa becomes available. As a result, Cambodians who win this status should not be required to wait for long periods in the dangerous border encampments.

Can an immigration program function normally in a first-asylum setting?

In reality, the humanitarian parole program for border Cambodians, to date, has moved only 24 people to the United States. Fewer than 200 have ever been interviewed by U.S. consular officials. The program has fallen victim to considerable logistical and procedural tangles, as well as to political complications between the United States and the Thai governments. Most of the problems can be solved, given sufficient initiative, but they do suggest that an immigration track in Thailand may not be tenable for more than a very small number of people per year.

The single most important question that must be asked of the shift toward immigration in Southeast Asia is: what impact will this have on refugees? The Ray panel did not return from visits to refugee camps calling for an end to the refugee program. Instead, noting that "the job is not over," the panel's processing report recommended that "adequate refugee admissions numbers and refugee processing should continue to be available for those who qualify as refugees—regardless of where or when they arrive, and regardless of their family ties or other eligibility."

It does not appear that this recommendation is being heeded. In October 1986, the State Department revised qualifications for the two refugee processing priorities that are based on family reunification. Several categories of relationship including married children, grandparents, and unmarried siblings were downgraded to lower processing priorities. More significantly, the INS recently proposed a rule change on refugee admissions to the effect that certain individuals who are admissible to the United States as immigrants may not be permitted to enter as refugees, even if they fully qualify for refugee status.

It seems clear that the administration wants to minimize the overlap between immigrant and refugee processing criteria. In cases where the overlap occurs, the administration is saying, the individual should be processed as an immigrant in order to preserve scarce refugee numbers for those who have no such alternatives. This argument may be sound in theory, but it shows serious flaws in application.

The first problem, as shown earlier, is that the immigration track simply isn't flexible and responsive enough to meet the needs of refugees in first asylum in a humanitarian manner. The one successful effort to foster direct, legal departure from countries of origin is the Orderly Departure Program from Vietnam. That program, which has brought more than 50,000 Vietnamese refugees and immigrants to the United States, has been stalled for more than a year, and its future is in doubt. Legal departure programs from Laos and Cambodia hardly seem possible.

Second, the proposed INS rule change would preclude refugee admission to certain individuals who meet both refugee and immigrant criteria. Such a change completely disregards the fact that refugees and immigrants are motivated to leave their country of origin for very different reasons and under entirely different circumstances. By definition, refugees are in flight from persecution, whereas immigrants are neither in flight nor victims of persecution. The blurring of these distinctions imperils the special status that refugees deservedly command. Further, it can lead to the dangerous and facile presumption that anyone who happens to meet immigrant criteria must not really be a refugee.

The Ray panel report urged that "safeguards are needed to ensure that new programs are in place and working before existing programs are ended." The report called for continued "flexibility" to respond to compelling needs in the area. In fact, all we are seeing are continued and planned reductions in refugee admissions from Southeast Asia without any corresponding increase in actual immigration from the region.

It is time for the administration to correct this imbalance with clearly stated, realistic, and compassionate policies toward the Southeast Asians. Without them, the Ray panel's proposal for an "immigration track" appears to be nothing more than a means of abandoning commitments to refugees.

1986 World Refugee Statistics

Published documents and other sources often vary in the numbers of refugees reported in a particular situation. Such variation can be disconcerting and may bring into question the sources' credibility. One obvious reason for discrepancies is the fluidity of refugee situations—a country quiet in February may be overwhelmed by June, and equally correct reports might be available for both periods. Counts obtained in relatively stable or contained situations may be more reliable than those from large or rapidly changing ones; statistics about populations in camps from which refugees are processed for resettlement, as in Southeast Asia, for example, appear regularly and are quite reliable. But even here, updated or revised censuses or estimates can lead to some discrepancies.

Media reports—although providing prompt, continuing information—may be inconsistent about whom they term a refugee or may not cite sources.

More subtle differences in refugee counts arise because those collecting data—while most often drawing on figures provided by the governments of asylum countries—do so according to definitions and criteria which may differ significantly. For example, numbers provided by the UN High Commissioner for Refugees include all refugees (of whom UNHCR assists some) reported by asylum-country governments, while reports such as those of the U.S. State Department classify refugees as "requiring protection and assistance" or "refugees resettled and persons granted asylum."

Politics and nations' administrative procedures affect counts of refugees. Some sources, for example, report certain aliens in a country as meriting international recognition as refugees, while others term them illegal migrant workers seeking economic opportunity. It may be in the political interest of a government to understate its refugee population or, in other instances, to report inflated numbers. Because countries may admit individuals under classifications other than refugee, some who might fit this description by virtue of their circumstances may not be counted as such; in countries of resettlement, these might include family reunification and special humanitarian admissions. Asylum seekers whose applications have been denied but who nevertheless are permitted to stay in a country may also not be reflected in refugee counts.

Some clarity in reporting is feasible: for example, agencies can report with some confidence the numbers for whom aid is provided or planned. Ideally, assistance and protection would be provided to all those who require it, and thus, counts of actual recipients of aid or "registered" refugees would represent all who are in need. In reality, of course, this is not always the case. Also, international assistance is sometimes provided to individuals who do not meet the international refugee definition per se, but who are deemed to be "in refugee-like situations"; these may appear in refugee counts. In Africa, for example, UNHCR operates in accordance with the mandate of the Organization of African Unity, whose refugee definition is broader than that of the UN's own convention and protocol, and its count of refugees of concern there is of broader scope than its count for Central America.

In some instances, accuracy may be detrimental, even dangerous. Figures following rigid definitions may jeopardize agencies' ability to provide adequate services to those quite obviously in need. Also, individuals may rightfully fear to draw attention to themselves, even in countries of asylum, for fear of retribution.

Suggestions for numerous refinements in the types of statistics available have been made to USCR—how many refugees are women and children, how many are aged, how many have some level of education, how many require immediate "emergency" assistance, how many need to be maintained and cared for beyond initial assistance, and how many might profit from longer-term development aid allowing prospects for durable solutions. Such detail is not generally retrievable from existing reports.

In view of the many deficiencies in the available data, questions may arise about the usefulness of collecting and reporting refugee statistics at all.

When used carefully and with a good understanding of their flaws, statistics provide one means to grasp the magnitude of "the refugee problem." Credible, clear, comparable data disallow flagrant exaggeration as well as understatement. For assistance to be provided and programs to be planned, reasonably reliable numbers are vital; data also allow one measure of success of efforts on behalf of refugees. Numbers are useful, too, to establish clearly that the burden of caring for refugees is shared, and that nowadays it is often the least well-off nations which support refugee populations.

In collecting data for the statistics and country reports, we rely largely on other sources which we judge to be responsible. The main sources used are listed at the end of the country reports. Instances where key sources differ significantly (for reasons we could identify as other than time period of reports) are indicated in the statistical tables with an asterisk (*). We have used the most current figures available. All numbers have been rounded, and we stress that none should be interpreted as absolute. For further detail or clarification of numbers in the tables, see the country reports.

TABLE 1

REFUGEES IN NEED OF PROTECTION AND/OR ASSISTANCE

Refugees who require international protection and/or assistance may be new populations, or they may have been in a country for several years. Their most important characteristics are their inability to repatriate due to continued fear of persecution in their homelands and the absence of permanent settlement opportunities in their country of asylum or elsewhere. In some cases, they may no longer require assistance, but still need international protection. For others, the situation is the reverse.

Asylum Country Source Country/Area	By Source Country	**Total**
AFRICA		
Algeria		**167,000***
W. Sahara	165,000*	
Others	2,000	
Angola		**92,200**
Namibia	70,000	
Zaire	13,200	
S. Africa	9,000	
Benin		**4,000**
Chad	4,000	
Botswana		**5,050**
Zimbabwe	4,200	
S. Africa	500	
Others	350	
Burkina Faso		**180**
Various	180	
Burundi		**61,000***
Rwanda	58,000*	
Zaire	2,600	
Uganda	400	
Cameroon		**5,000**
Chad	5,000	
Central African Rep.		**15,000**
Chad	15,000	
Congo		**1,200**
Chad	700	
Zaire	350	
Cameroon	150	
Djibouti		**17,000**
Ethiopia	17,000	

Egypt		**7,350**
Palestinians	4,350	
Others	3,000	
Ethiopia		**110,000**
Sudan	110,000	
Ghana		**140**
Chad	119	
Others	21	
Ivory Coast		**600**
Ghana	200	
Southeast Asia	200	
Others	200	
Kenya		**8,050**
Uganda	3,500	
Rwanda	1,900	
Ethiopia	1,850	
Others	800	
Lesotho		**2,500***
S. Africa	2,500*	
Liberia		**100**
Various	100	
Malawi		**70,000**
Mozambique	70,000	
Morocco		**800**
Various	800	
Mozambique		**400**
S. Africa	150	
Latin America	150	
Others	100	
Nigeria		**7,300**
Chad	4,900	
Namibia	1,000	
S. Africa	1,000	
Others	400	
Rwanda		**19,000***
Burundi	19,000*	
Senegal		**5,500**
Guinea Bissau	5,000	
Others	500	
Sierra Leone		**180**
Namibia	160	
Others	20	
Somalia		**550,000***
Ethiopia	550,000*	
South Africa		**175,000***
Mozambique	175,000*	
Sudan		**914,000***
Ethiopia	656,000*	
Uganda	165,000*	
Chad	93,000*	
Swaziland		**11,800**
S. Africa	7,000	
Mozambique	4,800	
Tanzania		**200,000**
Burundi	160,000	
Zaire	16,000	
S. Africa	6,000	
Others	18,000	
Togo		**1,700**
Ghana	1,200	
Others	500	
Uganda		**120,400***
Rwanda	118,000	
Zaire	1,400*	
Sudan	1,000	
Zaire		**333,000**
Angola	290,000	
Uganda	17,000	
Rwanda	11,000	
Burundi	10,000	
Others	5,000	
Zambia		**141,000**
Angola	86,000	
Mozambique	33,000	
Zaire	9,500	
Namibia	7,000	
S. Africa	3,000	
Others	2,500	
Zimbabwe		**66,500**
Mozambique	66,000	
S. Africa	500	

TOTAL AFRICA 3,112,950

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Burma		**1,050**
China	800	
Others	250	
China		**11,500***
Vietnam	11,500*	
Hong Kong		**8,500**
Vietnam	8,500	
Indonesia		**4,400**
Vietnam	4,400	
Japan		**800**
Vietnam	800	
Korea		**200**
Vietnam	200	
Macau		**600**
Vietnam	600	
Malaysia		**97,900***
Philippines	90,000*	
Vietnam	7,900	
Papua New Guinea		**10,500***
Indonesia	10,500*	
Philippines		**12,900**
(First Asylum)		
Vietnam	3,000	
(Refugee Processing Center)		
Vietnam	8,600	
Laos	700	
Cambodia	600	
Singapore		**125**
Vietnam	125	
Thailand		**405,300**
(First Asylum)		
Laos	87,700	
Cambodia	27,000	
Burma	17,000	
Vietnam	7,100	
(In Training)		
Laos	2,300	
Cambodia	600	
(Border Camps)		
Cambodia	260,000	
Vietnam	3,600	
Vietnam		**20,000**
Cambodia	20,000	

TOTAL EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC 573,775

EUROPE

Austria		**20,000**
Hungary	5,000	
Other E. Europe	15,000	
Greece		**3,640**
Middle East	1,190	
E. Europe	990	
Turkey	700	
Ethiopia	450	
Others	310	
Italy		**15,900**
Various	15,000	
Spain		**9,300**
Various	9,300	
Sweden		**8,250**
Various	8,250	
Switzerland		**12,200**
Various	12,200	
Yugoslavia		**2,250**
E. Europe	2,250	

TOTAL EUROPE 70,640

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Argentina		**12,000***
Latin America	12,000*	
Belize		**9,000**
El Salvador	6,000	
Guatemala	3,000	
Bolivia		**220**
Guatemala	120	
Chile	100	
Brazil		**450**
Europe	270	
Others	180	
Chile		**500**
Europe	500	
Colombia		**410**
Europe	200	
Others	210	
Costa Rica		**30,900**
Nicaragua	22,000	
El Salvador	6,100	
Cuba	2,500	
Others	300	
Cuba		**2,000**
Various	2,000	
Dominican Republic		**5,500***
Haiti	5,500*	
Ecuador		**800**
Chile	480	
Various	320	
El Salvador		**200**
Europe	200	
French Guiana		**6,000**
Suriname	6,000	
Guatemala		**12,000***
El Salvador	10,000*	
Nicaragua	2,000	
Honduras		**62,450**
El Salvador	35,000	
Nicaragua	26,450	
Guatemala	1,000	
Mexico		**175,000***
El Salvador	120,000*	
Guatemala	45,000	
Other L. America	10,000	
Nicaragua		**3,300**
El Salvador	2,300	
Guatemala	500	
Other L. America	500	
Panama		**1,000**
El Salvador	800	
Others	200	
Peru		**700**
Various	700	
Uruguay		**160**
Various	160	
Venezuela		**500**
Europe	100	
L. America	400	

TOTAL LATIN AMERICA/ CARIBBEAN 323,090

MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

India		**227,000**
Sri Lanka	125,000	
China (Tibet)	85,000	
Bangladesh	10,000	
Afghanistan	6,000	
Iran	1,000	
Iran		**2,330,000****
Afghanistan	1,900,000**	
Iraq	430,000**	
Iraq		**75,000***
Iran	75,000*	
Jordan		**823,000**
Palestinians	823,000	
Lebanon		**277,000**
Palestinians	271,500	
Others	5,500	
Pakistan		**2,802,500**
Afghanistan	2,800,000	
Iran	2,500	
Syria		**251,000**
Palestinians	251,000	
Turkey		**1,900**
Various Europe	1,900	
Yemen Arab Republic		**30,000**
People's Dem. Rep. of Yemen	30,000	
West Bank		**365,000**
Palestinians	365,000	
Gaza Strip		**435,000**
Palestinians	435,000	

TOTAL MIDDLE EAST/ SOUTH ASIA 7,617,400

GRAND TOTAL 11,698,000

*Indicates that sources vary significantly in number reported.

**Substantially higher figures than in previous years have been accepted for Afghani and Iraqi refugees in Iran as a result of a census carried out by the government of Iran in 1986.

TABLE 2
SELECTED POPULATIONS IN REFUGEE-LIKE CIRCUMSTANCES

In many countries of asylum, there are large numbers of undocumented aliens and asylum seekers. Significant portions of these populations fear persecution in their home countries and could well be considered refugees, although they may not have the right of asylum in their present country of residence or, for technical reasons, may lie outside the mandate of international refugee organizations. In Western Europe and the United States, for example, substantial numbers fall into this category, and throughout the Middle East there are Palestinians in countries outside UNRWA's area of operation. While information on the numbers within these groups is extremely fragmentary, and approximations of each population vary widely, depending upon the source, this table provides generally conservative estimates of some major populations of such persons. As these figures are not comprehensive, no total is provided.

Asylum Country	Total
Egypt Palestinians	50,000
France Various	28,000
Iraq Palestinians	20,000
Kuwait Palestinians, Armenians, Afghanistan, Iran, others	300,000
Other Arabian Peninsula States Palestinians, Sri Lanka, Afghanistan, Iran, others	300,000
Libya Palestinians	24,000
Turkey Iran	400,000
United States El Salvador, Guatemala, Iran, Ethiopia, Poland, Uganda, others	750,000
West Germany Various	70,000

TABLE 3
INTERNALLY DISPLACED

The following table identifies those countries in which substantial numbers of persons have been displaced from their homes and villages. People are displaced internally within their homelands as a result of civil strife, persecution, or drought and other national disasters. Although they share many characteristics with refugees who cross international borders, they are generally not eligible for international refugee assistance (though, often, distribution of aid to the displaced uses the same or similar channels). No agency has the capacity or responsibility for keeping track of all displaced people. Therefore, information is generally less specific than for refugees, and this table presents only reported estimates or ranges. Because the figures are not comprehensive, no total is provided.

Angola	480,000
Chad	150,000–500,000
Ethiopia	700,000–1,500,000[1]
Mozambique	900,000–1,800,000
South Africa	3,500,000[2]
Sudan	1,300,000
Uganda	300,000
Chile	20,000
El Salvador	500,000
Guatemala	300,000
Honduras	12,000
Nicaragua	250,000
Peru	350,000
Afghanistan	1,000,000
Cyprus	240,000
Iran	1,000,000
Iraq	20,000–50,000
Lebanon	400,000–800,000
Sri Lanka	120,000
Syria	33,000

[1] Includes approximately 600,000 moved in Ethiopian government resettlement program (see country report).

[2] Includes Blacks, "Coloreds," and Asians forcibly relocated since 1961 and approximately 100,000 persons displaced by political violence in 1986.

TABLE 4
1986 SIGNIFICANT VOLUNTARY REPATRIATIONS

Voluntary repatriation numbers reflect estimates of refugees who spontaneously returned to their homelands, as well as those people who participated in formal programs administered by UNHCR. Because this is not a comprehensive list, no total is given.

To	From	Numbers
Angola	Zambia	1,000
Chad	Sudan, Cameroon, Central African Republic	49,000
Ethiopia	Sudan	78,000
Uganda	Sudan, Rwanda, Zaire, Kenya	96,650
Chile	Argentina	400
El Salvador	Honduras	1,000

To	From	Numbers
Guatemala	Mexico	2,300
Haiti	Dominican Republic	500
Nicaragua	Honduras	10,000
Uruguay	Various Latin American and European countries	13,000
Indonesia	Papua New Guinea	400
Laos	Thailand	100

TABLE 5
PRINCIPAL SOURCES OF THE WORLD'S REFUGEES IN NEED OF PROTECTION AND/OR ASSISTANCE

The following table identifies, for each region of the world, those countries which have generated the greatest number of refugees still in need of protection and/or assistance. The counts may understate the total number of refugees from a given country, as asylum nations do not always specify the origin of refugees within their borders.

AFRICA

Angola	376,000
Burundi	189,000*
Chad	122,600
Ethiopia	1,229,850*
Mozambique	348,800
Namibia	78,000
Rwanda	188,900*
Sudan	111,000
Uganda	185,900
Western Sahara	165,000

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Cambodia	308,200
China	85,800
Laos	90,700
Vietnam	51,925

MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Afghanistan	4,715,000*
Iran	78,800**
Iraq	430,000*
Palestinians	2,149,850
Sri Lanka	125,000**

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

El Salvador	180,200*
Guatemala	51,620
Nicaragua	50,000*

*Indicates that sources differ significantly in numbers reported.

**Figures reflect only refugees accorded asylum. Substantial additional numbers are in refugee-like circumstances. See Table 2.

TABLE 6
REFUGEES IN NEED OF PROTECTION AND/OR ASSISTANCE IN RELATION TO INDIGENOUS POPULATION AND PER CAPITA GNP

Top 15 Countries
(in order of refugees-to-population ratio)

Sheer refugee populations should not be considered the only indication of the gravity of a situation. Both the relative size of indigenous populations and the economic strength of asylum countries, for example, are important considerations. Table 6 presents refugee populations in relation to size of receiving countries' indigenous populations and per capita gross national products.

Asylum Country	Ratio (Refugees/ Population)	Population (In Millions)	Number of Refugees	GNP Per Capita
Jordan	1/4	3.7	823,000	$1,720
Lebanon	1/9	2.7	277,000	N/A
Somalia	1/14	7.8	550,000	250
Djibouti	1/18	.3	17,000	N/A
Iran	1/20	46.6	2,330,000*	N/A
Belize	1/22	.2	9,000	1,130
Sudan	1/25	22.9	914,000*	400
Pakistan	1/36	101.9	2,802,800	390
Syria	1/42	10.5	251,000	1,790
Zambia	1/50	7.1	141,000	580
Swaziland	1/59	.7	11,800	870
Honduras	1/74	4.6	62,000	670
Costa Rica	1/87	2.7	30,900	1,070
Angola	1/89	8.2	92,200	N/A
Zaire	1/94	31.3	333,000	170
Gaza	1/1.2	.5	435,000	N/A
West Bank	1/2.2	.8	365,000	N/A

*Indicates that sources vary significantly in number reported.

TABLE 7
1986 CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL REFUGEE AID AGENCIES

Top 20 Countries
(Ranked by contribution per capita)

Country	Contribution Per Capita	Population (in millions)	Contribution ($ millions)	GNP Per Capita
Norway	$5.87	4.2	$ 24.6	$13,990
Denmark	4.24	5.1	21.6	11,490
Sweden	3.12	8.4	26.2	12,440
Switzerland	2.36	6.5	15.4	16,250
Netherlands	1.11	14.5	16.1	9,870
Canada	1.11	25.6	28.3	12,280
United States	0.96	241.0	232.1	14,080
Finland	0.84	4.9	4.1	10,710
Germany	0.79	60.7	47.7	11,400
Kuwait	0.61	1.8	1.1	16,200
United Kingdom	0.57	56.6	32.4	9,180
Japan	0.54	121.5	65.5	10,160
Australia	0.51	15.8	8.0	11,460
Qatar	0.45	.3	.14	21,160
Italy	0.45	57.2	25.7	6,390
Saudi Arabia	0.44	11.5	5.1	12,220
Bahrain	0.29	.4	.12	10,480
Ireland	0.26	3.6	.95	4,990
Libya	0.23	3.9	.9	8,460
Iceland	0.21	.2	.04	10,240

TABLE 8

REFUGEES ENTERED AND RESETTLED IN RELATION TO INDIGENOUS POPULATION

Top 15 Countries (in order of refugees-to-population ratio)

Refugees accepted for permanent settlement are no longer regarded as in need of protection or assistance. Hence, individuals below were not included in Table 1.

Resettlement Country	1975–1984	1985	Population (in millions)	Ratio (Refugees/ Population)
Namibia	40,000	N/A	1.1	1/28
Australia	114,100	9,680	15.5	1/125
Canada	157,700	16,456	25.5	1/146
Sweden	30,500	6,241	8.3	1/226
United States	949,500	70,583	239.0	1/234
Switzerland	17,400	936	6.5	1/354
Denmark	5,550	8,962	5.2	1/358
France	132,700	13,259	55.0	1/377
New Zealand	6,900	871	3.3	1/425
Austria	14,100	71	7.6	1/536
Norway	6,500*	763	4.2	1/578
Germany (FRG)	53,100	11,124	61.3	1/1,130
Netherlands	9,800	907	14.5	1/1,354
Spain	25,500	206	38.8	1/1,509
Belgium	3,200*	642	9.9	1/2,577

NOTE ON TABLE 8: The primary source for numbers of refugees resettled was the U.S. State Department. Countries which have established resettlement programs generally provide particularly precise data, but data were not available for all countries for all years. An asterisk (*) denotes that statistics were unavailable for 1975–1981. Those countries' totals reflect 1982–1984 entries.



NOTE ON TABLE 7 & GRAPH: Table 7 & this graph report the amounts of financial assistance provided to international agencies by countries. The relative significance of contributions should be considered not only in terms of absolute size, but also in relation to population and gross national product. Included are estimated 1986 contributions to UNHCR, ICM, and UNRWA.

Individual countries' contributions to the European Economic Community are not reflected. Bilateral aid, some forms of aid which are not exclusively or even primarily designated for refugees, and aid through such agencies as the World Bank, which may benefit refugees, are also not reflected.

AFRICA

Algeria

A large concentration of long-staying refugees inhabit camps in southwestern Algeria. The Sahrawi refugees, numbering 165,000, fled the western Sahara a decade ago following the withdrawal of Spain and prolonged fighting involving Morocco, Mauritania, and the Polisario Front.

The refugees are located in three settlements—Al Aioun, Asmara, and Dakhla—in southwestern Algeria. Conditions are harsh, dictated largely by the desert climate, but also by the paucity of international assistance. The Algerian government provides more than 90 percent of the funds for the camps—the remainder provided by international donor agencies. UNHCR assists only select vulnerable refugees.

An estimated 45,000 nationals of Mali and Niger have also sought refuge in Algeria as a result of the drought in the Sahel desert region. In May 1986, Algeria forcibly repatriated several thousand of them. According to reports, many were abandoned in the desert, and some 30 Malians reportedly died of exhaustion. Press reports also alleged brutality during transport, including robbery and rape and the denial of water. The Algerian government denied the charges.

Angola

The civil war which has raged in Angola since 1975 was itself preceded by a 13-year guerrilla struggle for independence. In 1986, the 25th year of violence in that country, the conflict widened further, forcing additional thousands of Angolan refugees to seek safety in the neighboring countries of Zaire and Zambia. Approximately 480,000 persons have also been displaced within Angola.

In February 1986, the conflict in Angola spread to the nation's northernmost province, which had not previously been seriously affected by the war. During the year the laying of landmines in village farmlands, dirt paths, and roads further reduced agricultural production and commerce throughout the country. Total grain production in 1986 was estimated at only 240,000 tons, down 20 percent from the previous year and totalling less than 40 percent of Angola's needs. The problem of low food production was further exacerbated by poor port facilities, inadequate land transportation, and insecurity which sharply restricted the delivery of relief commodities to severely affected populations.

Despite these domestic concerns, Angola continued to provide sanctuary for refugees from Zaire, Namibia, and South Africa, although no substantial increase in numbers was reported in 1986.

The greatest numbers of refugees in Angola, some 70,000, are from Namibia. Assistance to this group is administered through the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO), which is waging a guerrilla war for Namibia's independence from South Africa. Early

Southern Africa 1986*



in 1986, complaints of SWAPO mistreatment of Namibian refugees in Angola were made by a number of parents of these refugees and also by former SWAPO supporters. Some critics charged that hundreds of refugees under SWAPO auspices had been killed, and others accused SWAPO of torturing and raping refugees in their camps. SWAPO said that some detentions had occurred in connection with a spy network within its organization but, in April, denied the charges of abuse, blaming the negative criticism on a South African disinformation campaign. By year-end, no independent information on the charges had been obtained.

South African refugees in Angola number about 9,000 and receive assistance from UNHCR through the African National Congress (ANC), which is seeking to overthrow the minority regime in South Africa. Most South African refugees, however, are settled in north-central Angola, far from the South African border, and assistance to them is directed toward development of agricultural production.

There also remain in Angola about 13,200 Zairean refugees who chose not to return home following a declaration of amnesty by the Zairean president in 1983. These refugees are being resettled in Angola with assistance provided by UNHCR through the Angolan government although, at year-end, there were reports that many were considering voluntary repatriation.

Botswana

Botswana, a small land-locked democracy, continues to receive small numbers of refugees from its neighboring countries. The hospitality traditionally offered by Botswanans to political dissidents from other states, however, has been strained since May 1986, when South African Defense Forces launched their second commando attack in eleven months on homes in Botswana. South Africa alleged these targets were launching points for raids on its territory by guerrillas of the African National Congress (ANC). The May raid resulted in the death of one local resident and injuries to several others, but it appears no ANC members were present at the site of the assault.

A month after the South African raid, the government of Botswana reaffirmed its commitment to continue granting asylum to refugees who refrain from acts hostile to neighboring states, but fear of possible additional attacks by South African forces has led some citizens to deny housing to South African refugees and in other ways to discourage their presence. Almost all of the several hundred South African refugees in Botswana now reside in the Dukwe refugee settlement near the Zimbabwe border.

The continued presence of substantial numbers of Zimbabwean refugees in the Dukwe settlement also affected relations between Botswana and Zimbabwe, but tension between the states eased somewhat when Botswana deported to Zimbabwe a leading oppositionist refugee after Zimbabwean authorities presented evidence that he had recruited refugee youths for training as dissidents. In addition, Botswana has encouraged the voluntary repatriation of Zimbabwean refugees, 682 of whom returned to Zimbabwe under UNHCR auspices between November 1985 and July 1986.

Botswana is also host to small numbers of refugees from Angola, Lesotho, Namibia, Mozambique, and other countries. In August, the UNHCR branch office in Botswana reported an increase in Namibian refugees seeking asylum there, but no numbers have been provided.

Botswana is not a refugee producing country.

Burundi

The government of Burundi reported a total of about 267,500 refugees in the country as of January 1, 1986. Most of these are ethnic Tutsis, who fled from Rwanda in the 1960s and have largely integrated into Burundi society. At the start of the year, UNHCR estimated a total of 61,000 refugees in need of international protection and assistance, including ethnic Banyarwanda from Uganda and political asylum seekers from Zaire. Many of the Ugandans are believed to have repatriated in the first few months of 1986, following a change of government in Uganda.

More than 400 Zaireans were termed "unproductive aliens" by the Burundi government and were expelled from Burundi in September. It is uncertain how many of these had legitimate claims to political asylum, and their fate in Zaire is unknown.

During 1986, small numbers of Hutus, who fled ethnic and political conflict in Burundi in the 1960s, spontaneously returned to Burundi from their nations of asylum as the government of Burundi continued to pursue a policy of ethnic reconciliation. Severe over-population and extraordinary pressure on land in Burundi, however, mitigate against large-scale repatriation of exiles. Approximately 165,000 Burundese remain in refuge in neighboring countries, mainly in Tanzania.

Cameroon

The relatively prosperous nation of Cameroon continued to make progress toward democracy and refugee protection during 1986. For the first time in 20 years, secret balloting and a choice of candidates were permitted in an election of officials of the only political party allowed by the government. Also, early in the year, Cameroon became the 39th African state to ratify the Organization of African Unity's convention on refugees, signaling its commitment to continue providing asylum to refugees in need of protection.

Cameroon began receiving major influxes of refugees from neighboring Chad between 1979 and 1981, as civil war intensified in that nation. After a negotiated settlement of Chad's civil war in 1982, most refugees returned to Chad, but about 3,500 chose to remain in Cameroon, and UNHCR was asked to establish a permanent settlement for them at Poli.

Factional fighting, on a smaller scale, resumed in Chad in 1983, and some 500 additional Chadian refugees joined the residual population at Poli. Toward the end of 1984, the Chad conflict again intensified, causing another 8,000 to 9,000 refugees to flee into Cameroon. About 2,000 of these were also accommodated at Poli, while the remainder settled temporarily along the border and began slowly moving back into Chad in mid-1985, as fighting there abated. The continued presence of some refugees in the border area, however—and the Chad government's suspicions that armed dissidents were among them—prompted an attack by Chadian government forces on a group of refugees in Cameroon in December 1985, injuring 35 or more persons. Nevertheless, the situation within Chad has stabilized enough to encourage Chadian refugees in Cameroon to continue the process of repatriation, both spontaneously from border areas and under UNHCR auspices from the settlement at Poli. By mid-1986, only about 8,000

THE U.S. COMMITTEE FOR REFUGEES

REPRINT

Refugees from Mozambique: Shattered Land, Fragile Asylum

[In November 1986, USCR issued a report by Thomas Brennan on the situation of Mozambican refugees and displaced person, titled "Refugees from Mozambique: Shattered Land, Fragile Asylum".]

The decade-old civil war in the strategically situated southern African nation of Mozambique intensified dramatically in late 1986, impelling almost 100,000 Mozambicans to flee into neighboring countries where a quarter-of-a-million of their compatriots had already taken refuge.

By the end of 1986, the numbers of those displaced or seriously affected had reached almost four million. Most of the displaced rural population have been relocated to areas under government control near the cities and larger towns. They have been forced to abandon their homes and their farms, and are now almost wholly dependent for their survival on food rations donated by the United States and other Western countries and distributed through the Mozambican government and international relief agencies. The gap between domestic production and total requirements, however, greatly exceeds the amount of food available from the donors, and constant interdiction of supply routes by guerrilla forces has severely curtailed distributions. Malnutrition and its related diseases are common, and famine threatens large areas of the country.

Some 350,000 Mozambicans have managed to escape this chaotic and life-threatening situation, finding refuge in Malawi, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Swaziland, and even—indeed, especially—South Africa. Many others have died while attempting escape. While Mozambican refugees are almost invariably welcomed in their countries of asylum by distant relatives or by those with whom they share ethnic affinities or clan ties, however, the governments of some of these nations have forced additional tens of thousands back into the fray that they risked their lives to escape. And many who remain in refuge have only a tenuous grasp on a fragile asylum.

In South Africa and Malawi, in particular—but also in Zimbabwe and Zambia—the refugees from Mozambique are in urgent need of international protection. There is no question that justice in the region is the prerequisite for peace on the broad scale, but saving the lives of the innocent—one by one—must become a clearer priority. The Western media, donor governments, and international organizations should pay considerably more attention to events and issues which affect human rights and precipitate humanitarian emergencies throughout the southern Africa region. Displaced persons in the shattered nation of Mozambique and Mozambican refugees in fragile asylum deserve such consideration.

Chadian refugees remained in Cameroon, and by the end of the year the refugee population was estimated at approximately 5,000.

Central African Republic

Refugees from Chad began entering the Central African Republic in large numbers in September 1984, as civil conflict in the south of Chad intensified. By July 1985, approximately 50,000 Chadians had fled to the Central African Republic, and the government requested they be moved away from the border area where, reportedly, they had been attacked by forces from Chad.

UNHCR established four sites for the refugees further inland and began moving refugees away from the border. Meanwhile, however, a decrease in the level of hostilities in Chad permitted many refugees to return home and, at the beginning of 1986, only about 30,000 Chadian refugees remained in the Central African Republic, 16,000 of whom were living at the four UNHCR sites. Repatriation continued during 1986 and, by December, the remaining Chadian refugee population was estimated at about 15,000.

Djibouti

The Republic of Djibouti in 1986 reluctantly continued to provide asylum to approximately 17,000 refugees. Slightly smaller in area than the state of New Jersey, Djibouti has an indigenous population of about 300,000, has virtually no natural resources, suffers an unemployment rate in excess of 50 percent, and is attempting to cope with a certain amount of racial tension between its populations of Afars and Issas—related ethnically to Ethiopians and Somalis, respectively. Understandably, the government of Djibouti regards the presence of Ethiopian and ethnic Somali refugees as disruptive and exacerbative.

As many as 40,000 ethnic Somali refugees fled to Djibouti between 1977 and 1979, the height of the armed conflict in the Ogaden region of Ethiopia. Most returned to Ethiopia during a large-scale repatriation program begun in 1983 and terminated in December 1984, following international allegations that the Djibouti authorities were coercing refugees to repatriate and that the Ethiopian government was abusing returnees. During this period, a number of refugees took up illegal residence in Djibouti town and obtained employment there in violation of the law. The government deported several hundred of these workers to Ethiopia in April 1984, claiming they were not registered refugees and were therefore illegal aliens.

Additional thousands of Ethiopian drought victims entered Djibouti in early 1985, but remained only a few months. By April 1985, the government had closed their camp and some 10,000 persons had reportedly returned to Ethiopia on their own, carrying two months' rations provided by the World Food Program.

The residual population of refugees from the Ogaden, and a steady trickle of political refugees from elsewhere in Ethiopia during the past two years, continues to trouble the Djibouti authorities. In July 1986, the government issued a circular announcing another program of voluntary repatriation. All refugees wishing to receive assistance to repatriate voluntarily have been required to register their intentions, while those not accepting voluntary repatriation must request, individually, the continuation of their refugee status. By December 31, only about 1,700 refugees had registered to repatriate, and about 500 of these were assisted to return to Ethiopia in the last six weeks of the year.

A special committee created by the Djibouti authorities is expected to examine requests for continuation of refugee status and to make rapid determinations which will not be subject to appeal. The circular announcing the program, however, strongly suggested that most requests for continued asylum would be denied. Thus, the threat of massive, forced repatriation of refugees from Djibouti looms large in early 1987.

Egypt

In September 1985, the Egyptian Minister of Interior said that 3,000 political refugees from other Arab countries were residing in Egypt. A total of 1,100 refugees were registered by UNHCR.

An estimated 50,000 Palestinian refugees residing in Egypt are ineligible for UNRWA assistance because Egypt is outside UNRWA's area of operations. UNRWA has, however, provided temporary emergency assistance for 4,600 Palestinian refugees stranded in the Egyptian sector of Rafah following the reestablishment of the border between the Israeli-occupied Gaza Strip and the Egyptian Sinai in 1982.

Sudan continued to call for the extradition of exiled president Jaafar Nimeiry in 1986. Egypt maintains that its constitution prohibits the return of political refugees to their country of origin.

Ethiopia

Widely regarded as among the most oppressive governments in the world, Ethiopia nevertheless provides refuge to approximately 110,000 Sudanese—including about 25,000 new arrivals in 1986—who have fled civil conflict in southern Sudan. Most of the refugees in Ethiopia reside in the Itang refugee camp in Illubabor Region, where they receive basic relief assistance from UNHCR through the government's Relief and Rehabilitation Commission, and health services through the Ethiopian Red Cross. During 1986, an attempt was also made to encourage rural settlement and self-sufficiency for these refugees through a pilot project undertaken for UNHCR by the Lutheran World Federation. There are probably few prospects, however, for integrating Sudanese refugees—most of whom are young males—in the government's long-term economic plans for the region, and the security situation in southern Sudan offers little hope for repatriation in the foreseeable future. Refugees at Iteng are therefore likely to remain dependent on external relief for years to come.

In May, about 6,000 refugees from Sudan arrived in neighboring Keffa Region in very poor physical health. Emergency assistance was initially provided to them at the border by the Ethiopian Red Cross. For security and logistic reasons, however, UNHCR began in August to move these refugees to Dimma, about 45 miles from the border.

Ethiopian refugees of all age groups arrive at Gannet camp, in Somalia. UNHCR/Berger

A substantial number of Ethiopians, chiefly those who had fled famine in 1984 and 1985, repatriated from neighboring countries in 1986. The largest movement was one of about 78,000 Tigrayans who began walking from Sudan in February in a repatriation exercise organized by the Relief Society of Tigray (REST), the social service arm of the anti-government Tigray People's Liberation Front. UNHCR officials in Ethiopia claimed that returnees were living in secure conditions, but those returning under REST auspices marched only at night to avoid a repeat of the aerial bombardment that the Ethiopian government had inflicted upon them during their escape to Sudan. The arrival, during 1986, of about 51,000 Ethiopian refugees in Sudan, 45,000 in Somalia, and smaller numbers in Djibouti—including some who were escaping Ethiopia for the second time—also tended to belie the UNHCR claim.

Ethiopian refugees arriving in these neighboring countries were generally fleeing their government's programs of forced resettlement and villagization, both of which were suspended during the year following strong international protests against their coercive nature. Ethiopia's resettlement program attempts to move rural populations from the over-populated, infertile, and insurrectionist north to less populated and more fertile areas in the south. Villagization is intended to group scattered rural populations in tighter communities where social services can be more easily provided and collectivization can be enforced. Ethiopian refugees arriving in Somalia also alleged systematic religious persecution by the Ethiopian government, including the destruction of mosques, detention and execution of religious leaders, burning of the Koran, and the proscribing of prayer.

Lesotho

Completely surrounded by the Republic of South Africa, Lesotho has, for a number of years, received relatively small numbers of refugees fleeing South Africa. Until the overthrow of the government of Chief Jonathan Leabua in January 1986, the presence of South African refugees—particularly activists of the African National Congress (ANC)—in Lesotho heightened tension between the two countries. An economic blockade of Lesotho by South Africa, which began on January 1, 1986, contributed to Chief Jonathan's ouster later in that month.

The more conservative government which replaced Chief Jonathan refused South Africa's demand for extradition of a number of ANC personnel, but agreed to their relocation outside Lesotho. On January 25, a group of 57 refugees associated with the ANC—including blacks and whites, men, women, and children—was airlifted from Lesotho to Zambia, and 28 of these were later resettled in Tanzania. Upon the departure of these refugees from Lesotho, South Africa lifted its economic blockade. Since then, additional groups of ANC and PAC refugees, totalling perhaps 150 individuals, have been forced to leave Lesotho for Zambia, Tanzania, and Kenya because of security concerns.

According to estimates of the Lesotho government, there are approximately 11,500 South African refugees still in Lesotho, but this figure appears to include all South Africans who may have migrated to Lesotho for any reason in the past two decades. A more realistic assessment of those in a refugee-like situation and requiring international protection would likely place the total at about 2,500.

Following the fall of Chief Jonathan's government and the announcement of an amnesty for Basothos (as citizens of Lesotho are known) in refuge abroad, there have been reports of some Basotho exiles returning to Lesotho. No numbers of returnees are available, however. The Lesotho Liberation Army, an exile group which long opposed the Jonathan government, announced it would also oppose the new government in Lesotho.

Malawi

At the start of 1986, Malawi officially recognized a total of only about 250 refugees, mostly Mozambicans who were residing in urban areas of the country. Unofficial reports, however, suggested that tens of thousands of Mozambicans had been periodically seeking safety in Malawian border areas from intensifying civil conflict in Mozambique. During most of the year, the government of Malawi refused to allow an independent assessment of the border situation, but, in mid-November, when refugee numbers were reported to have increased dramatically, Malawian authorities permitted the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) to undertake a needs-assessment.

The ICRC confirmed the presence of 70,000 Mozambicans inside Malawi territory, and found health needs to be critical. An appeal for international assistance was subsequently issued through the League of Red Cross Societies. In December, the government finally agreed to receive a delegation from UNHCR headquarters in Geneva and granted permission to UNHCR to establish a limited presence, under the auspices of the United Nations Development Program, in the Malawian capital.

The extent to which the Malawi government intends to abide by international conventions in respect to refugees, however, remains unclear. About 1,550 Mozambican army deserters—who fled into Malawi with civilian refugees—and about 800 Mozambican railway workers and their families were handed back to the Mozambican government between October and the end of the year.

Somalia

Somalia, a poor country with few natural resources, began the year with an indigenous population of 5.5 million subsistence herdsmen and farmers, and a refugee population of perhaps 500,000—mostly ethnic Somalis from the Ogaden Region of Ethiopia.

Major flows of refugees to Somalia began in 1977, when rebels in the Ogaden—with support from Somalia—sought to secede from Ethiopia. With the assistance of 11,000 Cuban troops, Ethiopia defeated the rebels and the Somali army in 1978, and the total refugee population in Somalia swelled, by some estimates, to more than 1 million persons. The magnitude of the refugee population in Somalia, however, has been a matter of contention for some years, and the issue has been complicated by the fact that refugees are often indistinguishable from indigenous Somalis. International donors and relief agencies have charged that impoverished Somali nationals have entered refugee camps in order to benefit from food distributions, while the Somali government has claimed that many thousands of refugees live outside the camps among indigenous communities. There have also been sizable, but imprecise, cross-border movements in recent years, which further cloud the issue. Several hundred thousand refugees, attracted by a UNHCR program of rehabilitation assistance, returned to Ethiopia in 1983-84. But at least 100,000 drought victims, including some who were recently repatriated refugees, fled Ethiopia to Somalia in 1984-85.

In 1986, Somalia received additional influxes of refugees from Ethiopia—this time, chiefly ethnic Oromos fleeing the Ethiopian government's program of forced villagization and religious persecution. Between January and May, more than 50,000 Ethiopians arrived at Tug Wajale, a 1.2 square mile refugee transit camp, with a planned capacity of 2,000 persons, a few miles inside Somalia. The Somali government—embroiled in disputes with UNHCR and the international donor community over the true numbers of refugees already in Somalia, and over the rate of exchange at which monetary donations are converted into Somali currency—refused to allow the refugees to move to larger refugee settlements further inside Somalia.

The government said its policy was based on economic and social considerations: previous refugee flows had resulted in environmental degradation, and the new arrivals are primarily Oromos who are ethnically and linguistically distinct from Somalis. The result of this policy, however, has been severe overcrowding at Tug Wajale. This, along with poor sanitation and inadequate water supplies, has contributed to critical health conditions among the refugees. By June, up to 10 persons a day—mostly children—were dying of disease, and the Somali government added the fear of spreading disease among its own population to its reasons for refusing entry to the refugees. At the end of 1986, health teams from France, Britain, and the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies were still struggling to alleviate the sickness and suffering inevitable in such conditions, and UNHCR was still seeking to persuade the Somali government to offer a more hospitable site for long-term habitation.

South Africa

The Republic of South Africa does not formally recognize refugees, and has no legal or institutional mechanism for determining refugee status or ministering to refugee needs. Nevertheless, there are in South Africa an estimated 160,000 to 220,000 persons who have fled civil conflict in neighboring Mozambique and who would normally be defined as refugees elsewhere in Africa. As many as 9,000 of these arrived in South Africa in 1986.

Mozambican refugees, fleeing civil war between South African-backed insurgents and the government of Mozambique, began entering South Africa in 1984. By the end of 1985, approximately 75,000—mainly women, children, and the elderly—had arrived in four South African "homelands" where, following initial threats of deportation, they have been allowed to remain, with or without the formal agreement of the South African authorities. During the same period, an estimated 160,000 Mozambican males entered the country—seeking both refuge from the conflict in Mozambique and improved economic opportunity in South Africa—and settled in the mining and industrial areas around Johannesburg. Many undocumented Mozambicans, however, were apprehended by South African authorities—either before reaching the "homelands" or while seeking employment—and were forcibly repatriated to Mozambique. By the end of 1985, some 20,000 Mozambicans had been deported from South Africa.

Zimbabwean refugees choose clothes at a warehouse in Dukwe settlement, Botswana.
UNHCR/Gloaguen

During 1986, Mozambican refugees continued to enter South Africa in substantial numbers, and some 6,000 to 9,000 successfully reached "homelands" within that territory. Another 15,000 to 20,000 Mozambicans, however, were apprehended by the South African authorities before reaching a "homeland"—or while engaged in illegal employment—and were deported to Mozambique. Also, to stem the refugee influx, South Africa, on August 1, activated a 16-mile-long electrified fence along a portion of the Mozambican border. In October, the South African government estimated that 230,000 Mozambicans remained in the country illegally, but it is uncertain whether Mozambicans residing in "homelands" were included in that figure.

No major outflows of South Africans were reported in 1986, but as many as 100,000 persons were internally displaced by sharply escalating violence during the year. Also, for the first time, legal (i.e. white) emigration from South Africa exceeded legal immigration—probably reflecting a loss of confidence in the nation's political and economic stability—and significant numbers of white youths sought political asylum in Europe to avoid conscription in the South African Defense Force.

Early in the year, the South African government announced a commitment to an eventual "power-sharing" in the republic and the imminent scrapping of "pass laws." Nevertheless, by April 23, when arrests were finally suspended, more than 15,000 persons had been apprehended for pass law violations. The state of emergency—which had been in effect since July 21, 1985—was lifted on March 7, but was reimposed on June 12 following major violence at "Crossroads" squatter settlement which left some 70,000 persons homeless and at least 46 dead. Many observers alleged that the violence was precipitated by the government as part of its efforts to replace pass laws, restricting movement of blacks, with forced resettlement away from white areas, under a policy of "orderly urbanization." Forced displacement of many thousands of persons from Crossroads, Soweto, Oukasie, and other squatter settlements continued to the end of the year.

Sudan

Sudan, a nation the size of the United States east of the Mississippi River, is in a state of crisis.

Although national food stocks were adequate in 1986, severe food shortages resulted in southern Sudan when hundreds of thousands of civilians fled to towns and to the north to escape civil conflict which has raged for years in southern rural areas. The situation deteriorated further as the Sudan People's Liberation Army (SPLA) laid siege to a number of the major towns in the south. On May 20, a military plane carrying relief workers was shot down by the SPLA, killing 8 persons; on August 16, the insurgents downed a civilian airliner, killing 61. All flights by relief agency personnel were halted. Supplies of food to the government-held towns were prohibited by the SPLA and supplies to rural areas, held by the SPLA, were banned by the government. Some 120,000 Sudanese were reported to have fled to Ethiopia, but an estimated 1 million civilians trapped in southern Sudan were facing starvation. The situation remains critical at the end of 1986, but since October 12, a consortium of international agencies has received sufficient government security support to transport some supplies to government-held areas. The government, however, has continued to deny the relief agencies access to areas under SPLA control, insisting that relief aid be distributed only under government army escort.

While attempting to deal with its own formidable problems, Sudan has nevertheless maintained a tradition of hospitality toward refugees. Despite a net decline of 115,000 in its refugee population in 1986, Sudan still has the greatest number of refugees in Africa, an estimated 914,000.

The largest group of refugees in Sudan are northern Ethiopians—principally from Eritrea, Tigray, and Wollo provinces—who began fleeing Ethiopia in large numbers as early as 1967, when the imperial government of Haile Selassie took forceful measures against an Eritrean secessionist movement. By mid-1984, Sudan was host to 133,000 registered refugees in established settlements, as well as some 250,000 other Ethiopians spontaneously settled on Sudanese territory. In September of that year, the numbers began to increase dramatically, as drought exacerbated the situation of Ethiopians in their war-scarred northern provinces. During the next nine months, 300,000 new arrivals entered eastern Sudan.

Between mid-1985 and mid-1986, total numbers of Ethiopians in Sudan essentially stabilized, as a steady influx of refugees from Eritrea and escapees from Ethiopia's forced resettlement program—amounting to approximately 51,000 persons—was more than off set by the voluntary repatriation of about 78,000 Tigrayans, who returned to Ethiopia following the resumption of rains in their home province. At the end of 1986, the Ethiopian refugee population in Sudan was approximately 656,000.

There has also been an overall reduction in the number of Ugandan refugees in Sudan. The initial flow of refugees from Uganda into Sudan began with the fall of Idi Amin in 1979. Tens of thousands of Ugandan civilians from Amin's home region of West Nile—some of whom supported Amin and others who simply feared general reprisals by the forces of the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA)—fled with Amin's soldiers into southern Sudan. During the next three years, particularly in 1981 and 1982, the population that had remained in West Nile was increasingly abused by the UNLA, often in retaliation for sporadic forays into West Nile by ex-Aminists operating from Sudan. Each reprisal against the civilian population produced a new wave of refugees into Sudan and Zaire. By the end of 1982, more than 350,000 Ugandans had sought refuge in southern Sudan, both in organized UNHCR settlements and spontaneously settled in border areas.

In 1983, Ugandan refugees—particularly those settled near the border—began trickling back into Uganda and, by the end of 1984, their total numbers in Sudan were probably down to 300,000. Approximately 75,000 more Ugandans repatriated in 1985 and, in December of that year, the residual population in Sudan was estimated at 125,000 in organized settlements and perhaps 100,000 settled spontaneously.

When a successful insurgency brought a new government to power in Uganda in January 1986, soldiers of the UNLA—who had originally forced the West Nilers into refuge—also fled with their families to Sudan, increasing the Ugandan refugee total by about 25,000. Some of the UNLA soldiers then attacked previous Ugandan refugees residing in UNHCR settlements. Encouraged by the ascendency of the new government in Kampala, and fearful of further attacks by the UNLA remnants, many of the West Nile refugees quickly repatriated to Uganda. By the end of 1986, about 85,000 had abandoned their crops in Sudan and returned home. Some 165,000 Ugandans remain in Sudan, but many of these—with the exception of the early-1986 arrivals—are expected to repatriate in 1987 if the present government in Uganda is able to preserve security.

Refugees from Chad, fleeing severe drought and a confused security situation, began arriving in Sudan in large numbers in 1984. By mid-1985, approximately 121,000 Chadians were present in the Darfur region of western Sudan, about half residing in four UNHCR settlements established for them, and the remainder spontaneously settled among the indigenous population. In 1986, about 28,000 Chadians, mostly from among the spontaneously settled, returned to Chad following resumption of the rains and at least a temporary lull in hostilities there.

Swaziland

Swaziland's refugee population in 1986 grew by about 1,200, to a total of approximately 11,800. This increase was due almost entirely to a continuing influx of Mozambicans fleeing the deteriorating security situation in their own country, and brought the total Mozambican refugee population in Swaziland to about 4,800. The other 7,000 refugees in Swaziland are primarily ethnic Swazis who had previously fled Zulu administration of the South African "homeland" of KwaZulu, but there are also small numbers of non-Swazi South Africans fleeing apartheid.

As in the region's other countries, the presence of South African refugees in Swaziland creates severe security problems for the Swazi government, which fears attack by South African armed forces. Accordingly, in 1986, about 70 South African refugees belonging to the African National Congress were deported to other countries—mainly Zambia and Tanzania—in order to placate South African authorities.

The ethnic Swazi refugees in Swaziland had nearly reached self-sufficiency at the Ndzevane refugee settlement by mid-1985. The influx of Mozambicans, however, has created overcrowding at the settlement and has retarded its economic development. UNHCR's hand-over of the settlement to Swazi authorities, originally scheduled for mid-1986, has accordingly been postponed. UNHCR's reception center at Malindza is also woefully overcrowded, sometimes housing three times the designed capacity of 150 persons.

Tanzania

The United Republic of Tanzania continues to be the most generous of African nations in terms of receiving refugees and integrating them into the fabric of its society. In 1986, Tanzania was providing asylum to almost 200,000 refugees from all adjacent nations and from South Africa.

About 70 percent of the refugees in Tanzania are Burundese who fled ethnic and political strife in Burundi in the early 1970s, and reside chiefly in three large rural settlements established for them by the government with assistance from UNHCR. These settlements have all achieved self-sufficiency. There are also about 11,000 Burundese refugees spontaneously settled in Kigoma region, and another 11,000 economic migrants from Burundi who had settled in Kigoma prior to 1970, but whom the Tanzanian government prefers to regard as refugees. It is expected that the Tanzanian government will offer citizenship to Burundese refugees, as it did for 21,000 Rwandese refugees who fled civil war in Rwanda beginning in 1959 and who have been well-integrated into the Tanzanian economy and society.

Mozambicans, their feet blistered, arrive in South Africa. World Vision/Getman

A substantial number of Zaireans, including perhaps as many as 16,000 refugees, have also settled in Kigoma Region along Lake Tanganyika, which borders Zaire. The presence of active political dissidents among these refugees has caused concern to Zairean authorities for a number of years. The government of Tanzania has accordingly decided to move Zairean refugees away from the lake, and plans to establish a settlement for them near Kagera.

Tanzania has also provided asylum to approximately 6,000 South Africans who are members of South African liberation movements. Some 200-300 of these arrived in 1986 after their evacuation from countries in southern Africa because of threats to their security by the South African authorities. About 75 South Africans who have left liberation groups in Tanzania have been granted only temporary asylum by the Tanzanian government, and must seek resettlement in other countries.

Uganda

Civil conflict and widespread violations of human rights by a succession of post-independence regimes had, between 1975 and 1985, impelled hundreds of thousands of Ugandans to seek sanctuary in neighboring countries and had displaced one-half million civilians within the country. In January 1986, however, the capital of Uganda fell to the insurgent forces of Yoweri Museveni and his National Resistance Movement (NRM), and a qualitative improvement in the refugee situation has resulted. Nearly 100,000 Ugandan refugees have returned from exile in Sudan, Zaire, and Kenya since Museveni's ascendency, and repatriation is expected to continue in 1987. Although fighting between forces of the present government and remnants of the Uganda National Liberation Army (UNLA), loyal to the previous government, continues in the north of the country, peace now prevails throughout the rest of the nation, and the NRM is actively seeking to implement a policy of national reconciliation.

Even prior to Museveni's takeover of the government, tens of thousands of ethnic Banyarwanda—who had been forced off their land in the southwest of Uganda in 1982, and had sought sanctuary in neighboring Rwanda or in UNHCR refugee settlements within Uganda—had returned to areas under NRM control. Since January, they have returned to reclaim their lands and only a few instances of disputes have been reported. About 1,500 Banyarwanda who had remained in Rwanda through 1985 have also returned to Uganda and resettled on their former lands.

In the northwest of Uganda, an estimated 85,000 Ugandan refugees have returned from Sudan following attacks on some of their settlements there by soldiers loyal to the previous government fleeing the advance of Museveni's forces. While some 165,000

Ugandan refugees remained in Sudan at the end of the year, most are expected to return to Uganda in 1987. Approximately 25,000 of these refugees, however, are high-ranking officials and soldiers of the UNLA, and their dependents, who fled to Sudan in 1986 when their government was overthrown. The future of these refugees is uncertain.

Thousands of Ugandan refugees also returned to northwestern Uganda from Zaire in 1986, continuing a gradual process of repatriation which began in 1983. Only some 17,000 Ugandan refugees remained in Zaire at the end of the year and, as in Sudan, most are expected to return to Uganda in 1987.

About 2,500 Ugandans fled to Kenya immediately following Museveni's capture of Kampala, but more than 3,000 who had sought refuge there from previous governments soon returned home. The repatriation process from Kenya is also expected to continue in 1987.

Uganda continues to provide asylum for approximately 118,000 Rwandese refugees and 1,400 Zaireans who reside in eight rural settlements established by UNHCR. While some of the infrastructure in the settlements was destroyed during the years of conflict within Uganda, the health and nutritional status of refugees in the settlements is generally good. UNHCR is also pursuing the possibility of most of these refugees obtaining Ugandan citizenship.

Zaire

More than 10,000 refugees from war-torn Angola entered Zaire during 1986, swelling the number of Angolan refugees in Zaire to about 290,000. Zaire is also host to about 10,000 refugees from Burundi, about 11,000 from Rwanda, 17,000 from Uganda, and approximately 5,000 of various other nationalities.

Most of the Angolan refugees in Zaire have been there for a number of years, spontaneously settled in the western part of the country. These refugees have largely integrated into Zairean society, have generally achieved self-sufficiency, and receive no assistance. But, beginning in 1984, additional tens of thousands of refugees, fleeing the widening conflict in Angola, have entered the Zairean provinces of Bas-Zaire, Bundundu, and, especially, Shaba, where the government allowed them to cultivate undeveloped land a short distance from the border. Following an armed attack on refugees in Shaba in 1985, however, the government decided to move recent Angolan refugees—who now number about 55,000—away from border areas. Three settlements, for a total of about 30,000 refugees, were established in Shaba for this purpose, and three additional settlements, housing about 12,000 Angolans, have been established in Bas-Zaire.

Some 80,000 Ugandan refugees, who fled to Zaire during the period of conflict which followed Idi Amin's ouster in 1979, have been gradually returning to Uganda since 1983. Major international assistance to Ugandans in Zaire was terminated in December 1985, and a new government, emphasizing national reconciliation, came to power in Uganda in January 1986. By late-1986 only an estimated 17,000 Ugandan refugees remained in Zaire, and voluntary repatriation to Uganda is expected to continue in 1987.

Uprooted Populations of Southern Africa 1981–1986

COUNTRY	INTERNALLY DISPLACED		IN EXTERNAL REFUGE		TOTAL UPROOTED	
	12/81	12/86	12/81	12/86	12/81	12/86
Angola	30,000	480,000	197,200	376,000	227,200	856,000
Mozambique	–	1,100,000	–	348,800	–	1,448,800
Namibia	20,000	50,000	41,700	78,000	61,700	128,000
So. Africa*	–	100,000	24,300	34,650	24,300	134,650
Zambia	–	–	2,500	1,800	2,500	1,800
Zimbabwe	30,000	20,000	30,000	4,200	60,000	24,200
Totals	**80,000**	**1,750,000**	**295,700**	**843,450**	**375,700**	**2,593,450**

Equals 537% increase 12/81–12/86

*Figures for South Africa do not include an estimated 3,500,000 persons forcibly relocated since 1961 under the South African government's "homelands" policies.

Despite its generally positive attitude toward refugees in Zaire, isolated instances of disregard for its obligations under UN conventions again tarnished the image of the government of President Mobutu in 1986. In July, the Zairean government exchanged nine Zambians—including two journalists—who likely had legitimate claims to political asylum, for three Zaireans held by Zambia and wanted by the Zairean authorities. In September, there was also a report that a prominent Zairean exile—who, following assurances that he would not be persecuted, had repatriated to Zaire under UNHCR auspices—was being detained and tortured by Zairean authorities.

Zambia

The number of refugees from neighboring countries in Zambia grew steadily in 1986, from approximately 102,000 in January, to almost 141,000 in December. The new influxes were chiefly of refugees fleeing civil strife in Angola and in Mozambique. Early in the year, Zambia also accepted about 100 South African refugees who had initially been granted asylum in Lesotho, but who had been forced to leave that country because of threats to their security from the South African authorities.

At the start of the year, Zambia was already providing refuge to some 75,000 Angolans who had fled the civil war between the insurgent forces of Jonas Savimbi and the government forces of Jose Eduardo dos Santos. An estimated 63,000 of these were settled without assistance in Western and Northwestern provinces and 12,000 were residing in UNHCR settlements at Meheba and Mayukwayukwa. By June 1986, more than 12,000 additional Angolans entered the country. Reports that some Angolans were carrying firearms heightened the Zambian government's concern, and UNHCR was requested to help persuade Angolan refugees to return to Angola. Less than 1,000 agreed to formal repatriation under UNHCR auspices, although others may have returned spontaneously.

Refugees from Mozambique, fleeing civil conflict between government forces and South African-backed insurgents, began entering Zambia in significant numbers in September 1985. By the start of 1986, an estimated 7,000 Mozambicans had spontaneously settled along the border in Zambia's Eastern Province, and some 2,000 more entered in the first few weeks of the year. As fighting between government and insurgent forces in Mozambique intensified during the year, many additional thousands of Mozambicans escaped to Zambia and, by mid-year, the government of Zambia had agreed with UNHCR to establish a settlement for Mozambican refugees at Msanzara, near Petauke. In December, the Mozambican refugee population was estimated at 25,000 to 40,000. All were still residing along the border, but construction of the settlement was underway. It is anticipated that, once completed, residence in the settlement will be required for Mozambican refugees to receive any further assistance.

Zambia is also host to substantial numbers of refugees from other neighboring territories, including about 9,500 Zaireans spontaneously settled among the indigenous population in northern Zambia; 2,500 refugees of various nationalities, mostly residing in urban areas; 7,000 Namibians in a camp administered by the Southwest African People's Organization (SWAPO); and 3,000 South Africans in a camp administered by the African National Congress (ANC). The security of the Namibian and South African refugees was threatened in May, when South African commandos carried out a raid on the UNHCR-operated Makeni transit center, six miles from Lusaka, killing one Zambian and one Namibian. While South African authorities claimed the transit center was being used to plan attacks against South Africa, this was strongly denied by UNHCR, and no ANC or SWAPO members were present at the center at the time of the raid.

Zimbabwe

In January 1986, Zimbabwe had a refugee population of some 50,000 Mozambicans who had fled civil war and drought in Mozambique beginning in late-1983. Of these, 15,000 were residing in four UNHCR camps established for them in mid-1984, and the remainder were living unassisted along the border and elsewhere in Zimbabwe.

As civil conflict intensified in Mozambique during 1986, an estimated 15,000 to 17,000 additional refugees crossed into Zimbabwe, and about 10,000 of these also moved into the UNHCR camps. Thus, by the end of the year, more than 65,000 Mozambicans had taken refuge in Zimbabwe.

Despite having acceded, in October 1985, to the OAU convention on refugees—which includes those fleeing civil strife in its definition of refugees—Zimbabwe has been reluctant to accord refugee status to Mozambicans, apparently because of its close political ties with the Mozambican government. Nevertheless, the government of Zimbabwe is now generally cooperating with UNHCR in assisting what the Zimbabwean government officially terms "displaced Mozambicans" and, in contrast to its actions at the start of the refugee influx, is no longer forcing large numbers of refugees back into Mozambique. Isolated cases of forced repatriation, however, are still being reported. Prospects for a continuing high level of conflict in Mozambique make it improbable that Mozambican refugees will voluntarily repatriate in the near future.

Several hundred refugees from South Africa are also in Zimbabwe. The presence of these refugees, whom South African authorities suspect of being guerrillas of the African National Congress (ANC), has heightened tension between South Africa and Zimbabwe. In May 1986, South African commandos attacked and destroyed the ANC office in Harare, Zimbabwe's capital, and a suburban house often occupied by ANC members. No ANC personnel were present at either location at the time of the raid, but a Zimbabwean security guard was injured in the attack on the ANC office.

Political and ethnic tension within Zimbabwe—which had caused more than 12,000 ethnic Ndebeles, from southwest Zimbabwe, to flee into neighboring Botswana in recent years—eased somewhat in 1986, allowing about 550 Ndebele refugees to repatriate voluntarily to Zimbabwe. The murder or disappearance of opposition political figures has continued to cloud Zimbabwe's internal security situation and, for the present, precludes voluntary repatriation of Zimbabwean refugees on a larger scale. Negotiations between the rival political factions in Zimbabwe, however, were taking place at the end of the year, and there are some prospects for a successful resolution of their differences in the near future.

EAST ASIA AND THE PACIFIC

Australia

Australia's refugee admissions for its 1985-86 fiscal year totalled 12,000, with about half that number coming from Southeast Asia. Since 1975, almost 100,000 Indochinese refugees have resettled in Australia.

The Australian government has begun to take steps to stem the flow of boat people from Vietnam, citing concerns that a continued resettlement response on the part of Western countries was creating a "pull factor." One step the government took was to announce that it would no longer process refugees rescued by "mercy ships" operating in the South China Sea, maintaining that organized rescue-at-sea activities provide an incentive to leave Vietnam by an illegal and dangerous route, rather than through the Orderly Departure Program.

In addition to its refugee program, Australia operates a program for persons of special humanitarian concern who might not otherwise qualify as refugees. Beneficiaries of this program have included people from Lebanon, Sri Lanka, and East Timor. The cabinet announced in June 1986 that victims of apartheid in South Africa would be admitted under this program.

In the last several years, Australia has also accepted refugees from El Salvador, Chile, Afghanistan, Ethiopia, and Eastern Europe.

For the 1986-87 fiscal year which runs from July to June, the government has announced that the immigration quota will increase from 84,000 to 115,000. The refugee quota, which includes the special humanitarian program, will remain at 12,000, with the majority again expected from Indochina.

Australia remains a major contributor to international refugee assistance programs, giving more than $18 million in 1986.

Cambodia

Laotian child at Napho camp, Thailand. Marcus Halevi

Cambodia's population of 6.2 million has grown by a rate of about two percent each year since 1979, when Vietnamese troops invaded the country, ending the bloody four-year reign of Pol Pot and the communist Khmer Rouge. Conservative estimates suggest that more than one million people died of disease, starvation, and mass extermination during "Pol Pot time."

Since the installation of the Vietnamese-backed Heng Samrin regime in January 1979, at least 500,000 Cambodians have fled into Thailand. Many have been resettled in other countries, but more than half that number still live in camps along the Thai border. Vietnam, which maintains around 150,000 troops in Cambodia, has been opposed to these refugees returning, fearing that many are supportive of the Cambodian resistance forces active both along the border and inside Cambodia.

Fighting at the border between Vietnamese troops and the Cambodian resistance has lessened in the past two years, but no lasting political resolution appears in sight to the conflicts surrounding one of the world's most troubled countries.

Since 1980, there has also been a flow of Cambodians back into the country and, in that time, UNHCR has provided assistance to over 104,000 Cambodians returning from Laos, Thailand, and Vietnam. UNHCR reintegration projects in the central and southeastern provinces of Kompong Chhang and Svay Rieng distribute cloth, cooking utensils, farming tools, medical kits, and rice to new arrivals.

There are no reports that these returnees have been mistreated, although Amnesty International indicates that persecution of Christian groups and ethnic Chinese continues under the Heng Samrin regime. Political prisoners in Cambodia number in the thousands.

China

Since 1978, China has resettled more than 280,000 refugees—primarily ethnic Chinese who fled overland from Vietnam in 1980. UNHCR assistance for local settlement is now in the final phase of a three-year program totalling $12 million.

Most ethnic Chinese have been resettled on 196 state farms scattered across the southern provinces of Jiangxi, Fujian, Guangdong, and Yunnan, as well as in the Guangxi Zhuang autonomous region. More than 110,000 Vietnamese refugees are in Guangdong province, a coastal area that includes Hainan Island. Refugee farms in Guangdong and the Guangxi region suffered extensive damage as a result of two fierce typhoons in July 1986.

The Chinese resettlement effort is considered an overall success, although integration has proved difficult for some of the refugees with urban backgrounds. An additional source of friction has been the family planning exemption granted the new arrivals. Throughout most of China, the government has instituted a range of incentives and disincentives to encourage families to have only one child, but it has been lenient with the refugees from Vietnam.

Western countries generally have been reluctant to consider requests from refugees in China to be resettled elsewhere. Only about 1,500 Vietnamese in China have been allowed to resettle in the West in the last six years.

Hong Kong

Arrivals of Vietnamese boat refugees in Hong Kong increased dramatically in 1986, following five years of steady decline. A total of 2,100 Vietnamese boat refugees arrived in 1986, compared to 1,050 in 1985. The refugee camp population in Hong Kong stands at about 8,000 as of January 1987.

The majority of the new arrivals are from northern Vietnam, and generally have been less successful in gaining resettlement than their counterparts from the south. Current resettlement priorities favor those with family in the West, as well as those with previous ties to the South Vietnamese government or Western countries.

Departures for resettlement in other countries increased slightly from last year. The United Kingdom accepted only 44 refugees from Hong Kong in 1985, but took more than 500 in 1986, and has been urged to take a similar number in 1987. Resettlement to the United States, Canada, and Australia tapered off by as much as 20 percent.

In 1986, Hong Kong provided local resettlement to about 250 Vietnamese of Chinese origin who have lived in the camps for four years or more.

Since July 1982, new arrivals have been detained in "closed camps," virtual prisons that were established as a deterrent to would-be asylum seekers. The closed camps—Chi Ma Wan, Hei Ling Chau, and Bowring—have been criticized by UNHCR and several humanitarian organizations, including the U.S. Committee for Refugees, as being unnecessarily restrictive and demoralizing. There are about 4,500 refugees in the closed camps, which are administered as part of the Hong Kong penal system.

The 3,500 refugees who arrived before July 1982 live in the "open camps" of Kai Tak and Jubilee, where residents are permitted to come and go freely and to hold outside jobs. The open camps are administered by the International Rescue Committee and the British Red Cross. UNHCR provides care and maintenance services in both closed and open camps.

Despite the fact that departures continue to exceed arrivals, Hong Kong authorities have expressed growing concern about the residual camp populations, citing the high birth rate in the camps and the growing percentage of "long-stayers" who have been denied refugee status or are otherwise ineligible for resettlement. Some officials have indicated that involuntary repatriation to Vietnam is being considered for those arrivals who do not meet refugee resettlement criteria of third countries.

Since 1980, Chinese trying to cross the Hong Kong border have been apprehended and returned to China. In the first nine months of 1986, more than 11,000 were turned over to Chinese authorities at the border. Vietnamese arriving by land are also returned to China, which Hong Kong considers their resettlement country.

Indonesia

Since 1975, Indonesia has provided temporary asylum to more than 100,000 Indochinese refugees, mostly Vietnamese, but has accepted none for permanent resettlement.

As of December 1986, there were about 3,800 refugees on Galang Island, most of them in Site I, the first asylum camp. The regional refugee processing center in Site II houses only those who have been accepted for resettlement. There were 180 Vietnamese in Site II in December.

Indonesian authorities have protested the continued arrivals, and the long stays, of the Vietnamese boat refugees. In early 1986, the government expelled 19 Vietnamese crewmembers of shuttle boats it said were ferrying multiple loads of refugees from Vietnam for pay.

Indonesia is also a refugee-producing country. In the last three years, about 10,500 refugees from Indonesia's Irian Jaya province have crossed the border into Papua New Guinea, fleeing human rights abuses and civil unrest. Amnesty International reported the imprisonment and mistreatment of 12 Irianese refugees who were forcibly repatriated in 1985.

UNHCR has since become involved in voluntary repatriation efforts, under which about 400 refugees have returned to Irian Jaya. The Indonesian authorities so far have not allowed UNHCR to monitor the repatriation program once the returnees have crossed the border.

In April 1986, a group of 105 displaced persons from East Timor, which Indonesia had taken over from the Portugese in 1975, returned to their home villages. An additional 800 East Timorese remained on the nearby island of Atauro. Since 1975, several thousand people have fled East Timor, mostly to Portugal, Australia, and Macau. Some sources estimate that as many as 100,000 people died in the civil war and its aftermath.

Laos

Despite recent efforts by the Thai and Lao governments to improve relations and control migration back and forth across the border, lowland and highland Lao continue to seek asylum in Thailand. In the last ten years, nearly 360,000 have fled Laos, fully ten percent of the current estimated population.

More than 5,000 Laotians have been interviewed in the border screening program established by Thailand in July 1985. Some 1,600 have been rejected for admission to the refugee camps, following an interview with Thai border officials. They have been detained at Thai police stations along the border, awaiting eventual repatriation. Although the Lao government has agreed in principle to take them back, and UNHCR says it is willing to monitor a safe and orderly return, actual repatriation of this group has not begun.

About 900 cases are pending further review, and the remainder have been admitted to refugee camps, where they are eligible to apply for resettlement in another country.

In 1986, fewer than 100 refugees returned to Laos under the auspices of UNHCR. Since 1980, UNHCR has provided reintegration assistance to about 3,000 returnees, and an additional 5,000 to 10,000 Laotians have returned unofficially from Thailand in that same period.

Government repression persists of groups that are seen as supportive of resistance efforts. Reliable estimates suggest that 3,000 to 5,000 political prisoners remain in reeducation camps in Laos.

Reports continue to emerge about attacks on the Hmong, an ethnic hill-tribe group with a decade-long history of opposition to the communist Pathet Lao and to occupying Vietnamese forces. In May 1986, a group of 200 Hmong trying to enter Thailand were forced back across the border, where seven leaders were reportedly taken aside and shot by Lao troops.

In December, 43 Hmong, including women and children, reportedly were killed by Vietnamese troops as they were attempting to cross the Mekong River. Border violence increased significantly in the last two months of 1986, despite efforts by the Thai and Lao governments to improve relations.

USCR staff visited the Thai-Lao border in 1986 and also published an issue paper, *Refugees From Laos: In Harm's Way*. USCR has recommended that pushbacks of Lao must stop and that the screening process must be made available to all Laotian asylum seekers.

Malaysia

Malaysia has provided first asylum to more than 214,000 Indochinese refugees, mostly Vietnamese, since 1975, on the condition that they be resettled elsewhere as quickly as possible. A predominantly Muslim country, Malaysia has offered permanent resettlement to around 7,000 Cambodian Muslims in the last several years, saying that its delicate ethnic balance of Malays, Indians, and Chinese could not withstand absorption of any larger numbers.

As of December 1986, there were about 9,000 Vietnamese boat refugees in Malaysia, most of them confined to Pulau Bidong, a first asylum camp on an isolated island 17 miles off the Malaysian coast. Malaysian officials have expressed concern that the arrival rate for refugees in 1986 was slightly higher than the rate of departures, and furthermore, that nearly half of the camp population already have been rejected for resettlement by a third country.

Prior to the institution of massive third country resettlement efforts, Malaysian treatment of Vietnamese boat people had been harsh, and included forcing a number of overcrowded boats back out to sea.

Estimates of the number of Filipino Muslim refugees in Malaysia's easternmost state of Sabah vary from 70,000 to 200,000. UNHCR gives a figure of 90,000, with about 12,000 actually living in UNHCR-assisted camps. Most of the refugees came to Sabah in the 1970s, at the height of a Muslim revolt in Mindanao in the southern Philippines.

In January 1987, the Philippine government signed an "autonomy agreement" and cease-fire with the Moro National Liberation Front, a Muslim separatist group in Mindanao. This agreement potentially paved the way for the repatriation of many of the Filipinos in Sabah, but recent bombings and grenade attacks in Mindanao by Muslim factions at odds with the MNLF have postponed any such ideas for the time being.

The Christian-dominated Sabah United Party, which won a strong mandate in the state assembly elections in April 1986, is also supportive of repatriation efforts. Some of the Filipinos have been accused of participating in a violent series of politically motivated riots and fire-bombings that shook Sabah in March 1986.

Papua New Guinea

Since 1984, more than 10,000 refugees have crossed the border into Papua New Guinea from Irian Jaya, the Indonesian province that covers the western half of the island of New Guinea. Their future remains insecure despite the increased role that UNHCR is playing to resolve the situation. In July 1986, Papua New Guinea became the one-hundredth country to accede to the UN convention and protocol on the status of refugees.

New Guinea, the second largest island in the world and a former Dutch colony, was divided in half by a UN-supervised plebiscite in 1969, and the 500-mile border separating Indonesia and Papua New Guinea has been a troubled area ever since. About 3,000 Indonesian troops patrol Irian Jaya province in an effort to suppress the military actions of the Free Papua Movement (OPM).

The tense relations between the Indonesians and the native Irianese were further aggravated in 1984 when the Indonesian government won international funding for an ambitious "transmigration" program to move more than 500,000 Javanese to the island in a six-year period. The predominant ethnic group on both sides of New Guinea is Melanesian.

The Irianese refugees who crossed the border into the newly independent nation of Papua New Guinea are predominantly villagers and small landowners. This group, comprising about 70 percent of the refugee population, has fled civil unrest, harassment by government troops, and the growing pressures of the transmigration program in Irian Jaya.

An additional 20 percent of the border-crossers are civil servants and church workers fleeing religious and job discrimination. The remainder are army and police deserters or OPM activists. Most of the estimated 600 to 800 political activists and guerrillas are located in Blackwater camp, one of 14 refugee camps along the densely forested border.

In 1985, Papua New Guinea was criticized for deporting 12 OPM activists back to Irian Jaya, where Amnesty International reports they were imprisoned and tortured.

Under new arrangements with UNHCR, all Irian Jayans in Papua New Guinea will be interviewed to identify those with valid reasons for staying. UNHCR will seek third country resettlement for a small number of political refugees. Those who are not allowed to stay in Papua New Guinea will be returned to Irian Jaya under a cooperative agreement between the Indonesian and PNG governments.

Approximately 400 Irian Jayans were voluntarily repatriated under UNHCR auspices in 1985 and 1986. Indonesian authorities so far have not allowed UNHCR to monitor the repatriation process in Irian Jaya.

Refugee Protection in Thailand and the Closing of Khao I Dang

Court Robinson

Khao I Dang, the only Cambodian refugee camp remaining in Thailand under United States High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) protection, was closed to all new arrivals by the Thai government on December 31, 1986. Thai officials had been threatening to close the camp for some time, saying that Western nations had not followed through on their resettlement commitments. During the coming year, the Thai government has said that the 24,000 residents of Khao I Dang gradually will be transferred to encampments along the Thai-Cambodian border. It is likely that the status of these refugees will be reduced to that of "displaced persons," like their 250,000 compatriots on the strife-torn border. They may also lose the protection of UNHCR.

The first structures at Khao I Dang were erected in four days in November 1979 to shelter 5,000 Cambodian refugees and famine victims. The people kept coming, and by May 1980, Khao I Dang was said to be the largest Cambodian "city" in the world, with a population over 140,000. The numbers have ebbed and flowed in the past seven years, but the camp has remained a compelling symbol of the Cambodian refugee presence in Thailand.

In early 1980, the Thai government officially ceased granting asylum to Cambodian refugees, hoping to stem the tide of people flowing across the border. The UNHCR holding centers—Mai Rut, Sakaeo, Kamput, and principally Khao I Dang—were closed to new arrivals, their total population at the time around 165,000. Several hundred thousand more were restricted to border encampments where they were provided with food and shelter but were prohibited from registering as refugees or applying for resettlement.

Seven years later, Cambodians along the border still are referred to as "displaced persons" and, with few exceptions, still are not permitted to apply for resettlement. Neither are they accorded protection under the auspices of UNHCR. Services to this group are coordinated by UNBRO [UN Border Relief Operation], a program established in 1982 to serve displaced Cambodians. UNBRO's mandate is limited strictly to the coordination of such basic services as food distribution, health and sanitation, and education.

In Khao I Dang, UNHCR has exercised a far more extensive mandate. In addition to sharing responsibility for camp administration with Thai authorities, UNHCR carries out its principal mission: to promote "durable solutions" to a refugee's stateless condition—voluntary repatriation, local settlement, and resettlement in a third country—and to provide protection until one of these solutions can be found.

The predicament for Cambodians in Thailand so far has proven resistant to the two solutions of repatriation and local settlement. Thousands of Cambodians did return home voluntarily in 1980 and 1981, but tens of thousands spilled back into Thailand to escape the furious Vietnamese dry season offensives from 1983 to 1985. The Thai government has offered citizenship to about 9,000 Cambodians of Thai descent, but insists that it is unwilling and unable to settle any more. Third country resettlement remains the most viable alternative to the camps. Since 1980, over 200,000 Cambodians have been resettled in other countries. Almost 140,000 of these have come to the United States.

The residents of Khao I Dang have been recognized by UNHCR as being refugees under the terms of the UN convention and protocol. There is little doubt that they have a "well-founded fear of persecution" should they return to Vietnamese-occupied Cambodia. They are being returned to the border, and are in danger of losing their refugee status simply because they have been rejected by resettlement nations, or because those nations have expressed insufficient interest in their cases.

This would set a disturbing and dangerous precedent for other asylum countries around the world to follow. UNHCR, with diplomatic support from the United States and other governments, should insist that Khao I Dang residents retain their refugee status wherever they are moved. Further, UNHCR should seek the assistance of the international community in dispelling the notion that the 260,000 Cambodians on the border are only "displaced persons." They are refugees, as much as the Afghans in Pakistan, Salvadorans and Guatemalans in Honduras, and Mozambicans in Zimbabwe. All of these groups are served and protected by UNHCR.

To call the border Cambodians refugees does not imply that they will be resettled in a third country. It does mean, however, that they are entitled to the full measure of protection available through UNHCR. Protection problems have been severe in most of the border camps. Violence is an almost constant threat, whether it is at the hands of Thai, Cambodian, or Vietnamese forces. Extortion, robbery, corruption, and physical abuse are commonplace. Added to this is the fact that high birth rates have caused serious overcrowding in some camps, particularly Site 2, and created a population of whom 30 percent are under the age of five.

The closing of Khao I Dang is a signal of Thailand's growing impatience with the Cambodian refugee presence. It may also signal a diminishing commitment to resettlement on the part of the United States and other Western nations. But it also presents an opportunity to rectify, if only in part, the long-overlooked problem of protection for Cambodians along the border. That begins by recognizing them as refugees.

Photo is of head count at Site 2. Bill Burke

Court Robinson is on the USCR staff.

Thailand

Thailand remains the dramatic focal point of the continuing Indochinese refugee story. At least 800,000 Cambodians, Laotians, and Vietnamese have found sanctuary in Thailand since 1975. Of these, about 370,000 have been resettled in other countries, but more than 115,000 remain in first asylum camps. An additional 260,000 Cambodian "displaced persons" live in camps along the Thai-Cambodian border.

The UNHCR camps for Vietnamese refugees in Songkhla and Sikhiu closed in April 1986, as did the Ubon transit center for refugees voluntarily returning to Laos. All residents of these camps were transferred to the Phanat Nikhom refugee processing center not far from Bangkok.

In contrast, the 23,000 Cambodian refugees in Khao I Dang are expected to be gradually returned to the border, with the end-of-year closing of that camp. Khao I Dang is the last UNHCR holding center for Cambodian refugees. Residents of the border encampments are not allowed to apply for resettlement, nor are they currently under the protection of UNHCR.

More than a quarter of a million Cambodians live along Thailand's eastern border, still a war zone for the sporadic but violent clashes between Vietnamese troops and factional forces of the Cambodian resistance. The largest border camp, Site 2, is temporary home to 140,000 people and may swell further with the Khao I Dang arrivals. Site 2 is a dangerous and dispiriting place, and its residents have little hope that a durable solution to their predicament will be found any time soon.

Site 2 is also the temporary residence of 3,600 Vietnamese refugees who escaped by overland routes through Cambodia, rather than leaving by boat. Close to 200 new Vietnamese arrivals enter camp each month. About 1,900 of this group were resettled in the United States in 1986, including 200 members of Vietnamese hilltribe groups known collectively as Montagnards. The U.S. Committee for Refugees (USCR) has urged that the remaining land Vietnamese be evacuated to a safer location away from the border, as they have been subjected to physical assault, abuse, and extortion threats in Site 2.

With the closing of Songkhla and Sikhiu camps, Vietnamese boat refugees in Thailand now reside only in Phanat Nikhom. As of October 1986, Vietnamese in Phanat numbered about 7,000.

Pirate attacks continue on Vietnamese boat refugees in the Gulf of Thailand. Between 1981 and November 1986, out of approximately 34,000 boat people headed for Thailand, pirate attacks have been blamed for 1,022 rapes, 758 deaths, 643 abductions, and an additional 1,210 people listed as missing.

There are a few reasons to hope that progress is being made in anti-piracy efforts. Arrests of suspected pirates have risen sharply since the beginning of 1986, and reports of refugees being assisted by Thai fishermen have also increased. Moreover, there has been a decrease in both the number and percentage of boats being attacked in the last year. USCR visited Thailand in October 1986, and cautioned that some of the more positive trends are due to the fact that refugees have been more successful lately in avoiding the high attack area off the southern coastline of Thailand. The number of rapes reported in that area in 1986 was higher than during the previous year.

There are indications that an increasing number of Cambodians are choosing to leave their country by boat, rather than make the perilous trek across the land border, dodging mines and military patrols. In the first ten months of 1986, 450 Cambodians entered Thailand by boat, double the figure for last year. Many of these new "boat people" are ethnic Chinese and Khmer Krom, Cambodians originally from Vietnam's southern Mekong Delta. Most are apparently departing from southern seaports or the island of Koh Kong, and landing in Trat province, only 15 miles away.

Refugees from the highlands and lowlands of Laos now comprise the largest numbers still eligible for resettlement processing in Thailand. There are about 23,000 lowland Lao in Na Pho camp, and 54,000 highlanders in Chiang Kham and Ban Vinai.

A Vietnamese refugee, rescued at sea, mourns the loss of a friend. UNHCR/Manin

In July 1985, the Thai government instituted a border screening program, designed to separate those with valid claims to refugee status from those without. Out of about 5,000 interviewed in this program, 1,600 have been screened out. The future of the screening is in jeopardy given the increase in border violence and pushbacks at the end of 1986, and the inability of Thailand and Laos to agree on mutually acceptable terms for the repatriation of those who have been screened out.

The most serious protection problem on the Thai-Lao border is that of continuing "pushbacks" of Laotian asylum-seekers. In August 1986, USCR visited more than 20 police stations and immigration posts between Nakhon Phanom and Chiang Rai, and found that Hmong highlanders in particular were still periodically being forced back into Laos by Thai border patrols.

On that same trip to Thailand, USCR visited Karen refugee camps on the mountainous Burmese border to the west. The Karen in Thailand, who now number 18,000, are primarily farming people who have fled the fighting in their homelands between Burmese troops and the Karen National Liberation Army. The Karen national movement seeks to establish an autonomous state for the Karen people.

In a 1986 issue brief, "The Karens of Burma: Thailand's Other Refugees," USCR urged the Thai government to allow UNHCR to provide protection and assistance to the Karen refugees, but Thailand has so far been reluctant to do this for fear of damaging relations with the Burmese government.

Vietnam

Since the communist takeover twelve years ago, more than one million people have fled Vietnam. The majority of these have escaped by boat to various first asylum countries in the region. A small number—perhaps 10,000 in the last three years—have traveled overland through Cambodia to Thailand. And more than 115,000 have effected a safe and legal departure via the Orderly Departure Program since it was established in 1979.

Screening of new applicants for ODP has been on hold since January 1986, when Vietnam ordered U.S. interviewers in Ho Chi Minh City to leave. Despite several rounds of talks between the U.S. and Vietnamese governments in the past year, the program remains stalled.

Interviewing for the U.S. program was halted, according to Vietnamese officials, because the United States had allowed a backlog of about 22,000 cases to accumulate. These cases had been interviewed by U.S. staff in Vietnam, but they had not yet been approved or rejected. As of January 1987, the backlog is down to about 9,000 and processing continues for this group.

About 11,000 people departed Vietnam for the United States via ODP in 1986, and more than 50,000 have used this route to enter the country since 1980. But U.S. officials warn that, unless interviewing resumes, departures will come to a halt some time this fall.

Negotiations for the resettlement of more Amerasian children and political prisoners through ODP also remain at an impasse. Since 1980, about 3,500 Amerasians—sons and daughters of Vietnamese mothers and U.S. servicemen—have come to the United States. There are an estimated 8,000 to 15,000 still in Vietnam, where they are known as *bui doi*, or "children of the dust."

Fewer than 200 former political prisoners have resettled in America in the last two years. No current prisoners have been released in that time. Amnesty International estimates that there are currently about 7,000 prisoners in reeducation camps, of whom the great majority have spent at least ten years in camps or hard labor projects.

About 20,000 Cambodian refugees live in Vietnam with the assistance of UNHCR. Since 1980, about 7,500 Cambodians have left Vietnam for resettlement in other countries, primarily France and Canada.

EUROPE

Austria

Nearly two million refugees from Eastern Europe have found first asylum in Austria since 1945 and about 581,000 have become citizens. Austria still receives about 7,000 asylum applications per year, mainly from Eastern Europe, but in recent years it has served also as a transit point for those en route to third countries, mainly Soviet Jews. There were 20,000 refugees in Austria, mostly Eastern Europeans and Hungarians, at the end of 1985.

Each year Austria makes a commitment to UNHCR to take a certain number of refugees from various countries. By September 30, 1986, Austria had received 2,346 Vietnamese and Cambodians, 102 Iranian Kurds, 603 Chileans, and 232 Argentinians.

The largest number of asylum seekers in Austria continued to originate from Eastern European countries, as in the past. By September, nearly 7,000 persons, mainly Czechoslovakians, Romanians, and Hungarians, applied for asylum, according to the government. The government granted 971 requests. During the same period, more than 3,000 refugees resettled in third countries, including 1,463 to the United States.

The main transit center for refugees passing through Austria for resettlement in third countries is at Traiskirchen. It holds about 1,500 persons. While at Traiskirchen, refugees are allowed to work.

The number of refugees using Austria as a transit point declined slightly in 1986. Between January 1 and October 22, 1,712 Iranian Jews passed through Austria, only seven less than in all of 1985. Seventy Iranian Baha'is also transitted Austria during the period. Only 636 Soviet Jews came to Austria during these months, the smallest number since 1968.

Federal Republic of Germany

During the first half of 1986, German officials became increasingly alarmed at the growing numbers of asylum seekers from the Middle East. These numbers, fear of terrorism and rising unemployment seemed to become linked in the public mind. In reaction to these developments, the government began implementing measures designed to repel asylum seekers.

Most asylum seekers from the Middle East entered Germany by passing on trains from East to West Berlin, where there are no inspection facilities or personnel. During 1986, the West German government had appealed to the East Germans for months to curtail this activity. On October 1, 1986, East Germany announced that foreigners would be allowed to pass through East Germany only if they had an entry visa elsewhere. This measure was similar to one agreed to in July 1985 prohibiting Tamils from leaving East Germany without an entry visa.

Nearly 74,000 persons sought asylum in West Germany during 1985, and by July 1986, 52,000 more had registered. During July, the busiest month, more than 9,700 persons registered for asylum, 2,340 of these, Iranians. During the first weekend after the new East German policy, only four asylum seekers reportedly entered West Berlin.

The East German action came one month after Chancellor Helmut Kohl announced a series of measures designed to curtail asylum seekers. Among the measures was a fine against airlines who brought passengers without visas into West Germany—up to nearly $1,000 per passenger. Kohl also extended the work prohibition for so-called Third World refugees from two years to five, and required persons from Lebanon, Syria, Ghana, Pakistan and Bangladesh to obtain transit visas prior to stopping over in West German airports. Additionally, he requested an increase in border guards. Following these measures, there were reports that West Berlin officials had turned away some asylum seekers.

In recent years, West Germany has become a sought after haven for refugees, as other European nations imposed stiffer restrictions on immigration. West Germany is the only nation in the world with a constitution that protects the right of political asylum. Though only about 16 percent of all asylum applications are granted, West Germany does not expel denied asylees, and 70 percent of those denied also remain.

More than 134,000 refugees are estimated to be in West Germany. About 30,000 are Tamils. There are also large numbers of Lebanese, Iranians and Turks. There may be another 100,000 persons awaiting a decision on their asylum applications, which can take up to two years. Most refugees do not live in camps, but in private apartments. Work permits are not granted.

France

Despite maintaining a generous system of legal and social benefits for refugees, the French also adopted strict measures in 1986, aimed at limiting immigration, which may ultimately affect refugees' access to asylum in France.

In 1986, the French took steps to restrict access to France and French citizenship, and to broaden the powers of the Interior Minister to expel foreigners. These measures took place as right-wing, anti-immigrant groups continued to gain strength, particularly along the Mediterranean coast, where there are large Arab communities. The Anti-immigrant National Front party won 33 seats in France's national elections and claimed 10 percent of the popular vote.

Shortly after implementing new measures designed to stop terrorism, French authorities in October expelled 101 Mali nationals, including five who claimed they would be persecuted if returned, according to witnesses. The U.S. Committee for Refugees sent a letter of inquiry to the French Ambassador in the United States, requesting that he clarify his government's position with respect to the UN protocol and convention regarding refugees.

Several other nationals were expelled by France during the year, including a Togo opposition leader in March and five leaders of the Basque movement in August, four of whom were sent to Spain. In June, an Iranian opposition leader left France for Iraq voluntarily following a police raid on his apartment. French authorities claimed he was involved in political activities.

Critics charged the French were caving in to demands by the Iranian government that France extradite opponents of the Iran regime.

The French Cabinet approved a law in November which would require children born in France of foreign-born parents to apply for citizenship before a judge, instead of receiving it after five years of residence as had been the case in France for 59 years. Judges could deny citizenship to persons with criminal records, or to those who spoke French poorly. Of the 100,000 persons who naturalize in France each year, 17,500 are children of foreign-born parents. The law would also restrict access to citizenship through marriage.

In August, the government issued an expulsion order which allowed the Interior Minister to expel any foreigner 16 years-of-age and older who had been sentenced to six months or more in prison. The measure applied even to those who entered France before age ten. The regulations also required all foreigners, except those from the European Economic Community (EEC) and Switzerland, to obtain a six month entry visa before entering France.

Despite these restrictive measures, France continued its otherwise generous policy toward refugees. The French set no refugee ceilings. Persons can apply for refugee status with or without a visa. Those denied such status may appeal. Those granted refugee status receive a ten-year renewable residence permit, work authorization, and access to employment services and social security benefits. France also funds refugee training programs for 3,000 persons.

By the end of 1985, there were more than 174,000 refugees in France. During 1986, nearly 2,000 persons a month applied for asylum. Applications continued to come from Ghanaians, Sri Lankans, Iranians, and Haitians. Nearly 40 percent of all refugee applications were granted during 1985.

Included among those with refugee status in France are 111,000 Indochinese, 3,000 to 4,000 Haitians, and perhaps 20,000 Sri Lankan Tamils.

Italy

Only refugees from Eastern Europe are eligible for asylum and possible resettlement in Italy. Local settlement is financed by UNHCR and the Italian government. A bill was submitted to the Italian House of Representatives in November 1986 which would end Italy's geographic restriction and allow refugees from other countries to apply for asylum, but it had not passed by year's end.

Iranians and Ethiopians comprise the largest segment of non-European refugees. All are under the protection of UNHCR, which seeks to place them in third countries. As of June, 400 persons were being assisted.

Switzerland

Switzerland, host nation of the headquarters of the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), enacted measures designed to discourage refugee arrivals and restrict access to political asylum during 1986. A particular target of some of these initiatives seems to have been Sri Lankan Tamils, who were the subject of numerous Swiss press reports during the year linking them to alleged drug dealing.

On March 20, the government repealed an administrative order preventing the repatriation of Tamils. Since the repeal, Tamils whose asylum claims have been denied have six weeks to leave the country, or they will be repatriated at government expense. Tamils filed two-thirds of the 9,703 asylum applications during 1985. By April 1986, there were 5,000 Tamil asylum applications pending, and of 370 requests reviewed, 30 had been granted.

Refugees whose applications have been rejected can be detained for up to 30 days. Asylum applicants cannot work.

In June, the Upper House of the Swiss Parliament gave final approval to measures granting the Federal Council extraordinary powers in case of a refugee influx, including the authority to close Swiss borders. The measures also allowed the Council to designate border posts where asylum seekers must present themselves, and gave to local authorities the power to interview and screen asylum seekers at the border. The government contended these measures were aimed at economic or nonpolitical refugees.

The restriction of access to asylum in Switzerland represented a dramatic turn around since the early 1980s. The Swiss granted 90 percent of asylum claims in 1980, but only 10 percent in 1985. Stiffer measures may explain why only 4,000 asylum requests were filed in the first eight months of 1986, one-third the number during the same period in 1985.

A small sanctuary movement involving about 1,000 Swiss aiding some 200 Tamils developed during the year. By September, the government was considering harsh fines and jail terms for sanctuary participants along with fines for employers who hired undocumented foreigners.

It is estimated that there are 20,000 asylum seekers in Switzerland, including those from Eastern Europe, Africa, and Asia. UNHCR assists 30,000 refugees with legal and social counseling.

United Kingdom

Refugees in the United Kingdom—the largest numbers from Vietnam, Iran, Sri Lanka, Uganda, Ethiopia, and Poland—are allowed the same rights as citizens. They also face the same difficulties: finding jobs and housing are serious problems and instances of community tensions have frequently resulted.

The UK accepted 500 Vietnamese boat refugees from closed detention centers in Hong Kong in 1986. The House of Commons and other domestic groups had brought pressure on the UK to accept the refugees—many of whom had been in the camps as long as five years.

For the first time in 1986, the UK released its immigration statistics, including those on asylum seekers. Approximately one-fourth of asylum requests were granted during 1985. A larger percentage—approximately half—were given "exceptional leave to remain." Those granted the "exceptional" status must renew their permits to stay each year for the first four years in the country. The special status is applied to those who do not individually meet the criteria for being considered refugees, but who have compelling cases for being allowed to remain temporarily.

In June 1986, the government offered the "exceptional status" to Sri Lankan Tamils already in the UK, but warned that future arrivals would not necessarily be allowed to remain. The government's controversial decision in 1985 to require visas of Sri Lankans, despite their Commonwealth status, was its response to an influx of Tamils seeking refugee status because of ethnic violence in Sri Lanka.

LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN

Argentina

Civil violence in Chile caused a steady flow of refugees to seek protection in Argentina during 1986. From January to May, 360 Chileans asked for asylum and the Argentinian government recognized 107 claims.

Of the 12,000 refugees in Argentina, most come from Latin America. UNHCR assists some 1,000 Southeast Asians, 300 Europeans, and 1,600 Chileans, most of whom have permanently resettled.

Some reports indicate that Southeast Asian refugees, especially Laotians, have had a difficult time adapting to Argentine life. Many Southeast Asians, who first arrived in 1979, were relocated to rural Argentina. Some felt isolated and had difficulty finding work. When Argentina's economy suffered following the war with Britain in 1982, hundreds of Southeast Asians sought jobs in Buenos Aires, where many also believed their chances of resettling in the United States, Canada, or Europe would improve. However, only 17 Southeast Asian families have received visas to leave Argentina since 1979. Four-hundred Laotians have requested voluntary repatriation, but they are still thought to be in Argentina.

In May, ICM announced a joint project with the International Labor Organization to resettle 400 Salvadoran and Argentine families in northeast Argentina. The families were to engage in the production of coffee and sugar cane.

Belize

Nearly half of Belize's population of 165,000 are immigrants, and 75 percent of those are said by the government to be undocumented aliens from Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua. UNHCR estimates that 9,000 refugees are in Belize: 3,000 from Guatemala and 6,000 from El Salvador. The Belize government estimates the combined total at 7,000 for both countries.

UNHCR provides assistance to 2,600 Salvadorans and 1,400 Guatemalans. Its assistance to the rural Valley of Peace settlement was being phased out during 1986, as nearly 500 refugees became self-sufficient.

A 1986 constitutional amendment affirmed that any foreigner was entitled to citizenship after living in Belize for five years. The government said in April that 50 persons per week were taking advantage of the citizenship opportunity.

Chile

UNHCR suspended its participation in the repatriation of Chileans in September, following an announcement by President Augusto Pinochet that the government would suspend the reconsideration of decrees banning more than 3,700 exiles from returning. More than 300 Chileans returned during the first six months of 1986. It is estimated that 20,000 to 40,000 Chileans have fled their country for political reasons since 1973. There are at least 171 Chileans in internal exile, as well.

Some returnees have found it difficult to obtain work and some have faced the antagonism of Chileans who did not leave. Whatever the reasons, 15 percent of the 2,900 families that returned since 1983 subsequently left again.

Between 200,000 and one million Chileans are thought to be living abroad, mostly in Argentina, mainly for economic reasons. Nearly 1,000 Chilean refugees are being assisted by UNHCR in Argentina, and a small number of young unemployed Chileans who have residence permits in Bolivia, Uruguay, and Paraguay receive subsistence allowances.

Costa Rica

Violence in Nicaragua and El Salvador drove refugees to Costa Rica during 1986. Nicaraguans entered the country steadily throughout the year. Those who did not end up in overcrowded reception centers or camps made their way to San José or other cities in the central highlands.

Toward the end of 1986, the ability of Costa Rica to retain its generous refugee policies came under some doubt as government officials publicly expressed concerns about the burden refugees were placing on the country's economy and society.

There are about 31,000 refugees in Costa Rica, including 22,000 Nicaraguans, 6,100 Salvadorans, and 2,500 Cubans. UNHCR assists 15,000 Nicaraguans, 3,700 Salvadorans, and 800 others. The government says another 250,000 undocumented Nicaraguans may be living in the country.

For nearly 15,000 refugees, mainly Nicaraguans and Salvadorans living in cities and towns, prospects for a return to normal life in their new host country continued to improve. The Costa Rican Red Cross and the International Rescue Committee provided housing, food, education and health care assistance and opportunities for employment increased. In November 1985, the government announced that 6,000 work permits would be made available to Nicaraguan refugees where local labor shortages existed, though by mid-1986, UNHCR reported anticipating receiving only 1,000 by year's end.

In the countryside, conditions worsened. The reception center at Boca Arenal, which closed in December 1985, reopened in the spring of 1986, and by July there were reportedly 400 refugees on a half acre of land, sleeping in hammocks under a bullring's bleachers, or laid out in a communal hall filled with row after row of bunkbeds.

Similar conditions prevailed at another reception center in Alvaperal, where some refugees have lived for several months.

At the refugee camp in Limon, where, on December 9, 1985, Costa Rican civil guardsmen entered and arrested 130 young men suspected of criminal activity, animosity continued between locals and refugees. Though refugees were reportedly well-fed and receiving adequate health care, housing was inferior and the inhabitants, unable to work, were said to be despondent. In February, UNHCR had difficulty finding an agency to administer the facility.

The Costa Rican Red Cross, which oversees other UNHCR activities in Costa Rica, refused to administer Limon.

UNHCR went forward with plans to open additional sites to relieve the overcrowded conditions at Limon and the reception centers. By 1987, UNHCR estimated that at least 5,000 refugees would be located in rural settlements, or spontaneously settled in Costa Rica's farming areas.

Dominican Republic

Haiti's change of government in February 1986 did not lead to increased Haitian refugee movement to the Dominican Republic, nor did it contribute to large-scale voluntary repatriation. As of April 1986, there were still roughly 5,500 recognized Haitian refugees in the Dominican Republic.

By November, the Haitian government was still enforcing the policy of requiring Haitians travelling abroad to receive a re-entry visa from their government before returning. Thirty-five Haitians did repatriate with UNHCR assistance in April, and by the middle of that month 1,816 more had applied for repatriation assistance. From mid-February to November, 508 Haitians reportedly returned.

Following the ouster of President-for-Life Jean-Claude Duvalier, Haiti refused to honor a long-standing contract with the Dominican Republic to supply 20,000 Haitian workers to harvest the Dominican Republic's sugar cane crop. Some reports estimate that perhaps 4,000 Haitians were arrested by Dominican authorities and sent against their will to the sugar cane fields. Several million dollars were paid to the Duvalier regime over a twenty-year period to guarantee a supply of Haitian workers.

There are at least 500,000 undocumented Haitians in the Dominican Republic.

El Salvador

The civil war in El Salvador continued during 1986, and civilians, particularly those living in rural areas, were its principal victims. Close to half a million are internally displaced. More than 245,000 Salvadorans are estimated to be in neighboring countries; as many as 500,000 live without documentation in the United States.

Between January and March the military launched "Operation Phoenix," a campaign to separate the civilian population from the insurgents in the rebel-controlled Guazapa region 15 miles north of San Salvador and in Chalatenango province. Government forces reportedly bombarded several villages, burned homes, and rounded-up and detained more than 1,000 civilians in the Guazapa Region. Civilian casualties included 22 dead, 210 missing, and 427 captured during the campaign. A thousand more persons fled the fighting. In February, the U.S. State Department said that reports of indiscriminate bombing were "not supported by hard evidence." Officials of the Duarte government also denied ordering villages bombed.

Though there were infrequent reports of government human rights abuses, 30 persons a month died in political killings between January and August. In addition to government instigated violence, at least 100 civilians, many of them children, were killed by guerrilla land mines from January to July. Fighting in the countryside and political violence elsewhere caused many persons to seek safety in the capital of San Salvador or in neighboring countries.

The National Commission for Assistance to Displaced Persons (CONADES) is providing food and other aid to about 300,000 of the displaced and the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) aids 100,000.

During the summer, the army announced a repopulation plan for 14 provinces. To be funded by the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), the plan was designed to resettle displaced persons under army-supervision in areas cleared of guerrillas.

The army hoped to sponsor civil defense units in these resettlement areas. By the end of July, no resettlement had occurred, as the civilian ministers of government refused to endorse the plan.

Salvadorans have returned to their country in modest numbers. UNHCR, reported 827 repatriations for all of 1985 and 558 for the first five months of 1986, mostly from Honduras. In the fall, a Tripartite Commission on Repatriation, composed of officials of Honduras, El Salvador, and UNHCR began discussing the repatriation of Salvadorans from Honduras.

The Salvadoran government participated in drafting the Contadora Act on Peace and Cooperation in Central America, which included a commitment to the principle of nonrefoulement, and the recognition of the need to strengthen protection and assistance programs for refugees. The government announced in July it would require Nicaraguans to receive a special permit from the interior minister before they could enter the country.

French Guiana

More than 6,000 Surinamese had fled to French Guiana by the end of December as fighting continued in northeastern Suriname between government and insurgent forces. The refugees were being cared for by the French government in three camps in the St. Laurent region of western French Guiana. UNHCR had no presence in the camps.

Most of the refugees were "Maroons," descendants of escaped African slaves who comprise roughly 10 percent of the population.

Since the fighting began this year, estimates of the number dead range from dozens to more than 100. According to refugee reports, noncombatants, many women and children, have been killed in massacres by forces of the Surinamese government. Furthermore, refugees allege that government aircraft regularly shoot randomly into Maroon areas of Suriname. The killings are believed to have racist overtones.

French Guiana, which has a diverse ethnic population of 80,000 squeezed into a relatively small segment of the country, is a part of France. Suriname, also a multi-ethnic society, is a former Dutch colony ruled since 1980 by a five member military authority lead by Lt. Colonel Desire D. Bourtese. In 1982, the government executed opposition leaders it held in custody. The official number of executed is 15, but press reports indicate that the actual number is probably twice as high.

[Early in 1987, the insurgency had ebbed, although few observers predicted an imminent end to the fighting. Meanwhile, French Guiana, which is ruled by France, hosted a meeting in Cayenne between representatives of the refugees and the Surinamese government to discuss the chances for vol-

untary repatriation of the refugees. French Guiana authorities, who formally regard the refugees as "displaced persons," have indicated that no repatriation will take place without there being an improvement in the "political situation in Suriname, the collaboration of Surinamese authorities, and the agreement of the refugees."

Meanwhile, during a USCR site visit to French Guiana in January and February of 1987, refugees indicated their unwillingness to return to Suriname unless Bourtese is removed, and predicted that many more refugees would be coming to French Guiana.]

Guatemala

Though incidents of rural and urban political violence decreased during 1986, and though the new government of President Mario Vinicio Cerezo Arevalo continued to encourage Guatemalans in exile to return, as many as 250,000 persons remained displaced in 1986, and many Guatemalan refugees in other countries continued to express fears of returning home because of the on-going civil war.

The largest number of Guatemalan refugees, some 45,000, are in Mexico, nearly half of whom live along the border with Guatemala. Between 2,000 and 6,000 are in Belize. Between 500 and 1,000 are in Honduras; 200 in Costa Rica; 600 in Nicaragua; and five in Panama. As many as 100,000 Guatemalans may be in the United States.

For the displaced, work is scarce and living conditions are marginal. Among the displaced are more than 12,000 widows and at least 20,000 orphans. More than 100,000 children are thought to have lost a parent to political violence since 1978.

Miskito Indians from Nicaragua in a hastily prepared camp in Honduras. UNHCR/Fedele

Despite the decline in acts of political violence when compared with past years, murders and disappearances continued throughout 1986. The number of those who had disappeared during the year was difficult to gauge, although most human rights groups recognized a general decline in disappearances. A UNHCR Special Rapporteur, who studied Guatemalan human rights from March 1983 until March 1986, reported that 2,117 persons had disappeared since 1979.

In the highlands, where army raids between 1981 and 1983 killed at least 8,000 persons, destroyed more than 400 villages, and caused thousands to flee to Mexico, or elsewhere in Guatemala, the military continued establishing so-called "model villages." The program to create these villages began in 1982 under the administration of General Rios Montt and was designed to consolidate the army's presence in rural areas. Travel to and from the villages by inhabitants is restricted and the army supervises their operations. Once in the villages, men between ages 16-50 are required to join the Civil Defense Patrols, a national civilian armed force, estimated to number between 900,000 and one million. Because food is scarce in the countryside and available in the model villages, some persons, including insurgents, have taken up residence in them. In November, President Cerezo, who was somewhat critical of army practices during his presidential campaign, announced that some of the model villages were going to be dismantled.

No large-scale repatriations took place during the year, and officials of voluntary agencies and UNHCR continued to emphasize that individual security could not yet be guaranteed for returnees. In October, UNHCR reported assisting 343 Guatemalans to repatriate from Mexico since January. As part of procedures developed between UNHCR and the Guatemalan government, UNHCR staff accompany the returnees to the border, where they are met by Guatemalan civilian authorities and taken to their home villages. Before departing Mexico, they receive a small amount of currency and materials for reconstructing their homes.

UNHCR does not have an office in Guatemala and has no way of tracking whether or not returnees are still in their home villages. Three trips by UNHCR officials to locate returnees in Guatemala prior to September were inconclusive. That same month, the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA) reported receiving information from private agencies in Guatemala that some returnees had disappeared or had been killed.

Guatemala serves as refuge for 10,000 Salvadorans and 2,000 Nicaraguans, of whom only 260 receive indirect UNHCR assistance.

Honduras

Honduras, the second poorest nation in the hemisphere, caught in the crucible of Central America's civil wars, struggled to deal with growing numbers of refugees from Nicaragua and El Salvador during 1986.

As the year ended, it was estimated that between 60,000 and 90,000 refugees were in Honduras. The largest groups included up to 30,000 Miskito, Sumo and Rama Indians from Nicaragua; an undetermined number of Ladino or non-Indian Nicaraguans, 6,450 of whom receive assistance; and up to 35,000 Salvadorans. More than 20,000 of the refugees in Honduras are under the age of fifteen. In addition, as many as 100,000 undocumented persons may be in Honduras.

While there appeared no end in sight to the conflicts causing refugee flight in the region, the future security of all refugees in Honduras became increasingly clouded as reports of military actions against refugees mounted.

The continuing presence of anti-government forces in Honduras, especially those camped in the east along the Coco River which divides Honduras and Nicaragua, exacerbated tensions between the Honduran and Nicaraguan governments, and placed Miskito and Sumo Indian refugees in Honduras and Nicaragua at risk. Fighting in March between Nicaraguan troops and anti-government forces along the Coco River caused at least 10,000 Nicaraguan Miskito Indians to flee into Honduras, joining another 10,000 to 20,000 who fled earlier conflicts in the same border area. Some who fled the March attack may have been among those who only weeks before had returned to the same area. By December, several thousand had begun to return to Nicaragua, but an anti-government offensive in the area threatened them.

For security reasons, these Guatemalan refugees in Mexico were moved to a new site. UNHCR/Bregnard

Throughout the summer, Nicaraguan and Salvadoran refugees in a number of camps in Honduras were subjected to violence from various sources. On July 30, five refugees, including four children, were reportedly killed by contras located in Honduras who attacked the Panili relocation camp, a few miles from the border. In August, a UNHCR official noted an increase in the number of armed groups in some of the 30 Miskito camps. Members of one of the groups, KISAN, were accused of beating three women in the camp at Layasika and of kidnapping Miskitos from other camps. In September, five more refugees were reported kidnapped at gunpoint from a camp east of Tegucigalpa. Some reports indicated that the kidnappings were an attempt by KISAN to add new recruits to its forces, estimated to be 2,500.

Before fighting renewed in December, several hundred Miskitos, perhaps as many as 900, voluntarily repatriated.

Some Miskito and Sumo Indians participated in local-integration projects in Mosquitia. And a UNHCR official said in May that the Honduran government had agreed to grant 2-3 hectares of land for every Indian family in the region.

Some 6,000 ethnic Spanish Nicaraguans, called Ladinos, remained in UNHCR-supplied housing near Danli in Honduras. Unlike the Salvadoran camps, the Ladinos had substantial freedom of movement, and were allowed to interact with local Hondurans. Another 50,000 Ladinos, who have not registered, may also be in the country.

In April, a number of young male Nicaraguans reportedly disappeared from these settlements, possibly forcibly recruited to the anti-government forces.

The Honduran government indicated a willingness to provide land to Ladinos who wished to settle permanently, but the land had not been given as of May.

Though 375 Ladinos repatriated to Nicaragua in 1985, only 37 had done so through November 1986. Twenty-seven were resettled in third countries, 20 of these in Australia.

As many as 35,000 Salvadoran refugees were estimated to be in Honduras, 20,000 of whom were residing in four UNHCR camps in the western part of the country. More than 1,000 additional Salvadorans registered with UNHCR during the first quarter of 1986, but only 200 were thought to be new arrivals.

Many Salvadorans have been in camps for five or six years. Large-scale repatriations do not appear likely. A Tripartite Commission, composed of UNHCR and the governments of El Salvador and Honduras, began discussions in April, but failed to reach an agreement which would provide for the repatriation of most Salvadorans. By November, 814 Salvadorans had repatriated with UNHCR assistance. A few Salvadorans who did repatriate may have been detained in Mariona prison.

Voluntary agencies continued to be concerned about the protection of Salvadorans in camps, despite assurances from UNHCR that its 12 protection officers in Honduras constituted an adequate presence.

On March 5, 22 Salvadorans trying to enter a UNHCR camp were reportedly pushed back to El Salvador by the Honduran military. On March 11, three Salvadorans were reportedly killed and four captured by the Honduran military as they tried to enter Mesa Grande. The Honduran military refused to turn-over the captured Salvadorans to UNHCR. The four were allegedly jailed in Honduras for one month, then given to Salvadoran authorities, where they were jailed for another month before being released. The Honduran government denied any knowledge of these incidents.

Separate accounts also indicated an increased Honduran military presence at the Salvadoran refugee camp at Colomoncagua, where two refugees were killed in an incident with Honduran soldiers in August 1985. The last group of 99 Salvadorans entered the camp in April. In May, the camp was sealed by a military cordon.

Nearly 1,000 Guatemalans were also in Honduras. More than 500 were in UNHCR's El Tesoro camp near Copan. UNHCR continued to pursue repatriation for them, though no agreement was reached with the Guatemalan government.

The incessant conflict along the border between Honduras and Nicaragua has led to the displacement of up to 35,000 Hondurans, a problem of growing concern to international organizations during the year. No government programs had been undertaken to aid them.

Mexico

Central Americans fleeing civil unrest and violence in their homelands sought refuge in Mexico by the tens of thousands during 1986. There are thought to be between 265,000 and one million undocumented Central Americans in Mexico, and at least 175,000 are refugees: between 120,000 and 150,000 from El Salvador; 45,000 from Guatemala; and 10,000 from other countries in Central and South America. Only the Guatemalan refugees living in UNHCR camps, about 40,000, are recognized by the Mexican government. Another 5,000 Guatemalans, who registered with UNHCR, are dispersed in the countryside. There may be another 60,000 undocumented Guatemalans in the country.

There is no refugee status under Mexican law, though it does provide for political asylees. The Mexican government grants a handful of asylum cases each year, following a recommendation from UNHCR. Mexico has not signed the UN convention or protocol on refugees.

More than 20,000 Guatemalan refugees continue to live in 64 camps along the border inside Chiapas where they first settled following Guatemalan army attacks on their villages between 1981-1983. In early 1984, a raid by Guatemalan troops on a Chiapas camp left six refugees dead, but no further attacks have been reported. Refugees in Chiapas receive basic assistance from UNHCR and the Comision Mexicana de Ayuda a Refugiados (COMAR), the Mexican government's refugee agency, which was created in 1980. In Chiapas, the refugees' economic and legal situation is somewhat tenuous. No land has been made available to them, and they do not have work permits. Some are able to find seasonal work, especially during the sugar cane harvest from October to January. Under Mexican law, refugees in Chiapas are termed "border visitors." They are granted visas which must be renewed every three months, and they must remain within 50 kilometers of the border.

Guatemalan refugees in Chiapas, Mexico, bake bread for the camp. UNHCR/Taylor

In April 1984, following the attack on refugees in Chiapas, the government announced a plan to relocate all Guatemalan refugees to sites in Campeche and Quintana Roo states in the Yucatan peninsula. The plan, conducted with the assistance of UNHCR, was controversial. Some refugees were reportedly moved against their will by Mexican authorities. More than 5,000 Guatemalans are thought to have fled to Mexican villages during the relocation. By June 1986, 18,800 had been relocated.

About 12,300 Guatemalan refugees live in two main settlements in Campeche, and 6,000 live in two settlements in Quintana Roo. The government has provided land to refugees in all four sites, though poor soil quality and refugee reluctance to farm collectively have stifled efforts to make the settlements self-sufficient. Refugees in the Yucatan settlements receive a visa which must be renewed annually. They are allowed to work outside the camps, but only if they continue to live inside them.

The future for Guatemalans in Mexico remains uncertain. Some Guatemalan officials, including President Cerezo, have stated their interest in having Guatemalans return, while others were accusing the camps in Mexico of being sanctuaries of insurgency. Meanwhile, Mexico's undersecretary of the interior, Jorge Carrillo Olea, said in October, "It seems that the reasons that originally drove Guatemalan refugees to leave, no longer pertain." He still maintained that those along the border should be moved inland for their own protection.

By October, 350 refugees had returned to Guatemala, assisted by UNHCR, which accompanies the returnees to the border, where they are met by Guatemalan civilian authorities and taken to their home villages.

No agreement was reached between the governments of Mexico and Guatemala regarding large-scale repatriation of Guatemalans in Mexico. UNHCR and officials of voluntary agencies continued to emphasize that individual security could not yet be guaranteed for returnees.

For the 100,000 to 200,000 Salvadorans in Mexico, no formal government recognition exists. Each year, a few receive political asylum. Under Mexican law, Salvadorans must prove individual persecution before being granted asylum.

UNHCR recognizes and provides emergency assistance to about 5,400 refugees in Mexico City, about 4,000 of whom are Salvadorans. Salvadorans without UNHCR or government recognition face numerous difficulties. Because they are considered illegal aliens, they cannot work, and they are subject to deportation by Mexican authorities if arrested. Several hundred Salvadorans enter Mexico each month. Some arrive by air and then overstay their visas and remain illegally. Some enter illegally along the coastal corridor at Tapachula. Many of those who make it as far as Mexico's northern border are victimized by bandits or corrupt Mexican border officials. Nearly 80 percent of the 600 Central Americans detained each month at the northern Mexican border are Salvadorans.

Nicaragua

In recent years, more than 17,000 refugees have fled into Nicaragua, most of whom are fully integrated into Nicaraguan society and are active participants in agricultural cooperatives. There are about 16,000 Salvadorans, 500 Guatemalans, and 200 from other countries in Nicaragua. In June, 2,300 refugees were receiving UNHCR assistance and more than 1,100 of these were expected to become self-reliant by the end of 1986. Nicaragua cooperates with UNHCR in implementing refugee programs and has made land and other resources available to refugees.

Perhaps as many as 500,000 persons have fled Nicaragua since the civil war of 1978-1979. More than 200,000 are thought to be in Costa Rica and Honduras and another 200,000—250,000 may be spread among the United States, Mexico, and other Latin American countries. The Nicaraguan government estimates that at least 250,000 persons are displaced within the country.

During 1986, Nicaragua's war with insurgents escalated. With bases in neighboring Costa Rica and Honduras, the contras continued to raid Nicaraguan villages and military positions. Increased fighting between Nicaraguan and contra forces along the Coco River began in March and continued sporadically throughout the year. As a result, more than 10,000 Miskito Indians were forced to flee into Honduras.

In September, the Nicaraguan government asked UNHCR for $300,000 to help repatriate some of the Miskito and Sumo Indians in Honduras to their villages on the Nicaraguan side of the Coco, but toward the end of December, fighting between Nicaraguan forces and contras in this area had increased, endangering repatriation efforts.

Nicaraguan refugees also fled to Costa Rica. By September, 22,000 had reportedly done so. Fighting was reported between Nicaraguan troops and Costa Rican civil guardsman in April, and in November, the Costa Rican government announced that access to border towns would be restricted and that local villagers could only travel if granted a government permit.

Despite the continuing violence, at least 800 Nicaraguans, mostly Miskito Indians, had returned from Honduras by the end of June. Thousands more were in the process of returning in December when renewed fighting broke out between contra and Sandinista forces along the Coco. No returnees were reported from Costa Rica.



Surinamese refugees in camp in French Guiana. USCR/Cerquone

MIDDLE EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

Afghanistan

While the estimated 5 million refugees who have crossed Afghanistan's borders seeking asylum have received a certain degree of attention—noteworthy for being the world's largest concentration of refugees and for comprising about one-third of Afghanistan's total population—another million Afghans, internally displaced by the war, have gone largely unnoticed.

Much of the displacement has occurred as a result of Soviet and Afghan army efforts to deprive guerrilla forces of support from the civilian population. Aerial bombings and strafings, as well as reprisal massacres by ground troops against villages supporting the Mujahedin resistance, have destroyed tens of thousands of homes and whole villages. A scorched-earth policy including the use of napalm and defoliants has destroyed agricultural production in many areas. Many displaced people have gravitated to the capital city of Kabul, swelling its population to 1.5 million—double the 1978 population. In November 1986, the UN issued a report saying that the pattern of aerial bombardment indicates an intention to clear out the Afghan population from provinces bordering Iran and Pakistan.

In July, the Afghan cabinet agreed on a plan to relocate 300,000 Afghans from the mountainous eastern provinces bordering Pakistan to the western desert provinces. The relocation of these ethnic Pushtuns, members of Afghanistan's largest ethnic group who share ethnic identity with the Pushtuns of Pakistan, would remove them from areas where they could offer most support for the resistance. The government announced that the relocation was for "economic reasons" and that it would be voluntary. A lack of rainfall and food shortages in the western provinces, combined with the war, have caused many of the people from that region to seek refuge in neighboring Iran.

Another factor contributing to internal displacement is an ongoing civil war between rival Muslim resistance groups, particularly in the Hazarajat and Nuristan regions. In Hazarajat, in central Afghanistan, where the Shi'ite presence is most pronounced, a radical group loyal to Iran's Ayatollah Khomeini has engaged in brutal persecution of "capitalists" and "landowners." Thousands have been killed and tens of thousands displaced, many finding refuge among Sunni Pushtuns in Wardak province. The "landowners"—quite poor by any objective standard prior to their displacement—have become utterly destitute since becoming internal exiles.

Iran

Continuing a trend of the past several years, refugee traffic continued both to and from Iran during 1986.

In announcing the results of the first census since the revolution in November 1986, the Minister of Planning and Budget said that Iran hosts 2.6 million refugees.

Nearly two million of that number have sought refuge from Afghanistan. Some reports during the year said that Afghan refugees were continuing to enter the country at a rate of 2,000 per day.

The vast majority of Afghan refugees have not been formally registered and do not live in camps. Many travel to Iranian urban centers, especially to Mashad in the northeast, where an estimated quarter million Afghan refugees reside.

During 1986, increased coercion on the part of the Iranian regime to insure loyalty to Ayatollah Khomeini among Afghan resistance groups has been reported. Refugees have alleged mistreatment, denial of refugee cards, arrests, and forced repatriation to Afghanistan. No independent observers have been able to substantiate the charges.

At least hundreds of Afghan refugees have also reportedly been conscripted by Iran into the war against Iraq. One report said that 180 Afghan refugees were imprisoned in a detention center in Mashad for refusing to report for duty on the Iraqi front.

More than a million Iranian civilians have been internally displaced by the war. The war has also resulted in the influx to Iran of an estimated 400,000 Iraqis of Iranian descent. They have either fled, been expelled by Iraq, or displaced to Iran by the fighting. In October, 150 new arrivals were reported in a 15-day period. The same month, Iran also reported preparations to release 100 defecting Iraqi POWs and to grant them political asylum.

Although Iran claims to have established refugee camps for Iraqi refugees, the level of protection and assistance for them is unclear. Many have reportedly been imprisoned. Others have been refused entry, resulting in their internment in Iraq.

Some 30,000 Kurdish refugees who fled Iraq in 1974-75 remain in camps in Iranian Kurdistan. Conditions for Kurds in Iraq, Iran, and Turkey have worsened during 1986 with the escalation hostilities in Kurdish areas. Iran massed troops in Kurdish villages along the Iraqi border, which were bombed and shelled by Iraq, resulting in Kurdish civilian casualties.

Iranian and Kurdish forces in Iran also fought each other. By June, the leader of one Kurdish resistance group, the Komeleh, said that his group had been forced to abandon all territory in Iran and flee to Iraq. He said that Iranian military forces had also stepped up operations against the civilian Kurdish population.

Many sectors of the Iranian population continued to flee Iran during 1986 and seek asylum in other countries. The year saw a marked increase in men fleeing conscription. Increased numbers of Jews and Baha'is continued to flee the country.

Iraq

The war with Iran continued to be the major factor influencing both refugee flows across Iraq's eastern border and internal civilian displacement. Particularly troublesome for Iraq was the opening of a second front by Iran in the northern Kurdish area. Iranian military advances were accompanied by increased Kurdish insurgency. Kurdish villages in Iraq were attacked by both Iraqi forces as well as Turkish air and ground forces. These actions occurred at a time when Kurds in Iran were fleeing into Iraq as a result of fighting with Iranian forces there. In effect, since all three countries in the area were actively involved with hostilities against their Kurdish minorities, many Kurds were left with no borders to cross for safety, and thus remained internally displaced. As in Turkey and Iran, Kurdish refugees and displaced people in Iraq have not been provided with international protection or assistance.

Kurds displaced by the fighting have often been prevented from returning to their homes in the north and relocated in resettlement camps in the south. One camp located in the desert west of Baghdad holds up to 25,000 people.

Major destruction of Kurdish villages and relocation of their populations to the south occurred following the abortive Kurdish uprising of 1974 and the previous Iranian incursion into the northern Kurdish areas in 1983.

Thousands of Iranians have sought refuge in Iraq since the beginning of the war, and continued to cross into Iraq during 1986. In March, the Iraqi government reiterated its readiness to accept Iranian defectors, and Iraq's daily military communiques regularly noted new influxes of Iranian refugees and military deserters. In 1986, some of the most dramatic defections took place when Iranian pilots flew their planes to the Iraqi side. Some Iranian refugees, numbering probably less than 100, have been resettled in third countries with the assistance of the International Committee of the Red Cross.

In June, the leader of the People's Mujahedin, a principal opposition group in Iran, was expelled from France along with some of his followers and given refuge in Iraq. Other Mujahedin supporters sought asylum in Iraq during the year, including a group of Iranian athletes who defected from the Asian Olympic Games in South Korea.

An estimated 30,000 ethnic Arab civilians from Iran's Khuzistan province, bordering Iraq at the scene of the war's most intense fighting, are reportedly being held by the Iraqis.

Israel

The number of Jewish refugees seeking resettlement in Israel appeared to decline in 1986, perhaps to an all-time low. Some one million Jewish refugees are believed to have settled in Israel since the establishment of the state in 1948. Under the 1950 Law of Return, all restrictions on Jewish immigration were abolished. Israel, however, does not accord refugees a special status, but treats them as immigrants, making it difficult in any year to assess the number who could be considered to be refugees. Israel declined to identify publicly the countries of origin of new immigrants. It is believed that increased numbers of Jews from Iran entered the country during the year, but these were not acknowledged by the government. Romanian Jews appeared to be the largest contingent of refugees from the Soviet bloc.

Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union continued to decline in 1986, despite the release of several prominent dissidents, including Anatoly Sharansky. In 1986, 914 Soviet Jews were permitted to emigrate. The number of Soviet emigres has dropped precipitously since the 1979 high of 51,320. Also, a declining proportion of the declining number of Soviet emigrants have opted to immigrate to Israel in recent years. Thus, only 20 percent of the 1985 total of 1,140 Soviet emigrants chose to settle in Israel, a decrease from 75 percent a decade ago. New Soviet regulations scheduled to go into effect January 1, 1987 would effectively limit emigration to cases of reunification of immediate relatives.

No progress was made during the year to resolve the question of repatriation or compensation for Palestinian refugees, as called for in UN General Assembly Resolution 194. Israel has not recognized the resolution, saying that it fails to account for Jewish refugees who fled Arab states during the 1948 war.

Occupied Territories

Although the 19th year of Israeli occupation of Arab territories saw some moves on the part of the Israeli administration to improve the quality of life in the West Bank and Gaza Strip, conditions, particularly in the Gaza Strip, continued to be poor, and tensions continued to run high as no political solution appeared in sight.

There are 365,315 UNRWA registered refugees in the West Bank, one quarter of whom live in 20 camps. Another 435,478 UNRWA registered refugees live in the Gaza Strip. Nearly 45 percent of them live in 10 overcrowded refugee camps. A number of problems have arisen from the dense concentration of half a million people in a 363 kilometer area, including housing shortages, inadequate sanitation, health and nutritional problems, poverty and underemployment.

Children make up 40 percent of the Palestinian refugee population in Lebanon.
UNRWA

Both Israel and Jordan announced plans during the year for economic development of the territories, but little progress was made toward creating an economic infrastructure. Israel did slow the pace of Israeli settlement of the territories and also removed barriers from several refugee camps, including the barricade that had blocked the main entrance of the Al-Duhashayah camp for six years.

However, the authorities continued to impose collective punishments on refugee camp populations for security violations. Such punishments included curfews, temporary closings of UNRWA schools, travel restrictions, and the demolition and sealing of homes.

Since August 1985, the Israeli authorities have revived expulsion and deportation as a means of punishment. During the year, expulsion orders were issued against certain residents of the Al-Burayj, Al-Duyahshsh and Jabalyah refugee camps. More than 30 Palestinians have been deported since August 1985.

The number of separated Palestinian families allowed to enter the territories for reasons of family reunification continued to decline. From 1981 to 1984, about 1,200 people per year were granted family reunification. That number dropped to about 300 in 1985. In June 1986, 109 family reunification grants were announced.

In December 1986, demonstrators and Israeli security forces clashed repeatedly and violently. Although some of the worst violence occurred in and around the Balata refugee camp, the largest camp in the West Bank, the violence spread throughout the West Bank and Gaza Strip, resulting in deaths, injuries, and arrests.

Jordan

A rift between King Hussein and PLO leader Yasser Arafat, beginning in February and intensifying in July, helped to bring about changes in the relationship between Palestinians and the Jordanian government. Some PLO activists, including Arafat's top lieutenant, Abu Jihad, were deported, and restrictions were reportedly imposed on the internal movement of pro-Arafat figures.

On the other hand, Palestinians gained dramatically increased visibility in the Jordanian House of Representatives when it was expanded from 60 to 142 seats, divided equally between representatives of Jordan proper and of the Israeli-occupied West Bank and Palestinian refugee camps on the Jordanian East Bank.

An estimated one million Palestinians reside in Jordan, of whom 822,624 are UNRWA-registered. One quarter of them live in ten refugee camps.

Except for refugees from Gaza, Palestinians in Jordan have been granted Jordanian citizenship since the first refugee influx in 1948, and have enjoyed unrestricted property and employment rights. In 1986, Jordan began to issue temporary Jordanian passports for Palestinian refugees from the Gaza Strip residing in Jordan. The authorities estimated that more than 60,000 refugees would receive the three-year temporary passports. But Jordan also confiscated the Jordanian passports of several prominent West Bank figures who had not expressed support for King Hussein. In July, Jordan rescinded the authority of West Bank city councils to process Jordanian passports and family identity cards. Special passport clerks were assigned by Jordan to the West Bank, where some 800,000 West Bank Palestinians carry Jordanian passports.

Kuwait

Heightened security concerns, combined with a projected decline in state revenues, resulted in stepped up deportations of expatriate workers in 1985 and 1986. The majority of Kuwait's 1.6 million population is comprised of expatriates, but they are denied a voice in the country's affairs. Despite residing in Kuwait for decades, foreign workers are subject to deportation upon retirement or loss of employment. Naturalization is rare, even in cases of Kuwaiti-born children of expatriates.

The government of Kuwait deported 26,898 people in 1985. Kuwaiti press reports in May 1986 said that 30,000 workers would be deported by the end of the summer. The government confirmed to USCR its decision to reduce the expatriate work force, but said that the 30,000 figure was incorrect. When asked whether provisions were being made to adjudicate asylum claims for those workers claiming a fear of persecution, the government replied that "Kuwait does not give asylum," and said that expatriates are permitted to reside in Kuwait only "as long as they can be absorbed into the work force." Kuwait is not a party to the UN convention or protocol on refugees. A government official in November said that the deportation policy would continue "until we reach the point where we achieve security and safety for this land and its inhabitants."

In November, the press reported a plan to expel workers who had resided in the country for ten years or more. This plan would have a particularly strong impact on the estimated 300,000 Palestinians residing in Kuwait, many of whom have lived in the country for more than a decade and have Kuwaiti-born children.

In addition to Palestinians, there are other nationality groups who may well include refugees, including Armenians, Iranians, Afghans, and smaller numbers of Iraqis, Lebanese, and Sri Lankans.

Lebanon

Almost daily violence between and among competing Lebanese militias and the Palestinian refugee population wracked Lebanon throughout 1986.

An estimated 300,000 Palestinians live in Lebanon. UNRWA has registered 271,424, just over half of whom live in 13 refugee camps. Children represent 40 percent of the registered refugees; 49 percent of the total are female; and 9 percent are more than 60 years of age. They are in a vulnerable position, subject to attack from hostile Lebanese groups, from infighting within the competing Palestinian factions, and from Israeli military raids. Israeli aerial attacks hit refugee camps from the far north to the south during the year.

When refugee camps were struck, the attackers, whether Israeli, Syrian, or Lebanese, would attempt to justify their actions by citing the presence of armed elements in and around the camps. Most of the victims, however, were women, children, and the elderly. For their part, Palestinian leaders maintained that the possession of weapons in the camps was essential for the protection of refugee noncombatants.

The primary stated rationale of Amal, the Shi'ite militia, for its involvement in the 1986 "camps war" was to prevent the return of Palestinian armed strength to Lebanon. Most of the existing refugee camps are situated in predominantly Shi'ite areas, such as west and south Beirut, and southern Lebanon, which, until the Israeli invasion of 1982, had been dominated by the PLO. Despite often repressive measures to prevent their return, Palestinian guerrillas continued to build a presence in the camps.

In the Beirut area, particularly in the Burj al Barajinah and Shatila camps, fighting between Amal and Palestinians escalated periodically throughout the year. During the heights of fighting, the camps were cut off, the wounded went untreated, and breakdowns of sanitation and other basic needs occurred. By the end of the year, the

Location of UNRWA-Registered Refugees



Burj al Barajinah camp population faced severe food shortages due to the protracted siege. At various times, thousands of Palestinians fled the camps. In December, Palestinian sources claimed that 90 percent of the Shatila camp had been destroyed.

The situation for Palestinians in the south, in and around Tyre, was also precarious. Palestinians living outside refugee camps were especially vulnerable. Those in the towns of 'Adlun and Nabatiyeh were reportedly expelled and prevented by Amal from returning. Many of the displaced reportedly moved further north to Sidon.

The camps themselves were surrounded by Amal militiamen, and hundreds of Palestinian men were reportedly arrested and abducted by Amal during the year. UNRWA staff members were also arrested and the UNRWA office in Tyre was forced to close. In the fall, Amal began a ten-week siege of the Rashidiyeh camp, home to about 17,000 refugees. As in the Beirut camps, the blockade of food raised the threat of starvation for the camp population. Amal demanded the disarming of all Palestinians.

In response, Palestinians went on the offensive in the Sidon area, dislodging Amal from the Christian village of Maghdousheh, which overlooks Ain Helweh, the largest refugee camp in Lebanon. Fighting between Amal and the Palestinians then escalated in all of the Beirut, Sidon, and Tyre camp areas. Hundreds were killed and thousands wounded. These included 157 known dead and 604 known wounded registered refugees, excluding casualties in the Tyre area where UNRWA was unable to make an estimate. Five UNRWA staff were killed during the autumn conflict, while an estimated 18,000 Palestinians were displaced during that round of fighting.

Although not directly involved in these hostilities, the Christian population in the area found itself caught in the crossfire. Christian radio broadcasts reported killings, abductions, looting and destruction of homes in Maghdousheh and other Christian villages. Many reportedly fled to the Christian town of Jezzin, whose population of 40,000 had swelled from successive waves of Christian displaced persons in 1983 and 1985. Another 8,000 Christians remain displaced in the Israeli-controlled "security zone."

Inter-Christian factional violence resulted in an additional 30,000 displaced persons from East Beirut and surrounding areas earlier in the year.

Given the unsettled nature of the conflict, there are no reliable estimates for the total number of displaced persons in Lebanon. Civilians from all sides have been made homeless. It became increasingly dangerous to remain a member of a minority group in areas controlled by other groups during 1986. Frequently, homes abandoned by one group were inhabited by displaced persons from other groups. The Damascus Agreement, a plan for the reunification of the country which has been promoted by several prominent militias, includes a provision for the return of all displaced persons. It appeared, however, as the national cohesiveness of the country continued to disintegrate, that such a return seemed increasingly unlikely.

Pakistan

The hospitality provided by Pakistan for seven years to 2.8 million Afghan refugees—the world's largest concentration of refugees—continued to show the effects of strain in 1986.

By all accounts, Afghan refugees in more than 300 camp-villages are adequately provided for by the Pakistan government, which contributes about half of the cost of caring for them. However, tensions with local populations erupted at various points resulting in bloodshed and revealing underlying resentment towards the refugee presence.

In October, clashes between the Baluch and Pushtuns occurred in Quetta near the Afghan border. In December, at least 200 were killed and thousands injured and arrested in intercommunal violence in the southern port city of Karachi. A series of attacks and counterattacks escalated into full-scale rioting between Pushtuns, many of whom were identified as Afghan refugees, and Muhajirs, most of whom in this case were Bihari refugees from Bangladesh.

The violence was linked to a sweep by government troops through Karachi rounding up about 20,000 Afghan refugees and moving them into tents on the outskirts of the city. Some 2,500 shelters housing Afghan refugees were bulldozed, and it was reported that the refugees would be moved to camps closer to the border.

Although most of the reported conflict occurred in the Sind and Baluchistan provinces, 75 percent of the Afghan refugees are located in the Northwest Frontier Province, where the local host community is also predominantly Pushtun. Tensions were high in the Northwest Frontier Province in the spring, however, when a rash of terrorist bombings—about two per day during May and June—threw urban centers such as Peshawar into turmoil.

The face of Peshawar has changed dramatically since the beginning of the refugee influx. The population has almost doubled and many Afghan refugees have flourished in the Peshawar markets. The bombings created a wedge, however, between Afghan refugees and local residents. Pakistan security forces removed groups of Afghan refugees from the city and banned them from the Qissa Khwani bazaar.

In October, about 5,000 unregistered Afghan refugees were transferred from the Northwest Frontier Province to Punjab Province.

Many saw the terror campaign as an organized effort by Afghan secret police agents to sow fear and instability in order to lessen Pakistan support for Afghan refugees and resistance groups. During 1986, following the accession to power of Najibullah in Afghanistan, there was also a marked increase in the number of Afghan border violations. Targets of cross-border shellings and bombings included refugee camps. During 1986, Afghan planes reportedly flew many sorties over refugee camps in Pakistan.

Despite the strains in Pakistan, new influxes of Afghan refugees continued to enter the country, including an estimated 15,000 new arrivals in the last six months of 1986.

UNHCR has registered about 2,500 non-Afghan refugees in Pakistan, mostly Iranians. Pakistan is not a signatory of the UN refugee convention or its protocol. Although it has offered asylum to Afghan refugees, Iranians are not granted asylum, are denied government benefits, and are considered as illegal aliens. They are expected to leave Pakistan to seek asylum in third countries. Despite these obstacles, their numbers continue to grow every year. About half of the registered Iranian refugees in Pakistan are members of the Baha'i faith. Officials in Lahore said that the influx from Iran increased in 1986 from about 10 to about 50-100 refugees per day. Many, apparently, were fleeing renewed military call-ups for service on the Iraqi front. Thousands of Iranian refugees with no intention or hope of third country resettlement did not register with UNHCR. This was particularly true of the Iranian Baluch who could find refuge with their tribesmen in Pakistan's Baluchistan province.

Sri Lanka

In addition to some 200,000 people who have fled Sri Lanka, another 120,000 people have been displaced within the country as a consequence of ethnic strife between the dominant Sinhalese and minority Tamil communities.

Some 49,000 of the displaced population are housed in 110 camps called "welfare centers." Of these, 70.9 percent are Tamils, 25 percent are Sinhalese, and the remaining 4.1 percent are Muslims. The percentages of displaced persons outside the camps are lower for Tamils and Muslims, but higher for Sinhalese.

In August, the government indicated its intention to resettle displaced people and announced a plan to close the last welfare center in Mannar and transfer its 224 families to Vavuniya, both districts in the northern province. Displacement has also been reported in the eastern province in 1985 and 1986.

Intercommunal violence escalated during the summer months, resulting in exile press reports of further displacements. In July, an unconfirmed report alleged that 67 displaced Tamils inside a camp were shot and killed by security forces.

Syria

Syria continues to host 250,953 UNRWA-registered Palestinian refugees. Although ten refugee camps have been established, more than 70 percent of the Palestinian population has chosen to live outside the camps.

A series of explosions and assassinations in April 1986 led to security measures being imposed on Palestinian areas. Syrian security forces were reported to have arrested undisclosed numbers of Palestinians in Yarmouk, the Palestinian quarter of Damascus.

Mounting violence in neighboring Lebanon between pro- and anti-Syrian forces created tensions within Syria's Palestinian community as well. Some Palestinians arrested by Syrian and Syrian-backed forces in Lebanon were reportedly transferred to prisons in Syria.

Lebanese and Palestinians displaced by warfare in Lebanon continued to find refuge in Syria. UNHCR provided emergency assistance to 33,000 persons displaced by civil strife in Lebanon in 1985.

Turkey

Western European efforts during 1986 to shut down the flow of asylum seekers, combined with an increased influx

An Afghan widow receives medical assistance. UNHCR/Diamond

1986: Testing India's Response to Refugees

In 1986, as India approached the completion of four decades of independence and freedom, it faced serious challenges posed by the presence of refugee groups from abroad as well as restive ethnic minority groups of its own. Each group has in its own way tested India's tradition of democratic rule. Refugees, in fleeing threats to their lives and livelihoods, have sought succor from a government that is unable even to provide for all of its own citizens. Disaffected minorities, seeking greater autonomy and self-respect, have forcefully pressed their demands before the government, often producing violent clashes which have destroyed lives and property and displaced families.

Among refugee groups that have fled to India, the most recent arrivals are the tribal peoples from Bangladesh and the Tamils from Sri Lanka. Earlier, Afghans and Iranians came, and before them Tibetans. Among India's ethnic minorities that have faced the greatest difficulties are the Sikhs on the sensitive western frontier with Pakistan, and ethnic communities in northeastern India, such as the tribal Tripuras and Nagas and, most recently, the Gurkhas.

The most serious problem involves the tribal refugees in northeastern India. The flight of tribal peoples, mostly Chakmas from Bangladesh, is serious for several reasons: large numbers are involved; they have been subjected to brutal, genocide-like treatment; their suffering has occurred largely without the notice of the outside world; and conditions continue unchanged with the prospect of ever increasing refugee flows.

These tribal peoples—70 percent are Chakmas, but there are up to 13 other tribes included—live in the Chittagong Hill tracts of southeastern Bangladesh. Their languages and religion (mostly Buddhist) are different from the lowland Bengali-speaking Muslims, the country's majority community, whom the government has resettled in the hill tracts to relieve the population pressure that makes Bangladesh one of the world's most densely populated nations. This resettlement has led to clashes between the settlers and the Bangladeshi army on one side and the tribals and the tribal guerrillas, on the other.

Over 10,000 tribals have sought refuge in Tripura state in southeastern India since April 1986; earlier waves in 1979-81 saw tens of thousands flee. Yet they are not altogether safe in India; in the summer, 6,000 were apparently pushed back by India's Border Security Force on the grounds that the camps in India were full. In late 1986, Indian and Bangladeshi military commanders agreed to deny sanctuary to the guerrillas in the hope of stopping cross-border movements. From the refugees' standpoint, this development is ominous and raises serious concerns for their protection.

According to recent reports released by Amnesty International (AI) based on eyewitness accounts, treatment of tribals by the army and settlers is often brutal and savage, even genocidal. All are targets—young and old are killed, women are raped and disembowled, victims are thrown into burning huts or their corpses burned. Buddhist religious symbols have been attacked, monks killed, and shrines destroyed. Aside from AI and some sketchy press accounts, little has been reported to the outside world about what is happening to these tribal peoples.

In the southern Indian state of Tamilnadu, the government is providing refuge for 125,000 Tamils from the nearby island of Sri Lanka. The mostly Hindu Tamils who comprise a minority of the country's population have for years felt discriminated against by the majority Buddhist Sinhalese and from time to time feelings have spilled over into violence between the two communities which are also separated by linguistic and ethnic differences.

Most Tamils fled to India after the 1983 riots on the island and, being largely middle class, were basically able to fend for themselves. Many used airlines to flee but others made the short trip by boat as many have done since. More recent arrivals, mostly fishermen and some farmers, have needed more assistance. The state government has established four main camps and scores of smaller ones (134 in all) for the refugees. Most are being reasonably well looked after by the government and private agencies. Though the UNHCR has offered assistance, its overtures have been declined by the Indian government, which wishes not to internationalize the problem. Despite ethnic and language ties, some tensions do exist between the refugees and locals, but not of crisis proportions.

Most local nongovernmental organizations are church-related and receive some support from abroad. A few have been organized by refugees to care for their own, but these usually have links with one of the Tamil political organizations involved in the fighting. Overall assistance—whether in cash or kind—is limited, however, and the situation for some of the poorer refugees outside the camps—perhaps 15 percent of the total—is thought to be very difficult.

The Tibetans are the largest, long-standing refugee community (over 85,000) and have lived in India since 1959. Some have recently begun to voice political demands; but, in general, the Tibetans still long to return to their homeland with their leader, the Dalai Lama, who has shared their exile.

The Sikh problem has affected many people directly, with hundreds dead and thousands injured and displaced; beyond this, its importance lies in its challenge to the central government. The Sikh issue has come to be viewed, in India and outside, of critical importance to the future of democratic rule in India; how it is dealt with and resolved—provided a solution is found—will likely become a model for the settlement of other related communal problems.

There is an irony in the Sikh situation: unlike most embattled minorities, the Sikhs are one of India's success stories. Adherents of a religious movement that began in the 1500s, Sikhs belong to a hard working, enterprising community that has generally prospered during independent India. Most live as farmers in Punjab state—India's breadbasket—but many live elsewhere in India as well as abroad, engaged in a variety of occupations.

As they made economic advances over the years, Indian Sikhs also sought greater respect and political rights for their community. These sentiments were embodied in a political movement which developed moderate and extremists factions. In 1984, a crisis developed with the army takeover of the Sikh's holiest shrine, the Golden Temple, and, subsequently, the assassination of Prime Minister Indira Gandhi. Following her death, widescale rioting broke out, especially in New Delhi, and over 2,000 died, mostly Sikhs. Many Sikhs, displaced from homes and businesses, still live in temporary camps. These traumatic events have created a deep divide between Sikhs and other Indians, especially Hindus, that will not be easily bridged.

In mid-1985, an agreement was reached between the government and Sikh leaders, but it has still to be enacted. In mid-1986, militant Punjabi Sikhs began a scare campaign designed to force Hindus out of the state and further their aim of creating Khalistan, a Sikh homeland. Many Hindus took refuge in Delhi at six temple complexes. Some have organized armed vigilante groups to counter the Sikh threats. Communal tension remains high.

Though less critical than the Sikh problem, India faces similar difficulties of displacement and disaffection with other groups in its northeastern region. For years Naga and Mizo tribes people in India have demonstrated for greater autonomy and control over their lives. India's Assamese peoples, feeling threatened by years of large-scale immigration of Bangladeshi laborers, finally got the central government's agreement in 1985 that some workers, at least, must go back. Unhappy tribals in Tripura have organized the Tripura National Volunteers and begun to agitate. And, in 1986, a new movement emerged: the Gurkhas of British army fame—originally from Nepal but settled now in Darjeeling—voiced a demand for their own state.

As India confronts these problems of displaced and refugee peoples, it faces the daunting challenge of insuring state authority and control yet protecting the freedom and rights of these groups.

of Iranian asylum seekers into Turkey during the year, created a "pressure cooker" effect in the country. A growing number of refugees had no place to go.

Turkey's accession to the 1951 UN refugee convention carries a geographical limitation recognizing as refugees only those who flee from Europe. Thus, the estimated 400,000 to 1 million Iranian exiles in the country were regarded as being "in transit" awaiting visas for third country resettlement. As the prospects for third country asylum or resettlement continued to dim, new pressures were felt by the Turkish authorities to deal with the Iranian exile population.

The most dramatic change in the Iranian exile community during the year was the increased presence of single men of military draft age. About 15 percent of the refugees continued to represent Iran's religious and ethnic minorities.

Many of the exiles were politically active, and clashes were reported among exile groups. Factions loyal to Khomeini were also present, and some assassinations of anti-Khomeini activists were reported. The Turkish authorities reportedly carried out police sweeps of hotels housing Iranian exiles, and increasingly vigilant in apprehending undocumented aliens. Some were reportedly returned to the Iranian border.

In recognition of the deteriorating situation for Iranian asylum seekers, UNHCR announced in October that it would temporarily reinforce its presence in Ankara.

Amnesty International submitted a list of 94 cases of alleged refoulement—forced repatriation—to the authorities for 1984 and 1985. Turkey denies that any asylum applicants have been handed over to Iranian border guards involuntarily.

Last-minute efforts to flee to Western Europe via East Berlin were reportedly foiled in September when Bulgarian authorities refused admission of Iranians across its border with Turkey. Incidents of Turkish border guards firing on Iranian refugees attempting to cross into Greece were also reported.

The borders with Syria, Iran, and Iraq continued to be fortified against the Kurdish insurgency. New border and extradition agreements were signed with Syria during the year, and Kurdish villages were reportedly cleared from border areas and replaced by fences and floodlights.

A campaign by Bulgaria during 1985 and 1986 to assimilate its Turkish minority resulted in some refugee movement into Turkey. As of August, Turkey reported receiving 110 refugees from Eastern Europe and Greece during the year.

About 5,000 Turkish-speaking Afghan refugees—mostly Kirghiz—have been permanently resettled since 1981. Another 300,000 Afghan refugees in Pakistan, mostly Uzbek and Turkmen tribespeople have reportedly applied for resettlement with the Turkish embassy in Pakistan.

Yemen Arab Republic

An explosion of bloodletting within the ranks of the ruling communist party of the neighboring People's Democratic Republic of Yemen in January resulted in a flood of refugees into the Yemen Arab Republic in 1986.

The January events, which took between 2,000 and 10,000 lives, caused thousands of people to flee the country. About 6,000 foreign nationals fled to Djibouti in the first weeks following the outbreak of violence on January 13. Many Yemenis flocked to the YAR, creating camps near the border. Several unconfirmed border incidents were reported during the year.

In March, the PDRY government announced an amnesty and claimed, in September, that 1,000 exiles had opted to return. However, refugees continued to flee the country throughout the summer. In July, following meetings between PDRY and YAR officials on the subject of repatriation, the U.S. Committee for Refugees contacted the YAR on its asylum policies. The government informed USCR that refugees would not be repatriated against their will. By the end of the year, the YAR government said that more than 30,000 people had entered the country from the PDRY.

NORTH AMERICA

Canada

Canada admitted almost 20,000 refugees in 1985, and preliminary figures indicate that a similar number were resettled in 1986. Southeast Asian refugees numbered about 6,000 and Eastern Europeans were an additional 5,400. Refugees from Latin America, primarily El Salvador and Guatemala, totalled 4,500 in 1986 and Africans 1,100.

Canada admits refugees under three categories. "Convention" refugees are those who meet the UN definition of refugee as spelled out in its convention and protocol. "Designated class" immigrants are those in refugee-like situations who do not necessarily meet the UN definition. The third category consists of beneficiaries of special humanitarian programs. In 1986, this included about 2,200 people from El Salvador, Guatemala, Lebanon, Iran, and Sri Lanka.

In August 1986, 155 Tamil refugees from Sri Lanka were found drifting in two small boats off the coast of Newfoundland. Although they were granted one-year permits to remain in Canada until a final decision is reached on their refugee status, their arrival touched off a heated debate as to whether these were true refugees or merely "queue-jumpers" trying to circumvent the overseas admissions process. The Tamils had admitted to paying thousands of dollars each for transport from West Germany, where they had already registered for asylum.

From April to November 1986, Canada granted refugee status to 973 people who applied for asylum after arriving in the country. Facing a backlog of asylum cases that had grown to more than 22,000 as of May, the government has proposed to establish a more streamlined refugee determination system. Among other changes, the new system will establish a special board to deal exclusively with refugee claims, and may cut the asylum process from a two-to-three-year period to four months.

In May 1986, the Canadian government began an administrative review of the backlogged asylum cases. By the end of the year, more than 7,800 had been granted permanent resident status.

Some humanitarian organizations in Canada, while applauding positive aspects of the new system, have expressed concern that four groups will be denied access to the determination system: those with refugee status in another country, those who have exceeded the time limit for making an asylum claim, those who have been previously denied refugee status in Canada, and those with removal orders from Canada.

Under the proposed new system, an applicant whose refugee claim is denied can appeal to the federal court. A number of Canadian church and human rights groups contend that the federal court system lacks the expertise to assess the credibility of a refugee claim.

On November 13, 1986, the people of Canada were awarded the Nansen Medal for "outstanding achievements attained in favor of refugees," marking the first time that a country, rather than an individual, has been selected for the award.

Canada's 1987 annual plan for resettlement allocates 12,000 places for government-assisted refugee resettlement. For planning purposes, the government estimates about 5,000 refugees will be admitted through private sponsorships, and an additional 5,000 to 8,000 people will enter through special humanitarian programs. The number of immigrants will increase from 115,000 to 125,000.

[In February 1987, responding to increased flows of refugee claimants entering from the United States, Canada cancelled the blanket policy which had allowed certain asylum seekers one year residence.]

United States

Though refugee admissions from abroad continued to decline, the United States remained the world's leading country of refugee resettlement as well as the leading contributor to international refugee assistance. More than a million refugees have been resettled in the United States since 1975, nearly three-quarters of them from Southeast Asia. In fiscal year 1986, 62,450 refugees arrived in the United States; this fell short of the government's refugee admission ceiling of 67,000. The dip in refugee admissions relative to the worldwide ceiling was attributed to budget cutting to reduce the federal deficit.

From the admission of 71,113 refugees in 1984 and of 68,045 in 1985, the 1986 admission of 62,450 refugees continued a three-year downward trend in overseas refugee admissions.

On the other hand, despite the declining trend in admissions, the United States announced an admission ceiling of 70,000 for fiscal year 1987, the first increase since 1980.

The year started with Vietnam's suspension of the Orderly Departure Program, the sole mechanism for legal emigration from Vietnam. Despite the suspension of ODP interviewing, actual ODP admissions met the ceiling of 8,500, using the backlog of people approved, but not yet processed for admission to the United States. Efforts by either the United States or Vietnam to restart the program appeared minimal.

Efforts to admit Cuban refugees were similarly frustrated due to the abrogation of an immigration accord between Cuba and the United States that would have allowed 3,000 political prisoners to be released to the United States. Despite the continued impasse on the immigration issue, 69 former political prisoners and their families were released to the United States in September. The total of 173 refugee admissions fell far short of the original 1986 regional ceiling of 3,000. Not a single non-Cuban refugee from Central America, South America, or the Caribbean was processed for admission to the United States during the year.

The Statue of Liberty centennial focused national attention on America's receptivity to immigrants and refugees. The image of "tempest toss't" Haitian boat people "yearning to breathe free" marked a dramatic counterpoint to the national celebration. The fall of the Duvalier regime in February after 30 years of dictatorial rule in Haiti, was greeted with a mixture of hope and fear. Uncertainty about the country's future led to a renewed boat exodus. The U.S. Coast Guard interdicted 3,405 Haitians through August 20, the highest annual figure since the interdiction policy began in 1981. Only two Haitian boat people have been permitted to enter the United States to plea for political asylum since the interdiction program began. Since that time, more than 9,000 others have been returned to Haiti.

The July 4th celebration also brought national attention to discrepancies in U.S. asylum practices. Haitians, Guatemalans, and Salvadorans continued to be denied asylum at rates far higher than for nationals of countries considered to be unfriendly to the United States. Some 30,000 Salvadorans have been returned to El Salvador since the increase of political violence in 1980 and the consequent stepped up migration.

Concern about the fate of undocumented Central Americans resulted in a legislative initiative that would temporarily suspend detention and deportation of Salvadorans and Nicaraguans. Passed by the House of Representatives as an amendment to the immigration reform bill, the provision did not survive in the final Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986. The new act did include an amnesty provision that could allow 1.4 to 2 million undocumented aliens to become legal residents. More than 30,000 Haitians became eligible to apply for permanent resident status.

The sanctuary movement, which began as an initiative by local religious congregations throughout the country to provide sanctuary and assistance to undocumented Salvadorans and Guatemalans, expanded in 1986 to include 22 city councils and one state legislature. Those active in the sanctuary movement have stated that they are acting upon their religious beliefs and in accordance with international and U.S. refugee law, but the U.S. government has insisted that they are simply guilty of smuggling and harboring undocumented aliens. In May, six persons involved in the sanctuary movement in Tucson, Arizona were convicted on charges of conspiracy to smuggle undocumented aliens into the United States.

Another controversial U.S. policy area affecting refugees has been assistance to forces in various parts of the world fighting against governments the United States opposes. Aid to Afghan, Nicaraguan, Angolan, and Cambodian resistance forces—all situations involving significant numbers of refugees—has been sometimes overt, sometimes covert, sometimes military, sometimes "nonlethal and humanitarian." Aid to each of these groups has aroused concern, different in each situation, about its effect on the security of refugees.

DIRECTORY OF ORGANIZATIONS

The following are selected international, governmental, and private U.S. organizations providing information about or assistance for refugees. Descriptions are generally provided by the agencies themselves.

International Organizations

Amnesty International, 1 Easton St., London WCIX 8 DJ, United Kingdom. Secretary General: Ian Martin. U.S. Section: 322 8th Ave., New York, NY 10001. Executive Director: John G. Healey.

International human rights organization working for the release of prisoners of conscience, for fair and prompt trials for all political prisoners, and to abolish torture and executions worldwide. Provides information for political asylum applications and opposes refoulement of persons who might reasonably be expected to be imprisoned as prisoners of conscience, tortured, or killed. Publishes annual report, newsletter, and country and special reports on worldwide human rights conditions.

Centre for Documentation on Refugees (CDR), 5-7 av. de la Paix 1202 Geneva, Switzerland. Telephone: (022) 310-261. Head of the CDR: Hans Thoolen.

Computer-based documentation center which gathers, stores, and disseminates information on all aspects of refugee protection, reception, resettlement, and integration. The center forms part of UNHCR, but also serves outside users. Reading room and computer files available through staff. Publisher of quarterly *REFUGEE ABSTRACTS* and ad hoc bibliographies.

Human Rights Internet, 1502 Ogden St. NW, Washington, DC 20010. (202) 543-9200. Executive Director: Laurie S. Wiseberg.

An international communications network and clearinghouse which serves the information needs of the human rights community: scholars, activists, and policymakers concerned with the promotion and protection of internationally recognized human rights. Publishes *Human Rights Internet Reporter*, a comprehensive reference work on humanitarian activity worldwide.

Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM), 17, route des Morillons, P.O. Box 71, CH-1211 Geneva 19, Switzerland. (Telephone: (022) 980-066) Director General: James Carlin. Representatives: New York—Richard Scott, 60 E. 42nd St., Suite 2122, New York, NY 10165. (212) 599-0440; California—James Gildea, 2173 Francisco Blvd., Suite D, San Rafael, CA 94901 (415) 459-8035; Washington—Gretchen S. Bolton, 440 National Press Blvd., 1319 F St. NW, Suite 820, Washington, DC 20004. (202) 393-2904.

Established in 1951 to arrange resettlement processing and transportation for refugees and migrants. Conducts related programs for medical screening, language training, and cultural orientation. Plans and implements programs for the transfer of specialized human resources through migration to developing countries. Organizes biennial international seminars on major migration themes. Represented in forty countries worldwide.

International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), 37-39 rue de Vermont, Case postale 96, CH-1211 Geneva 20 CIC, Switzerland. Secretary General: Dr. Elizabeth Winkler. President: Mr. Edouard De Brandt. In the U.S., 1319 F St. NW, Suite 820, Washington, DC 20004.

Links Catholic assistance agencies in both first asylum and refugee resettlement countries, providing logistical and sometimes financial support for their emigration processing activities. Since 1951, has administered a series of travel loan funds for refugees and migrants. Acts as Joint Voluntary Agency Representative in six countries. Administers the U.S. component of the Orderly Departure Program. Promotes local settlement activities through project assistance and training of refugee officers.

International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), 17 Avenue de la Paix, CH-1202 Geneva, Switzerland. Delegations in 36 countries. In the U.S., 780 Third Avenue, 28th Floor, New York, NY 10017. President: Alexandre Hay.

Founder of the Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, promotes international humanitarian law. A Swiss, independent, neutral, humanitarian organization with the internationally recognized role of intermediary between belligerants during armed conflicts. Provides legal protection and material assistance to military and civilian victims of those conflicts, including medical aid, relief supplies, a tracing and information agency for prisoners of war and missing persons, a service for transmission of family messages and visits to civilian internees and prisoners of war.

International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), 13 Rue Gautier, 1201 Geneva, Switzerland. (022) 316-602 (Cable: VOLAG (Geneva), Telex: 22891 icva ch). Executive Director: Anthony Kozlowski.

Founded in 1962 to provide a forum for voluntary agencies active in the fields of humanitarian assistance and development cooperation. At present, has 79 members comprising international and national voluntary agencies.

League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies, 17 chemin des Crets, P.O. Box 372, CH-1211 Geneva 19, Switzerland. (Telephone: (022) 345-580 Telex 22555 lrcs ch) Secretary-General: Hans Hoegh.

Coordinates international Red Cross relief actions on behalf of refugees and displaced persons and in other emergency situations.

Minority Rights Group, 29 Craven St., London WC2N 5NT, U.K. (01) 930-6659. Director: Ben Whitaker. New York Branch: Sue Roff, 35 Claremont Ave., Suite 4S, New York, NY 10027. (212) 864-7986.

International human rights information and education body. Publishes reports on minority groups worldwide. Free list of reports and activities available.

Relief and Development Institute, Ferdinand Place, London NWI 8EE, U.K. (Telephone: (01) 485-0944, Telex: DISINST 21879) Director: Edward Clay; Deputy Director: Christine Hogg; Research Director: Frances D'Souza.

Researches all aspects of disaster relief and management, including refugee communities. Runs workshops, briefing and training courses for field staff, and acts as an information center. Also publishes reports; the quarterly newsletter, *IDI News*; and the quarterly journal, *Disasters*.

Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Palais de Nations, 1211 Geneva 10, Switzerland. High Commissioner: Jean-Pierre Hocké. UNHCR Branch Office at UN Headquarters, UN Bldg., New York, NY 10017. (212) 754-2194 or 6200. Regional Representative: Mr. Antoine Noel. UNHCR Liaison Office, 1718 Connecticut Ave. NW, Suite 200, Washington, DC 20009. (202) 387-8546. Head of Liaison Office: Mr. Joachim Henkel.

Established in 1951 to provide international protection to refugees who fall within the scope of its statute and to seek durable solutions for the problems of refugees. Also coordinates assistance programs for displaced persons in accordance with various subsequent General Assembly resolutions. Representation in some 90 countries.

United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), 3 UN Plaza, New York, NY 10017. (212) 415-8000. Executive Director: James Grant.

Since 1946, has cooperated with developing countries in providing child assistance programs involving nutrition, primary health care, water and sanitation, and education. Provides humanitarian assistance to emergency victims of natural and man-made disasters.

United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East (UNRWA), Vienna International Centre, PO Box 700 A 1400, Vienna, Austria. Commissioner-General: Giorgio Giacomelli. New York Liaison Office: Robert Gallagher, UN Bldg., Rm. DC2-0550, New York, NY 10017. (212) 754-2255.

Since 1950, has provided assistance to registered Palestinian refugees, now numbering more than two million, in Lebanon, Jordan, Syria, and the occupied territories of the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Offers basic health and relief services to eligible refugees, and education to children up to the lower secondary level as well as vocational and teacher training at eight centers. Also provides emergency relief services to Palestine refugees displaced by war and violence, as it has been doing continuously since 1982 in Lebanon.

World Food Program (WFP), Via delle Terme di Caracalala, 00100 Rome, Italy. Executive Director: Mr. James C. Ingram. (Telephone: 06-57971).

The largest development assistance body in the United Nations System, WFP became operational in 1963 to provide food aid for long-term development and emergency relief. The governing body, the Committee on Food Aid Policies and Programmes, is comprised of 30 member states of the United Nations. The Program's Secretariat is located in Rome; professional field officers in 83 developing countries.

U.S. Government Offices

Department of Education, Office of Bilingual Education and Minority Language Affairs, Transition Program for Refugee Children, Division of State and Local Programs, 400 Maryland Ave. SW, Rm. 421, Reporters Building, Washington, DC 20202. (202) 872-1842. Senior Program Officer: Jonathan H. Chang.

Administers federal grants to states for educational services to refugee and entrant children in public and private (nonprofit) local schools.

Department of Health and Human Services, Office of Refugee Resettlement, 330 C St. SW, Room 1229, Washington, DC 20201. (202) 245-0418. Director: Philip Hawkes.

Provides assistance to refugees after initial placements in U.S. communities with federal funding through existing federal programs which are administered by states.

Department of Justice, Immigration and Naturalization Service, 425 Eye St. NW, Washington, DC 20536. (202) 633-2000. Commissioner: Alan C. Nelson.

Administers immigration and naturalization laws relating to the admission, exclusion, deportation, and naturalization of aliens.

Department of State, Bureau for Refugee Programs, Room 5214, 2201 C St. NW, Washington, DC 20520. (202) 647-5822. Acting Director: Robert L. Funseth.

Formulates policy for and directs U.S. refugee and migration programs; assists refugees abroad and during reception and placement in the U.S.

House Judiciary Committee, 2137 Rayburn House Office Building, Washington, DC 20515. (202) 225-3951. Chairman: Peter W. Rodino, Jr.; Subcommittee on Immigration, Refugees, and International Law Chairman: Romano L. Mazzoli.

Studies and makes recommendations on immigration and naturalization, citizenship, admission of refugees, treaties and international agreements, and other appropriate matters.

Office of the U.S. Coordinator for Refugee Affairs, Department of State, (S/R) Rm. 7526, 2201 C St. NW, Washington, DC 20520. (202) 647-3964. U.S. Coordinator for Refugees: Jonathan Moore.

Coordinates the development and implementation of the international and domestic refugee policies of the U.S. government.

Refugee Materials Center, U.S. Department of Education, 10220 N. Executive Hills Blvd., 9th Floor, Kansas City, MO 64153. (816) 374-2276.

Provides bibliographies and free educational and resettlement materials concerning refugees and immigrants.

Senate Judiciary Committee, 224 Dirksen Senate Office Bldg., Washington, DC 20510. (202) 224-5225. Chairman: Joseph Biden; Subcommittee on Immigration and Refugee Policy Chairman: Theodore Kennedy.

Studies and makes recommendations on the problems of refugees; has jurisdiction over immigration and naturalization legislation.

U.S. Resettlement Agencies

Following are selected U.S. voluntary agencies that participate in programs to resettle refugees. Readers may contact such agencies for information on sponsorship.

American Council for Nationalities Service, 95 Madison Ave., New York, NY 10016. (212) 532-5858. Executive Director: Wells C. Klein.

Since 1975, actively engaged in the resettlement of refugees and entrants from Indochina, Cuba, Afghanistan, Czechoslovakia, Ethiopia, and other African countries. The U.S. Committee for Refugees is an ACNS public information program (see separate entry). ACNS publications include *Refugee Reports*, a monthly newsletter covering all aspects of refugee resettlement.

American Fund for Czechoslovak Refugees, Inc., 1776 Broadway, Room 2105, New York, NY 10019. (212) 265-1919. President: Dr. Jan Papanek.

Organized in 1948 to help resettle Czechoslovak and Central and Eastern European refugees. Since 1975, AFCR has participated in the resettlement of Indochinese refugees.

Buddhist Council for Refugee Rescue and Resettlement, City of 10,000 Buddhas, Box 217, Talmage, CA 95481. (707) 468-9155. Executive Director: Heng Shun.

Composed of Buddhist organizations and Asian-American civic associations in the U.S. Resettles Indochinese refugees and operates an English language and acculturation training program for newly arrived refugees.

Church World Service/Immigration and Refugee Program, 475 Riverside Dr., New York, NY 10115. (212) 870-2164. Director: Dale S. de Haan.

Relief and development arm of the National Council of Churches. Provides refugee and first-asylum services in the U.S. and responds to human need around the world. Works closely with regional ecumenical colleague agencies, including the World Council of Churches.

Hebrew Immigrant Aid Society, Inc. (HIAS), 200 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10003. (212) 674-6800. Executive Vice President: Karl D. Zukerman.

The refugee and migration agency of the organized American Jewish community. Assists Jewish refugees and migrants from Eastern Europe, Middle East, North Africa, and elsewhere. Also assists Indochinese, Ethiopian, Afghan, and other non-Jewish refugees through programs in cooperation with the U.S. government. Global network of offices and affiliated organizations in 47 countries on six continents. Provides for premigration planning, visa documentation, reception, transport, etc.

International Rescue Committee, 386 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10016. (212) 679-0010. Executive Director: Robert P. DeVecchi.

Nonsectarian, nonpartisan voluntary agency providing medical, public health, education, emergency relief, and resettlement services for refugees and displaced victims of war.

Lutheran Immigration and Refugee Service/Lutheran Council in the U.S.A., 360 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10010. (212) 532-6350. Director: The Rev. Dr. Donald H. Larsen.

Provides a full range of services to refugees and their sponsors from pre-arrival through initial resettlement, with a nationwide network of local offices, congregations, and community groups. Also provides immigration counseling. Since World War II, has resettled refugees from Eastern Europe, Indochina, Latin America, the Caribbean, the Middle East, and Africa on behalf of Lutheran church bodies in the U.S.

Migration and Refugee Services (MRS), United States Catholic Conference, 1312 Massachusetts Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 659-6618. Executive Director: Rev. Nicholas DiMarzio.

Responsible for all immigrant, migrant, and refugee activities conducted by the Catholic Church in the U.S. Coordinates a national network of more than 180 diocesan refugee resettlement offices and 40 local immigration offices. Works with public and private sector agencies to resettle and help assimilate individuals and families in American society.

The Presiding Bishop's Fund For World Relief/Episcopal Church, 815 Second Ave., New York, NY 10017. (212) 687-9454 or 55. Executive Director: The Reverend Canon Samir J. Habiby, D.D.; Assistant Director for Migration Affairs: Marion M. Dawson (Mrs. Robert J.)

Official channel through which the Episcopal Church responds to human need around the world, providing funding for Episcopal, Anglican, and ecumenical projects in relief, rehabilitation, development, and refugee migration. Conducts a program for refugee resettlement in the U.S. through Episcopal dioceses.

Tolstoy Foundation, Inc., 250 W. 57th St., Suite 1101, New York, NY 10107-0144. (212) 247-2922. Executive Director: Leon O. Marion.

Founded in 1939 to assist Russian refugees. Scope has broadened to assist other refugees. Has a cultural center and field and regional offices in the U.S., operational offices in Europe and Latin America, and correspondents in the Middle East.

World Relief/Refugee Services Division: National Association of Evangelicals, P.O. Box WRC, Nyack, NY 10960. (914) 268-4135. Program Director for Domestic Ministries and Refugee Resettlement Division: Dennis Ripley.

Provides comprehensive refugee services through an international network of offices, including both regional and satellite offices in the U.S. Overseas, provides relief and development assistance in countries of first asylum. Domestically, assists sponsoring churches, community groups, families, and individuals from prearrival through initial resettlement of Indochinese, Afghan, African, and Eastern European refugees. Provides ongoing services to Cuban and Haitian entrants, other refugee communities, and ethnic churches. Coordinates other refugee-related services in some localities.

U.S. Aid & Information Organizations

Following are selected U.S. voluntary agencies and human rights and educational organizations that provide assistance to or information about refugees.

Afghan Community in America, 139-15 95th Ave., Jamaica, NY 11435 (212) 658-3737. Chairman: Habib Mayar.

Provides nonmilitary assistance to those made needy by the present war in Afghanistan. Solicits contributions and gifts of any kind.

Afghanistan Relief Committee, Inc., 345 Park Ave., Suite 4100, New York, NY 10154. (212) 355-2931. Executive Director: Jenik Radon.

Provides charitable, educational, humanitarian, and benevolent assistance to the people of Afghanistan wherever they are located, either directly or through organizations with similar purposes. Solicits funds and in-kind medical donations.

Africare, Inc., 440 R St. NW, Washington, DC 20001. (202) 462-3164. Executive Director: C. Payne Lucas.

Dedicated to improving the quality of life in rural Africa through the development of water resources, increased food production, the delivery of health services, and refugee assistance. Currently operates more than 220 programs in Africa and many development education programs in the United States. Refugee programs currently in East, Southern, and Francophone Africa.

Aid for Afghan Refugees (AFAR), 450 Hudson St., Oakland, CA 94618. (415) 658-4675. Executive Director: Winkie Campbell-Notar.

Founded in 1980 by Afghans and Americans. Raises funds for humanitarian aid for refugees in Pakistan; promotes public awareness of Afghanistan and refugees' situation; supports refugee community projects locally.

Alien Rights Law Project, 1400 Eye St. NW, Suite 450, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 682-5900. Director: Carolyn Waller.

Begun in 1978 by the Washington Lawyer's Committee for Civil Rights under Law, the project provides legal assistance to aliens, focusing on asylum and refugee issues as well as those cases where aliens suffer discrimination or are deprived of civil rights because of immigration status.

American Council for Voluntary International Action (InterAction), 200 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10003. (212) 777-8210. Washington, DC Office—2101 L St. NW, Suite 916, Washington, DC 20037. (202) 822-8429. President, Chief Executive Officer: Peter J. Davies. Director, Washington Office: Dr. Christine Burbach. Program Officer, Committee on Migration and Refugee Affairs (New York Office): Serge Duss.

InterAction is a broadly based, participatory association of 108 U.S. private and voluntary organizations working in international development, relief and reconstruction, migration, refugee assistance and resettlement, public policy and federal relations, and education on Third World issues. Member agencies participate in any or all of six working committees: Development Assistance, Migration and Refugee Affairs, Resources, Public Policy, Development Education, and Private Funding.

American Friends Service Committee, 1501 Cherry St., Philadelphia, PA 19102. (215) 241-7000. Executive Secretary: Asia Bennett.

Quaker organization that provides food, shelter, and supplies, especially in response to needs created by war, disaster, gross violations of human rights, where provisions of relief may lead to constructive community development. Advocacy for refugees in the United States.

American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, Inc., 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017. (212) 687-6200. Executive Vice President: Ralph I. Goldman.

Established in 1914, serves as the overseas arm of the organized American Jewish community and provides for the rescue, relief, and rehabilitation of Jewish communities around the world. Current programs in more than 30 countries are largely funded by the campaigns of the United Jewish Appeal. Nonsectarian activities have benefitted people in El Salvador, Mexico, Colombia, Ethiopia, Cambodia, Italy, and elsewhere.

American Jewish Philanthropic Fund, 386 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10016. (212) 679-0010. President: Charles J. Tanenbaum.

Provides relief, resettlement, and retraining services to Jewish refugees in Europe and the U.S. through programs administered by the International Rescue Committee.

American National Red Cross, 17th & D Sts. NW, Washington, DC 20006. (202) 737-8300. President: Richard F. Schubert. International Social Services Unit: Mary-Lou McCutcheon (202) 639-3308.

Assists refugees in cooperation with National Red Cross Societies, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the League of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies. Assists refugees in locating missing family members through its international tracing service. Also provides guidance and assistance in reuniting refugee families.

American Refugee Committee, Headquarters: 2344 Nicollet Ave., Rm. 350, Minneapolis, MN 55404. (612) 872-7060. Chicago Office: 317 Howard St., Evanston, IL 60202. Executive Director: Ronald L. Way.

Internationally, provides medical volunteers for refugee camps in Thailand and Sudan, East Africa, to provide direct care, medical training, and nutritional feeding for Indochinese and Ethiopian refugees and other famine victims. In U.S., provides resettlement assistance nurse-training for refugees, utilizing returned medical volunteers as instructors; training in English; training of mental health personnel working with refugees.

CARE, 660 First Ave., New York, NY 10016. (212) 686-3110. Executive Director: Dr. Philip Johnston.

An international aid and self-help development organization. Responds to the needs of refugees and displaced persons in emergency situations through the development of effective delivery systems to facilitate the distribution of food and other aid. Also implements long-term development programs in health and nutrition education and natural resource management to improve living conditions and facilitate self-sufficiency among refugees, displaced persons, and repatriates. Has ongoing refugee programs in Rwanda, Somalia, Sudan, and Thailand and programs for the displaced in Chad, Mali, Niger, Sudan, Ethiopia, Mauritania and Mozambique.

Catholic Relief Services—USCC (CRS), 1101 First Ave., New York, NY 10022. (212) 838-4700. Executive Director: Mr. Lawrence A. Pezzullo.

Overseas relief and development agency of the American Catholic community. Active in 70 countries with nutrition, community development, self-sufficiency, emergency relief, refugee aid and rehabilitation projects. Major refugee foci this year are drought-affected Africa, Central America, and Thailand. Works only overseas.

Center for Applied Linguistics, 1118 22nd St., NW, Washington, DC 20037. (202) 429-9292. President: G. Richard Tucker.

Offers refugee education guides, including a bibliography of teaching materials and dictionaries, through the ERIC system's Clearinghouse on Languages and Linguistics. Provides language and cultural orientation information and assistance for a fee. Under a cooperative agreement with the Department of State, CAL operates the Refugee Service Center, with offices in Manila and Washington, DC. The Manila office serves the testing, materials, and information needs of the State Department's intensive training programs in Thailand, Indonesia, the Philippines, Europe, and the Sudan. The Washington office acts as liaison between the overseas programs and U.S. service providers.

Central America Resource Center, Refugee Legal Support Service (RLSS), Box 2327, 600 West 28th St., Austin, Texas 78768. (512) 476-9841. Director: Chula Sims.

Established in 1983, provides political asylum documentation for refugees from all Central American countries. Information is obtained from an extensive human-rights data base of computer-indexed U.S., Central American, and international human-rights reports, newsclipping services, and church and government reports. Documentation reference searches can be by client name, social group, organizational membership, and province or town. Referrals are made to expert witnesses, affiants, and direct service organizations.

Cultural Survival, Inc., 11 Divinity Ave., Cambridge, MA 02138. (617) 495-2562. President: David Maybury-Lewis.

Provides research and analysis concerning the survival of indigenous peoples and ethnic groups. Examines ethnic persecution as cause of refugee flows. Involved in maintaining the land and health care necessary for the survival of threatened groups.

Direct Relief International, 2801-B De La Vina St., P.O. Box 30820, Santa Barbara, CA 93130. (805) 687-3694. Executive Director: Robert K. McGill.

Receives and donates contributions of pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and equipment to assist needy health facilities in medically less developed areas of the world, as well as refugees and other victims of natural disaster and civil strife. Recruits, screens, and arranges assignments for volunteer doctors, nurses, and other medical/dental personnel.

Emergency Relief Fund International, P.O. Box 30820, Santa Barbara, CA 93130. (415) 864-3734. Executive Director: Woody Carter, Jr.

A Bay Area-based agency that relies on volunteer help and individual contributions to alleviate sickness and suffering around the world. Nonsectarian, nonpartisan, with emphasis on medical assistance and aid to children. Current projects in Africa, Central America, and the Middle East.

Eritrean Relief Committee, Inc., 475 Riverside Drive, Rm. 769, New York, NY 10115. (212) 870-2727. Executive Director: Tesfa A. Seyoum.

Founded in 1976, aids Eritreans displaced as a result of war and natural disaster, with major focus on emergency and development project assistance through the Eritrean Relief Association, based in Sudan. Program of assistance includes funds and material aid for food, medicine, shelter, seeds, tools, and the provision on education in food production and agriculture leading to self-sufficiency and health-care.

The Experiment in International Living (EIL). Projects and Grants Division, Kipling Road, Brattleboro, VT 05301. (802) 257-4628. Director: Donald Batchelder.

In cooperation with Save the Children Federation, offers English as a second language, cultural orientation and pre-employment training for Indochinese adults in Galang, Indonesia. In a consortium with SCF and World Education, offers a similar program at Phanat Nikom, Thailand, including preparation for American secondary schools, and native language literacy. Both programs assist refugees in becoming self-sufficient upon their arrival in the U.S. Also provides technical assistance in the form of management training and training for trainers for refugee service providers and government ministries in Somalia and the Sudan, and in a Distance Teaching Program in Somalia for refugee teachers.

Freedom House, 48 East 21 St., New York, NY 10010. (212) 730-7744. Executive Director: Leonard R. Sussman.

Publishes a survey of freedom; monitors compliance with the Helsinki Accords; publishes writing from individuals in countries where there is oppression; and has information and analysis programs on the Caribbean Basin, Central America, Afghanistan, and other countries.

Grassroots International, P.O. Box 312, Cambridge, MA 02139. (617) 497-9180.

Provides humanitarian assistance to third world peoples and social movements as a basis for building awareness and activism among North Americans in support of equity, justice, and peace. Sends funds and material aid to local partner organizations linked to broad-based movements for change in crisis areas—currently South Africa, the Philippines, the Horn of Africa, and the Middle East. All projects supported—in development, emergency food and medical relief etc.—are community-based with emphasis on community organizing and empowerment. Also produces informational and educational resources for domestic use.

Georgetown University Center for Immigration Policy and Refugee Assistance (CIPRA), P.O. Box 2298, Georgetown University, Washington, DC 20057. (202) 625-3545. Director: Fr. Harold Bradley, S.J.

Objective is to influence the choices which will be made in developing a humane, reasonable, and enforcible immigration policy for the U.S. Sponsors lectures, seminars, public meetings on refugee admissions and policy; and educational programs offering internships in refugee assistance and medicine, dental care, and nursing, small business training and leadership development. Tutorial program offers community service to refugees in local school systems. Conducts on-going research on international migration in the Americas.

Holt International Children's Services, Inc. 1195 City View, Box 2880, Eugene, OR 97402. (503) 687-2202. Executive Director: David H. Kim.

An international child caring agency which serves children in Korea, the Philippines, Thailand, India, and Latin America. Works with a number of affiliate agencies in providing a wide range of services to homeless children. Holt's adoption philosophy is 1) re-unite the child with birth parents if possible, 2) place the child with adoptive parents in the country of origin, or 3) if the first two solutions are not possible, provide a permanent home for the child with a family in the United States.

Indochina Resource Action Center (IRAC), 1118 22nd St. NW, Suite 300, Washington, DC 20037. (202) 223-8866. Executive Director: Le Xuan Khoa.

Assists Southeast Asians in the U.S. to make the transition from the status of refugees to a productive Asian-American minority. Major activities include public education and advocacy, leadership and citizenship development, capacity-building for Indochinese self-help organizations, and economic development.

International Social Service—American Branch, 95 Madison Ave., New York, NY 10016 (212) 532-5858. Executive Director, Wells C. Klein. Associate Director, Sidney Talisman.

Established in 1924, liaison between social agencies in U.S. and agencies abroad to resolve on a case-by-case basis problems which derive from international migration and the separation of families by national boundaries. Special emphasis on services and protection for children in migration, inter-country adoption planning, and family reunification, including refugee families. Member of an international structure with General Secretariat in Geneva. Since 1983, affiliated with the American Council for Nationalities Service.

Lawyers Committee for Human Rights, 37 W. 44th St., Room 914, New York, NY 10036. (212) 921-2160. Executive Director: Michael Posner. Deputy Director: Diane Orentlicher. Director, Political Asylum Project: Arthur Helton.

Public interest law center in the fields of international human right and refugee law. Monitors the U.S. government's human rights policy toward countries that receive foreign aid. Works to ensure that persons seeking refuge in the U.S. receive the protections they are guaranteed under the U.S. Constitution and international law. Legal representation for individual asylum applicants provided by volunteer attorneys.

Lutheran World Relief, 360 Park Ave., South, New York, NY 10010. (212) 532-6350. Executive Director: Norman E. Barth.

Serves as the overseas development and relief agency on behalf of most U.S. Lutherans to assist with long-term and emergency help for people, especially in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. Refugee assistance is often channeled through programs of Lutheran World Federation.

Mennonite Central Committee, 21 S. 12th St., Akron, PA 17501. (717) 859-1151. Executive Secretary: John A. Lapp.

Cooperative relief and service agency for Mennonites and brethren in Christ in North America. Provides material aid and development assistance to refugees from man-made and natural disasters. Current work includes assistance to refugees in the Horn of Africa, Central America, Southeast Asia, and Lebanon. Arranges resettlement for refugees in the U.S. and Canada.

National Immigration, Refugee, and Citizenship Forum, 533 8th St. SE, Washington, DC 20003. (202) 544-0004. President: Rick Swartz.

A national, nonprofit, educational organization with a broad multi-institutional and multi-ethnic membership. Mission is to establish positive working relationships among the diverse communities represented by its membership, and to promote the pro-immigrant, pro-refugee philosophy embodied in its statement of principles. By creating and preserving a national atmosphere conducive to and supportive of the migration and full integration of newcomers into our society, helps assure that its diverse membership can best carry out their respective missions.

Operation California, Inc. 7615 1/2 Melrose Ave., Los Angeles, CA 90045. (213) 658-8876. Telex 295252 OPCAUR. Executive Director: Richard Walden.

A nonprofit organization founded in 1979. Objectives are to collect and transport high-priority emergency relief supplies to areas of need. Has been active in Somalia, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kampuchea, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Honduras, Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, Mexico, Lebanon, and Poland.

Oxfam American, 115 Broadway, Boston, MA 02116. (617) 482-1211. Executive Director: John Hammock.

Funds small-scale agricultural and technical assistance projects in Asia, Africa, and Latin America designed to increase self-reliance and promote lasting economic and social development. Also develops educational programs for Americans.

Polish-American Immigration and Relief Committee, 119 East 15th St., New York, NY 10003. (212) 254-2240. Executive Vice President: Janusz Krzyzanowski.

Nonsectarian voluntary agency founded in 1947 to help displaced persons and political refugees. Field offices in Europe. Activities include resettlement, adjustment of status, family reunification, and social services.

Rav Tov, Inc., International Jewish Rescue Organization, 500 Bedford Ave., Brooklyn, NY 11211. (718) 963-1911.

Through its network of overseas offices, provides care and maintenance, medical assistance, visa documentation and pre-migration planning to refugees while in transit. In countries of resettlement, provides a full range of services including reception, housing, medical care, language training, education, employment counseling, and maintenance assistance.

Refugees International, 220 I Street, NE, Suite 240, Washington, DC 20002. (202) 547-3785. Executive Director: Susan Goodwillie.

Monitors refugee situations worldwide to ensure that refugees' basic needs for protection and care are met. Provides information to policymakers and the public through national membership organization. Advocates fair refugee policy in U.S. and abroad.

Refugee Policy Group (RPG), 1424 16th St. NW, Suite 401, Washington, D.C 20036. (202) 387-3015. Executive Director: Dennis Gallagher.

Serves as an independent center of policy analysis and research on domestic and international refugee issues. Houses a refugee resource library and provides auspices for policy analysts, researchers, and program developers to meet and conduct their work.

Refugee Women in Development (RefWID), 20 F Street NW, Fourth Floor, Washington, DC 20001. (202) 628-9600. Executive Director: Sima Wali.

The only national organization established specifically to promote the self-sufficiency and economic development of refugee women in the United States. Priorities include: organizing newcoming refugee women around economic development and self-sufficiency efforts; developing materials for use in refugee women's self-help efforts; developing leadership and information exchange among refugee women of diverse ethnic origins; promoting better understanding of refugee women's needs and resources among policy makers, mainstream organizations, and refugee program operators.

The Salvation Army World Service Office (SAWSO), 1025 Vermont Ave. NW, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 737-3330. Executive Director: Dean B. Seiler.

As a development arm of The Salvation Army, provides technical and financial assistance in support of self-help, relief, and training programs. Assistance, including aid to disaster victims, refugees, and displaced persons, is available to the 89 countries and territories in which The Salvation Army operates, focusing on approximately 50 of those which are developing countries.

Save the Children Federation, Inc., 54 Wilton Rd., Westport, CT 06880. (203) 226-7272. President: David L. Guyer.

Founded in 1932, serves children through community development in 46 countries. In its refugee programs, provides humanitarian assistance with an emphasis on making refugees self-sufficient and providing a base on which long-term development can take place. Agriculture, nutrition, health care, sanitation, education, and income generation are program components in Somalia, Zambia, Zimbabwe, Sudan and Pakistan. Training in literacy, language, cultural orientation, employment skills, and secondary and primary education are program components in Thailand and Indonesia.

Technical Assistance Information Clearing House (TAICH), American Council of Voluntary International Action (Interaction), 200 Park Ave. South, New York, NY 10003. (212) 777-8210.

Through its Migration and Refugee Affairs Committee, provides a forum for exchange of information and coordination among its member agencies engaged in U.S. refugee resettlement. Focuses on the needs of refugees and is concerned with protecting the rights of displaced persons and refugees everywhere. Maintains close links with international and government agencies concerned with refugee issues.

United Lithuanian Relief Fund of America, Inc., 2558 W. 69th St., Chicago, IL 60629. (312) 776-7582. President: Mary P. Rudis.

Nonsectarian voluntary agency founded in 1944 to help political refugees and displaced persons. Provides immigrant relief, resettlement, rehabilitation and social welfare services, educational aid, community service, and counseling assistance.

U.S. Committee for Refugees, 815 15th St. NW, Washington, DC 20005. (202) 667-0782. Executive Director: Wells Klein; Director: Roger P. Winter.

Public information and advocacy program of the American Council for Nationalities Service. Issues publications and provides information about refugees worldwide. Participates actively as refugee advocate in development of U.S. policy with respect to refugees in U.S. and abroad. Supports specialized UN agencies working to alleviate world refugee programs.

U.S. Committee for Somali Refugee Relief, Inc., 1900 L St. NW, Suite 707, Washington, DC 20036. (202) 833-8542. Director: Martin R. Ganzglass.

Formed in 1979, major goals are to raise money to provide medicine and related medical supplies to refugees in Somalia and publicize the plight of refugees there.

U.S. Committee for UNICEF, 331 E. 38th St., New York, NY 10016. (212) 686-5522. President: Lawrence E. Bruce, Jr.

Established in 1947, the oldest and largest of 34 national committees for UNICEF. The committee informs Americans about UNICEF's efforts to meet the needs of the developing world's children and their mothers in the areas of nutrition, primary health care, clean water and sanitation, education, social services, and emergency relief and rehabilitation. Raises funds for UNICEF through greeting card sales, group fund-raising events, direct contributions, and special events.

World Concern International, PO Box 33000, 19303 Fremont Ave. North, Seattle, WA 98133. (206) 546-7201. President: Charles Morton.

Provides emergency relief and long-term development assistance to refugees in Asia, Africa, and the Americas. Provides financial grants, emergency supplies, medical teams, public health workers, and economic development assistance. Can respond quickly to developing situations.

World Vision Inc., 919 W. Huntington Dr., Monrovia, CA 91016. (213) 357-7979. President: Dr. Ted W. Engstrom.

Founded in 1950, a Christian humanitarian organization active in 85 countries of Africa, Asia, Latin America, the South Pacific, and the U.S. Involved chiefly in community development, emergency relief, child care, and Christian outreach programs.

YMCA Refugee Resettlement Services, YMCA of the USA, 101 N. Wacker Dr., Chicago, Ill. 60606. (312) 977-0031. Director: Michael Diamond.

Coordinates YMCA services for refugees in the United States. Acts as liaison for local U.S. YMCAs and World Alliance of YMCAs. Cooperates with other national voluntary agencies and appropriate government agencies.

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Further information about the world refugee situation may be obtained from:

U.S. Committee for Refugees, 95 Madison Ave., New York, NY 10016 (212) 532-5858; or 815 15th St. NW, Suite 610, Washington, DC 20005 (202) 667-0782; or from one of the following local agencies affiliated with the American Council for Nationalities Service.

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Akron, OH 44310
(216) 376-5106

ALBANY
International Center of the Capital Region
West Mall Office Plaza
875 Central Avenue
Albany, NY 12206
(518) 459-8812

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American Civic Association
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Binghamton, NY 13905
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International Institute of Boston
287 Commonwealth Avenue
Boston, MA 02115
(617) 536-1081

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Bridgeport, CT 06605
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Buffalo, NY 14209
(716) 883-1900

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Travelers and Immigrants Aid of Chicago
327 South LaSalle Street
Chicago, IL 60604
(312) 435-4500

CINCINNATI
Travelers Aid-Int'l Inst. of Cincinnati
632 Vine Street, Suite 505
Cincinnati, OH 45202
(513) 721-7660

CLEVELAND
The Nationalities Service Center
The Price Building
1715 Euclid Avenue
Cleveland, OH 44115
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Detroit, MI 48202
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Erie, PA 16512
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720 North King Street
Honolulu, Hawaii 96817
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YMCA International Service
YMCA of the Greater Houston Area
2903 W. Dallas Street
Houston, TX 77019
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Manchester, NH 03102
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Philadelphia, PA 19107
(215) 893-8400

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St. Paul, MN 55108
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International Institute of San Francisco
2209 Van Ness Avenue
San Francisco, CA 94109
(415) 673-1720

SANTA ROSA
Indochinese-American Council
709 Davis, Room 204
Santa Rosa, CA 95401
(707) 542-3773

TOLEDO
International Institute of Toledo
2040 Scottwood Avenue
Toledo, OH 43620
(419) 241-9178

WASHINGTON, DC
Travelers Aid Society of Washington, DC
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Washington, DC 20005
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